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As the world contends with an energy shortage,the development of alternativesources of energy has become a criticalproblem.Nuclearpoweris
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sociated with the use of nuclearpower is the important question of nuclear
waste disposal. In this article, Messrs. Shields and Spector discuss the nuclearfuel cycle, bring together a survey of how countries aroundthe world
are dealing with the question ofnuclear waste disposalboth domestically and
on an internationallevel, andmake suggestionsfora more aggressiveinternationalregulation of nuclear waste disposal.

The common threat posed to the economies of the United States,
Western Europe, and Japan by the monopoly power of the oil exporting nations is one of the most deeply etched realities of the Seventies.
During 1978, imported oil accounted for 50.1% of energy consumption
in Western Europe, 72.0% in Japan, and 20.5% in the United States.2
The bulk of this oil comes from the Middle East where the OPEC oil
embargo of 1973 and the Iranian revolution of 1979 clearly demonstrated the instability of oil supplies. Added to the political turmoil of
the Middle East is the vulnerability of its oil to interception on the sea
lanes along which oil tankers travel to the West. The strategic folly of
dependence on Middle East oil is accompanied by the detrimental impact of such dependence on our economy and those of our chief trading
partners. Indeed, rapidly escalating oil prices, which between January
1970 and July 1979 jumped over tenfold from $1.80 to $20.00 per barrel,3 are credited as being largely responsible for the long term decline
in the rate of growth of most of the world's economies. 4
Nuclear energy can substitute for foreign oil in the production of
electricity; and, in nations lacking untapped coal or hydroelectric resources such as Japan and those in Western Europe, it is often the only
attractive alternative to oil. At the current price of oil, it is less expensive to produce electricity by nuclear means than by oil fueled power
plants; and in some settings nuclear generating costs are less than the
costs of coal plants. 5 The Department of Energy projects that this disparity will continue to grow.6
For these reasons, the industrialized countries of the West have
turned their hopes increasingly to the use of nuclear energy for electric
Faltmeyer, Burying Nuclear Trash Where It Will Stay Put, FORTUNE, March 26, 1979, at 98;
Feates, Nuclear Power and Radioactive Waste Management, 19 CONTEMP. PHYS. 531-542 (1978,
No. 6.); Nathanson, InternationalManagement of Radioactive Wastes, 5 ENVT'L AFF. 363-80
(Spring 1976). For an excellent discussion of transnational pollution, see Handl, TerritorialSovereignty and the Problem of Transnat'lPollution, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 50 (Jan. 1975).
2 BRITISH PETROLEUM, LTD.,

BP STATISTICAL REVIEW

OF THE WORLD OIL INDUSTRY

10, 16

(1978).
3 See The Next Blowfrom OPEC,NEWSWEEK, June 25, 1979, at 33-34.
4 Id

5 See Halloran, Nuclear Energy Confusion, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1979, § 3 (Finance), at 17,
col. 1 (city ed.).
6 Id
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power generation.7 Until the recent slowdown in nuclear power development, it had been widely estimated that by the mid-eighties nuclear
power would provide 20% of all electricity in the United States, Great
Britain, and Japan; 30% of the electricity in Sweden and Switzerland;
and 50% of the electricity in France and West Germany' with addi-

tional major growth in nuclear power use projected through the end of
the century. Finland, Spain, Belgium, Italy, Brazil, India and Canada

are also launched on major nuclear power programs.9

The increasing use of nuclear power has given rise to many diffi-

cult health, safety and strategic problems.' 0 This article deals with one
of those problems-the disposal of radioactive wastes generated during
nuclear power production.
In their efforts to obtain a measure of energy independence, the
advanced industrialized countries have failed in several important
ways to deal effectively with the long-term hazard posed by these

materials. Indeed, no country has yet developed a proven and widelyaccepted solution to the disposal of these wastes, a failure which, along
with other factors, has caused several important set-backs of government programs to develop nuclear power."
Austria's first nuclear power plant at Zwetendorf, for example, has
never operated. 12 It stands idle as a result of a referendum in November 1978 in which voters acted to prevent the plant's operation because

no clear method for the disposal of its waste was in hand. 13 In Sweden,
a 1977 law prohibiting construction or operation of any new reactors
unless plans are provided for the absolutely safe disposal of their
wastes has prevented operation of two fully-constructed facilities for
7 See text accompanying notes 74-192 infra.

8 Conversation between Leonard S. Spector and Atomic Industrial Forum Staff (Aug. 1979).
See text at notes 74-192 infra and related footnotes for discussion of projected development of
nuclear generating capacity. But see Britain Plans Nuclear Energy Increase,Washington Post, Oct.

17, 1979 at A9, col. 1. For information on the recent slowdown, see NUCLEONICS WK., July 12,
1979, at 3-4 (NEA predicts that expected nuclear growth for remainder of century has dropped by
38% for OECD countries); Euratom Study Notes EEC Nuclear Slowdown, NUCLEAR FUEL, June

25, 1979 (EEC forecast of nuclear growth down 60% since 1974 estimate); Gorleben HearingsStart
Wi-th Germanyr Nuclear Future Riding On Them, NUCLEONICS WK., Mar. 29, 1979, at 11-12;
Japan Intendsto Slow Its Plansto Increase Nuclear Power Output, Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1979, at 20,

col. 3.
9 Id
See generally FoRD-MITRE STUDY, note 1 supra.
11 See, ag., Enthusiasm about Nuclear Power Turns to Anxiety in West Germany, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 7, 1977, at A8, col. 2 (city ed.); Opposition to Nuclear Power, 4 ENERGY POL'Y 286-307 (Dec.
1976).
12 See NUCLEONICS WK., Nov. 9, 1978, at 4.
13 Ird

10
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nearly a year and delayed construction plans for a number of other
plants. 14
West Germany has also suffered a reactor construction moritorium
because of the lack of an acceptable nuclear waste disposal program. 5
Today, its proposed solution to the waste management problem, the
construction of a major waste repository and processing facility at
Gorleben, is threatened, because of local opposition. 6
In Japan, the shutdown of several operating nuclear power plants

was threatened when difficulties arose in obtaining U.S. approval for
the shipment of spent nuclear fuel from those facilities to processing
plants in England and France. 7 Here in the United States, at least four
states, California, Iowa, Maine, and Wisconsin, have prohibited further

construction of nuclear power plants within their respective borders until an acceptable nuclear waste management program has been developed by the federal government. 8 The legislatures in several other
19
states are scheduled to consider similar action.
Although no ban on the development of additional power reactors
has yet occurred in England or Canada, blue ribbon commissions in
both nations have decried the lack of permanent waste disposal pro-

grams and demanded prompt remedial actions.2" Switzerland narrowly averted a defacto prohibition on further reactor construction in
February 1979 when a referendum in which nuclear waste issues
figured prominently was defeated by a slim 51% margin. 2 '
The disposal of nuclear wastes has thus become an important do-

mestic political issue in the great majority of advanced nations using
14 21 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 24 (summary of Act No. 140, § 2, Apr. 21, 1977); The Swedish Coalition Government HasAgreedto Allow Two Reactors to Be Started, NUCLONICS WK., Oct. 5, 1978,
at 7.
15 GorlebenHearingsStart with Germany's NuclearFuture Riding on Them, NUCLEONICS WK.,
March 29, 1979, at 11-12.
16 See Germany's NuclearProject on the Skids, Energy Daily, May 17, 1979, at 1.
17 See MacLachlan, OnceAgain JapanAsks U.S. ConsentforSpent FuelReprocessing,Energy
Daily, Dec. 15, 1979, at 30; Hearingson Nuclear TransferforReprocessing: Pending Cases, Before
the Subcomm. on Int'l Policy and Trade of the House Coma on Int'l Relations, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as Nuclear Fuel TransferHearings].
18 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE NATION'S NUCLEAR WASTE-PROPOSALS FOR

ORGANIZATION AND SITING 3-6 (EMD-79-77) (June 21, 1979).
19 Id
20 See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, note 1 supra; Mayman, The CanadianProgramforStorage and Disposal of Spent Fuel and High-Level Wastes, in PROCEEDINGS OF IAEA AND NEA
SYMPOSIUM ON MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 49

(IAEA-SM-207/91) (Mar. 1976).
21 See Swiss Referendum NarrowyApproves NuclearProgram,Wall Street J., Feb. 20, 1979, at
10, col. 4; Swiss Reject Curb on Nuclear Power, Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 1979, at A35, col. 1.
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nuclear power.2 2 This universality, seen against the background of
common concerns over energy supply, provides the most compelling
reason for considering the nuclear waste issue from an international
perspective.
It does something of an injustice to public concerns for the safe
disposal of nuclear waste to view the issue simply in terms of its political manifestations. The extreme toxicity and long life of nuclear wastes
pose potentially grave health hazards unless these materials are cared
for properly. While the health- and environment-related dangers from
nuclear wastes would, in the first instance, affect the populations of the
countries in which the wastes are generated, they also have an international component because of the risks of transnational pollution and of
the adverse environmental impacts upon global common areas, such as
the high seas and Antartica. One of the key technical problems in permanently disposing of nuclear wastes within geologic formations, for
example, is the risk of ground water contamination, which could affect
drinking water supplies many miles from the repository site. If repositories are located close to national borders (the proposed West German
Gorleben facility is about three miles from East Germany) the possibility of transnational pollution is manifest.3 Pollution of the high seas is
threatened both by transportation accidents, which are increasingly
likely as more and more nations begin shipping used reactor fuel to
other countries for processing or storage, and by deliberate dumping as
a method of waste disposal. Although the 1972 London Convention on
Ocean Dumping2' bans such disposal of the most toxic nuclear wastes,
it expressly permits dumping of lower level nuclear waste. 25 The possibility of waste disposal within the sediments of the ocean floor is still
receiving consideration in a number of countries, including the United
22 See generally Donnelly & Kramer, Evidence of Opposition to Nuclear Power in Europe, reprinted in CONG. RESEARCH Smv., LIB. CONGRESS, REPORT No. 78-210 ENR (Oct. 16, 1978).
This study reviews major events concerning opposition to nuclear power plant development as
reported in Nucleonics Wk., Energy Daily, and Nuclear Eng'r Int'l. The study concludes that
concern about the risks of long-term nuclear waste disposal and the absence of a demonstrated
long-term disposal methodology have been major concerns of those parties in Europe and Japan
opposed to development of nuclear power. See also P. Lewis, All1 Over Europe, the Atoms are
Restless, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1978, at E3, col. 1 (city ed.).
23 Rippon, ProspectsLook Goodfor Gorleben Center, 21 NUCLEAR NEWS 48, 49 (Feb. 1978).
See also Teclaff & Teclaff, Transboundary Ground Water Pollution: Survey and Trends in Treaty
Law, NAT. RESOURCES J. 629, 635 (1979).
24 INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE ON THE CONVENTION ON THE DUMPING OF WASTES

AT SEA, FINAL DOCUMENTS, adopted Nov. 13, 1972 [hereinafter cited as London Convention].
For further discussion of the London Convention, see text accompanying notes 349-56 infra.
25 Id
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States and Britain.2 6 In sum, along with the political impact of the nuclear waste issue on the expanded use of nuclear power, the international aspects of these health and safety risks must also be considered.
There is a third international dimension to nuclear wastes: the
programs of certain advanced nations to export nuclear power plants to
less developed countries. West Germany, France, Canada, and the
United States have active export programs with such nations as India,
Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina, the Philippines, Korea, Taiwan, and, until
recently, Iran.2 7 In addition to nuclear fuels and facilities, however, the
supplier countries are also exporting the problems of coping with nuclear wastes to nations which may well lack the technical expertise and
financial resources to develop sound indigenous nuclear waste disposal
programs. Some less developed countries (LDC's) importing nuclear
technology, moreover, appear to be exercising lower safety standards
than the supplier countries in the building and operation of nuclear
power plants and in the intermediate storage of nuclear wastes.28
These problems suggest that LDC's may be more likely than developed
countries to have safety problems in their permanent disposal of nuclear wastes.
None of the supplier countries, including the United States, address the subject of nuclear wastes in their export agreements with recipient countries, either to urge that these materials be disposed of
safely or to offer specific technical assistance in achieving this result.2 9
Wastes generated in recipient countries can affect not only the particular recipient, involved, but also neighboring nations and global common areas, compounding the potential problems nuclear export
programs may engender in this regard.
Finally, the unique chemical and physical conditions which give
rise to nuclear reactor wastes mean that the issue of disposing of these
wastes is intimately bound up with the question of nuclear weapons
26 See D. DEESE, NUCLEAR POWER AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE 123-41 (1978).

27 For discussion of nuclear export programs and supplier nations' practices with respect to
the radioactive wastes produced therefrom, see text accompanying notes 259-345 infra. Iran's
nuclear power program has been abandoned. See note 179 infra.
28 For discussion suggesting that less rigorous safety standards have been implemented among
less developed countries using nuclear energy, see Benjamin, 4tomic Power, The SpreadofNuclear
Technology Holds Promise andPerilforDeveloping World,Wash. Post, Dec. 3, 1978, at Al, col. 2;
Benjamin, Building.4tom Plants. "It'sa Bit Scary,'Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 1978, at Al, col. 1; Benjamin, t's Hardto Keep Atom PlantsRunning Without Parts,Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 1978, at A16, col.
1-3; Benjamin, 'The Only ReactorProtectedby God, Wash. Post, Dec. 5, 1978, at A16, col. 1. See
also note 181 supra.
29 See text accompanying notes 259-345 infra.
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proliferation.3 ° In the course of reactor operation, plutonium is created
in the irradiated nuclear fuel.3 ' Plutonium can serve as an important
indigenously-produced reactor fuel, but, unlike the uranium fuels now
used in power reactors, it is also a crucial component in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.32 At present, those nations eager to utilize
plutonium's energy potential and those nations which fear that
widescale use of plutonium will lead to nuclear weapons proliferation
are engaged in a major international debate over whether plutonium
should be extracted from used nuclear fuel. 33 The outcome of this debate in particular nations will have a major impact on their nuclear
waste disposal programs, determining such basic questions as what
materials will be considered to be waste and whether construction of
major facilities for separating plutonium will be needed.34
Making this matter still more complicated is that for the many nations which have imported nuclear fuels from the U.S.-including Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, and several developing countriesthe decision on whether to extract plutonium from the used fuel is subject to prior U.S. approval.35 Since the U.S. is trying to discourage plutonium separation in order to curb the spread of nuclear weapons,
while most of the nations subject to the U.S. veto have long planned to
recover and use this material as a reactor fuel, the waste management
plans of these nations are presently subject to major uncertainties.
Non-proliferation concerns are thus a central issue to be considered
along with worldwide reliance on nuclear power, global pollution, and
nuclear supplier/recipient relations in assessing the international
dimensions of the nuclear waste problem.
This article presents a summary of the domestic waste disposal
programs of nuclear power producing countries. It suggests that no
country in the world has perfected the technology of waste disposal nor
built even a demonstration facility for the permanent disposal of the
most toxic of these radioactive materials. It then discusses the efforts of
the multilateral institutions, demonstrating that they have been ade30 For a discussion of the interrelationship between the nuclear weapons proliferation ques-

tion and the waste disposal question, see text accompanying notes 91-97, 191, 276-89, 293-305
infra.
31 See notes 43-47 and 58 and accompanying text infra.
32 FoRD-MrrRE STUDY, supra note 1, at ch. 9.

33 See text accompanying notes 91-97 and 115-92 infra.
34 Benjamin, Carter'rNuclear Policy Wins Few Converts Abroad,Wash. Post, Dec. 6, 1978, at
A10, col. 1; Benjamin, Plutonium Reprocessing: The Step the U.S. is Most Eager to Block, Wash.
Post, Dec. 5, 1978, at A16, col. 1; Benjamin, Taiwan'sNuclear Plans Concern U.S. Officials, Wash.
Post, Dec. 20, 1978, at A21, col. 2.
35 See text accompanying notes 191, 276-89, and 293-305 infra.
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quate for the exchange of information on waste disposal, but have been
unable to regulate disposal of the most hazardous radioactive wastes or
even to propound minimum disposal standards. Next, the practices of
those free world countries which supply nuclear fuel and equipment
are analyzed with respect to the nuclear wastes generated from their
exports in recipient countries. In that section the authors indicate that
exporters have largely failed to address the matter, although a number
of avenues for exporter initiatives appear to be available. Fourth, international treaties which deal with radioactive wastes or related nuclear energy or environmental issues will be reviewed. In this section
the authors note that although there has been no accord which deals
with the overall nuclear waste disposal problem, existing treaties afford
some useful safeguards as well as suggest that a multilateral accord on
nuclear waste disposal might be widely adopted. Finally, the authors
conclude by suggesting a number of ways in which an international
consensus on safe and effective means of nuclear waste disposal can be
encouraged.
THE PRODUCTION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR WASTES

Although a variety of radioactive waste materials are produced at
various stages of the fuel cycle associated with nuclear electric power
production, this article is concerned specifically with the radiotoxic byproducts produced in the nuclear fuel itself during the operation of nuclear power reactors. These wastes, because of their intense
radioactivity and exceptionally long life, have become the principal focus of public concerns and political debate regarding nuclear wastes
around the globe.3 6
36 These wastes will hereinafter be referred to as "post-fission wastes."
As explained more fully below at the text accompanying notes 43-65 infra, irradiated nuclear
fuel contains a variety of unwanted constituents which, because of their long lifespan and high
radioactivity, require long-term isolation from the environment. If it were decided not to separate
these constituents from irradiated reactor fuel, such fuel, itself, would be treated as waste material
and would require long-term sequestration. "Post-fission waste" is used in this article as a convenient short-hand phrase to include the material which would need permanent disposal under both
alternatives: the unwanted constituents of irradiated fuel, if separated (together with equipment
contaminated by such constituents in the course of separating them), and such fuel itself where it
is considered to be a waste product. Unifying these apparently diverse wastes under a single
rubric also serves to highlight their essential similarity. The wastes in either case pose roughly
comparable public health hazards and would require comparable long-term disposal measures.
Thus, the nuclear fission process confronts the nuclear power user with what is basically the same
irreducible problem.
Numerous other radioactive wastes are generated in the course of the nuclear fuel cycle in
addition to those indicated in the preceeding paragraph. These include the residues from the
processing of uranium ore, known as uranium mill tailings, which are hazardous because of their
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Nuclear power reactors produce energy through the controlled

splitting, or fission, of atoms of uranium.37 In simplified terms, fission
occurs when these atoms, some of which are inherently unstable, are

struck by neutrons, spontaneously emitted by certain nuclear fuel iso-

topes.38 Upon splitting apart, the fissioned atoms give off energy in the

form of heat and emit additional neutrons, which strike other unstable
fuel atoms in a continuing, heat generating chain reaction whose rate
can be controlled by various devices in the reactor. The heat produced
is used39to turn water into steam which drives a turbine producing electricity.
The most widely built reactor type is the "light water" reactor

(LWR), the type which strongly predominates in the United States,
Western Europe, Japan, and in a significant number of developing
countries.0 LWR's are fueled with enriched uranium; i.e., uranium in
radium and radon content; the liquid and gaseous effluents of normal nuclear power plant operation which occur as radioactive substances migrate through small fuel rod defects into reactor
cooling water;, "low lever' wastes, which are clothing and equipment contaminated in the course
of reactor operation and other nuclear fuel cycle activities with modest amounts of radioactive
material; and disused nuclear facilities, themselves, which require decontamination and decommissioning. Seegenerally FoRD-MrrRE STUDY, supranote 1, at ch. 8; M. WILLRICH & R. LESTER,
note I supra, IRG REPORT, note I supra.
37 Virtually all nuclear power reactors in operation today use uranium fuel. As discussed in
the text at note 58 infra, plutonium may serve as a substitute for fissionable uranium in some
applications; mixed uranium-plutonium fuels would be used in breeder reactors which are now
under development.
38 An isotope is one of several different species of a chemical element, which is distinguished
from other isotopes of the same element by variations in the number of neutrons in the atomic
nucleus, but indistinguishable by chemical means. FoRD-MITRE STUDY, supra note 1, at 409.
Uranium-235 is the fissionable isotope of uranium of importance to nuclear power production.
Uranium-233, another fissionable isotope of uranium, may play an important role in the nuclear
fuel cycles associated with certain experimental reactors.
39 For a brief introduction to nuclear power reactor operation and technology, see FoRDMrrRE STUDY, supra note 1, at appendix.
40 The following table indicates the number of operating LWR's in each of the nations listed
and their total generating capacity in megawatts (one megawatt equals 1,000,000 watts):

Austria
Belgium
Fed. Rep. of Germany
Finland
France
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland

Operating
1
3
5
3
3
3
17
2
2
6
3

LWR's
Under Construction
0
4
5
1
26
2
7
0
7
2
2
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which the readily fissionable isotope, uranium-235, has been artificially
concentrated from its naturally occurring rate of .7% to a concentration
of between 2 and 4 percent.4 1 The increased uranium-235 permits the
chain reaction to be initiated and sustained when the enriched uranium
fuel is submerged in normal, or "light," water. LWR fuel consists of
pellets of enriched uranium encased in closed, stainless steel or zirconium alloy tubes about one centimeter in diameter and between 380
and 410 centimeters long, which are assembled into bundles (fuel assemblies) in a square array, with the rods spaced apart and supported
World List of Nuclear PowerPlants, 22 NUCLEAR NEWS 59-64 (Feb. 1979) (figures as of Dec. 31,
1978). For LWR's in use in less developed countries, see note 179 infra. The United Kingdom
has 32 power reactors in operation with a total capacity of 7706 megawatts and 6 more under
construction (3700 megawatts). All are gas-cooled reactors of British design as opposed to LWR's.
Id
The second principal type of nuclear power reactor in use today is the "heavy water reactor"
(HWR). Because HWR's immerse their nuclear fuel in deuterium-oxide----"heavy water"-which
permits more efficient use of the neutrons emitted by the uranium fuel than does normal "light"
water, HWR's do not require fuel in which the fissionable isotope of uranium has been concentrated, or enriched; instead these reactors operate on natural uranium fuel. Canada manufactures
the HWR which is available commercially today, known as the "CANDU" reactor for "Canadian-deuterium-uranium." FORD-MITRE STUDY, supra note 36, at appendix. The following table
shows the deployment of CANDU and other HWR's currently:
Operating
Argentina
Canada
India

Korea
Pakistan

1
8
1
0
1

HWR's
Under Construction
I
9
5

1
0

World List of Nuclear Power Plants, supra.
Unless otherwise indicated, the figures used in the text to describe waste production in nuclear fuel refer to light water reactors. Figures on accumulations of used nuclear fuel include fuel
from all types of reactors. Although the characteristics of irradiated HWR fuel differ in certain
respects from those of irradiated LWR fuel, these differences do not alter the general considerations presented in this paper. See INTERAGENCY REVIEW GROUP ON NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT, DRAFT SUBGROUP REPORT ON ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGY STRATEGIES FOR THE

ISOLATION OF NUCLEAR WASTE 3 (TID-28818) (Oct. 1978) [hereinafter cited as IRG SUBGROUP
REPORT].
41 U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE STORAGE

OF U.S. SPENT POWER REACTOR FUEL 11-2 (DOE/EIS-0015-D) (Aug. 1978) (Supp. DOE/EIS0015-D) (Dec. 1978) [hereinafter cited as DOE DOMESTIC SPENT FUEL STORAGE DRAFT EIS].
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42
by grid structures and end pieces.
In the course of the nuclear chain reaction, uranium atoms which
are fissioned break apart into smaller, lighter, and usually highly radio-

active 4 3 isotopes, such as strontium-90, cesium-137, and iodine-131;

these are known as "fission products."' Some neutrons in the reactor,
however, rather than splitting nuclear fuel atoms, are absorbed by
them, producing heavier isotopes than those found in the fuel initially.
These new isotopes either decay or absorb another neutron and, in
turn, fission or transmute so that through these complex processes, a
spectrum of heavy isotopes45 is eventually created in the nuclear fuel.
Virtually all of these heavy atoms are also radioactive and, in addition,
have extremely long half-lives. Their radioactive nature endures for
many thousands of years, with some, such as neptunium-237, enduring
for millions of years.46 In contrast, the vast majority of fission products
have shorter half-lives, losing their radiotoxicity in 500 to 1000 years.47
When nuclear fuel can no longer sustain a nuclear chain reaction
at economic power levels, it is considered to be spent and is removed
42 1

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, FINAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

STATEMENT ON HANDLING AND STORAGE OF SPENT LIGHT WATER POWER REACTOR FUEL 2-1

(NUREG-0575) (August 1979).
43 Radioactivity is the emission of energy in the form of electromagnetic radiation, such as
gamma rays, or in the form of high speed subatomic particles, including alpha particles (the nuclei
of helium), beta particles (electrons) and neutrons. Nuclei in radioactive materials are unstable
and emit this energy spontaneously;, in so doing, the nuclei are transmuted, or "decay", into other
nuclei which, themselves, may or may not be radioactive. Every radioactive nucleus eventually
decays into a stable nucleus through a chain of such transmutations, with the length of the chain
and the duration of each transmutation in the chain varying according to the particular radioactive nucleus involved. The period needed for a given type of radioactive nucleus (or radioisotope)
to decay into its next form is measured in terms of the half-life of that radioisotope, that is, the
time necessary for half of a sample of that radioisotope to decay into its next phase on the chain.
M. WILLRICH & R. LESTER, supra note I, at 1-4.
44 FORD-MITRE STUDY, supra note 1, at 246.
45 Heavy isotopes are generally considered to be those with atomic weights (the total of protons and neutrons in the atomic nucleus) greater than that of lead. Those heavy elements with
atomic weights which are also greater than uranium's are known as the "transuranic" elements,
including neptunium, plutonium, americium, and curium, all of which are found in spent fuel.
IRG SUBGROUP REPORT, supra note 40, at app. A, 2.
46 For a listing of the half-lives of the isotopes referred to in the preceding note, including
neptunium-237, see M. WILLRICH & R. LESTER, supra note 1, at 3.
47 DOE COMMERCIAL WASTE MANAGEMENT DRAFT EIS, supra note 1, at 1.9 (500 years);
FORD-MITRE STUDY, supra note 1,at 257 (700 years); IRG SUBGROUP REPORT, supra note 40, at
16 (1000 years); Hearingson Nuclear Waste Management Before the Senate Subcomm on Energy,
Nuclear Proiferation,and FederalServices ofthe GovernmentalAffairs Comm, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 80 (1978) (statement of Dr. Charles L. Hebel) (600 years) [complete hearings hereinafter
cited as Glenn 1978 Hearings]; Bredehoeft, GeologicalDisposalofHigh-Level Radioactive Wastes:
Earth-SciencePerspective,U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR No. 779 (1978) (several hundred
years) [hereinafter cited as U.S.G.S. STUDY]; Hearingson Nuclear Waste Management Before the
House Subcomm on Fossiland NuclearEnergy Research, Development, and Demonstrationof/he
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from the reactor. Typically, one quarter to one third of the fuel in a
LWR is replaced during an annual reload, resulting in the discharge of
about 30 tons of spent fuel, which is initially stored in water-filled pools
adjacent to the reactor." At this point, the highly radioactive spent
fuel contains virtually all of the fission products produced during reactor operation, all the heavy isotopes built up by neutron absorption that
have not, themselves, fissioned, and a significant percentage of the uranium originally charged into the reactor. By weight, the respective proportions of these three components in spent fuel are approximately 3%,
1%, and 96%."9
If radiation from spent fuel or any other source reaches the tissues
of the human body, the result, depending on the intensity of the dose of
radiation received, is cell damage or destruction.50 This in turn can
lead to the growth of cancerous cells, damage to chromosomes causing
genetic defects in future generations, or, if the radiation is sufficient,
Con=. on Science and Technology, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1978) (statement of Milton Levenson)
(1000 years) [complete hearings hereinafter cited as MeCormack 1978 Hearings].
It may be noted that two fission product isotopes, iodine-129 and technetium-99, are exceptions to the rule, remaining radioactive for many thousands of years. FORD-MITRE STUDY, supra
note 1, at 243.
48 The following table shows current estimates of existing quantities of spent fuel in the
United States and abroad, with projections of future amounts through the year 2000.
The volume of spent nuclear fuel is projected to increase very rapidly in the U.S. and abroad
through the end of the century. It seems likely that a rapid expansion will continue beyond the
year 2000 as well.
TABLE
Projected Spent Fuel Generation
(Cumulative)

1977
1980
1985
1990
2000

Foreignb

United Statesa

Year

MTHMc

TCFd

MTHM

TCF

3300
7000
16800
34800
97800

43.2
91.7
220.1
455.9
1281.2

9000
18000
40000
78000
217000

117.9
235.8
524.0
1021.8
2842.7

Based on a nuclear growth consistent with National Energy Plan.
Free-world only.
c Metric tons of heavy metal.
d Thousands of cubic feet.
a
b

IRG REPORT, supra note 1, at D-28.
49 See IRG SUBGROUP REPORT, supra note 40, at app. A, 3-4.
50 See FORD-MITRE STUDY, supra note I, at ch. 5. This chapter provides a detailed but readily comprehended explanation of the various types of radiation hazard posed by spent fuel.
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acute illness and death."1 Depending on the type of radioactive isotope
involved, the dangers posed to man will vary. Generally speaking, the
radioactive fission products found in spent fuel emit what is known as
beta or gamma radiation. Such radiation is highly penetrating, requiring several millimeters of lead or other heavy shielding to reduce its
intensity appreciably. 2 In contrast, the heavy transuranic elements in
spent fuel, formed from neutron absorption, emit alpha radiation. Alpha radiation has very little penetrating force and can be stopped by an
inch of air or by the outside layer of human skin. 3 If, however, alpha
emitting radioisotopes lodge in sensitive parts of the body, such as the
lungs, through inhalation or through ingestion, they can cause considerable damage. 4 In spent fuel, the presence of high amounts of penetrating gamma and beta radiation from the fission products make direct
exposure to the fuel extremely dangerous, requiring that it be heavily
shielded. At reactor sites, it is kept deeply submerged in water-filled
pools, with the water providing such shielding. When it is transported
off-site, it must be placed in massive metal cannisters weighing some 70
to 100 tons. Even as the beta radioactivity in spent fuel diminishes-it
approaches background levels in 500 to 1000 years-the fuel remains
extremely hazardous because of the risk that the longer-lived alphaemitting heavy elements might enter the biosphere and be inhaled or
will continue at high
ingested by man.5 6 Alpha-emitting radioactivity
57
levels in spent fuel for over 100,000 years.
Because spent fuel contains potentially valuable quantities of both
unused uranium and plutonium, a readily fissionable material which
can serve as a substitute fuel in LWR's or as the fuel for future breeder
reactors, it has long been assumed that spent fuel would undergo chemical "reprocessing" to recover these fuel resources.5 8 In reprocessing,
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id
Id
Id

id
Id

Id
Id
See general, FORD-MITRE

STUDY,

supra note 1, at 247; M. WILLRICH & R. LESTER, supra

note 1, at 10-11; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, FINAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE USE OF RECYCLED PLUTONIUM IN MIXED OXIDE FUEL IN LIGHT

WATER COOLED REACTORS (GESMO) (NUREG-002) (Aug. 1976). See also FUNDAMENTAL
REALIZABILITY OF THE WASTE TREATMENT AND STORAGE CENTRE FROM THE SAFETY ENGINEERING ASPECTS, ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE [WEST GERMAN] REACTOR
SAFETY COMMISSION (RSK) AND THE RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION COMMISSION (SSK) 2-3 (Oct.
1977); NUCLEAR POWER AND THE ENVIRONMENT, THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE SIXTH
ROYAL COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION 8 (London 1977) (citing ROYAL COMMIS-
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spent fuel rods are chopped into small pieces and then dissolved in
nitric acid. The plutonium and uranium are chemically separated from
this solution, leaving behind the unwanted fission products, and all of
the heavy elements (including about 0.5% of the originally present plutonium). Following the reprocessing stage, this residue, termed "liquid
high-level waste," must be stored and, ultimately, disposed of in a manner that will not endanger the public. Typically, reprocessing programs
have contemplated an initial period of storage of these liquid wastes in
steel tanks at the reprocessing plant site, followed by solidification of
this material in glass or another enduring substance, and, finally, emplacement of the solidified high-level waste in cavities mined in stable
geologic formations. 59 Here the waste would remain until it had decayed to innocuous levels, a period usually measured in millenia because of the long-term hazard posed by the heavy alpha-emitting
elements.60 Although the separated plutonium would not require disposal since it would be reused as a reactor fuel and, in effect, be
"burned up," the reprocessing itself and the subsequent fabrication of
plutonium bearing fuels results in the production of waste materials
heavily contaminated with plutonium. These "transuranic wastes," as
they are known, because of their long-lived alpha radioactivity, require
isolation from the environment for periods similar to those necessary
SION REPORT, supra note 1, at 80-81); NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY GROUP OF EXPERTS, OBJECTIVES, CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE ARISING

FROM NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMMES 66, 69 (Sept. 1977) [hereinafter cited as NEA GROUP REPORT].

59 Glassification, or vitrification, as a means ofsolidifying high-level waste is being pursued by
Germany, France, India, the U.S.S.R., the U.K., and the United States.
Some notion of the overall toxicity of post-reprocessing high-level waste can be obtained
from the estimate that by the year 2000, dilution of accumulated U.S. high-level wastes (about 60
percent or more would be from civilian power applications) to safe levels would require almost
twice the volume of fresh water in the world's lakes, rivers, ground water, and glaciers. U.S.G.S.
STUDY, supra note 47, at 2. Another commentator has noted that the wastes produced from just
one year of U.S. nuclear power production contain the potential, if ingested, for producing millions to billions of cancers; the possibility of such wholesale ingestion is, however, exceedingly
remote. Id (citing COHEN, The DisposalofRadioactive Wartesfrom Fission Reactors, 236 SCIENTIFIC AM. 28 (1977)).
60 See, e.g., DOE COMMERCIAL WASTE DRAFT EIS,'note I supra; FORD-MITRE STUDY, supra
note 1, at 243, 254; U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, STATE OF GEOLOGICAL
KNOWLEDGE REGARDING POTENTIAL TRANSPORT OF HIGH LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE FROM

DEEP CONTINENTAL REPOSITORIES (EPA/520/4-78-004) (1978) [hereinafter cited as EPA STUDY];
U.S.G.S. STUDY, note 47 supra- Glenn 1978 Hearings,note 47 supra.
Current U.S. conceptualizations of a geologic repository envision that such facilities would be
2000 acres in size and located approximately 1500 feet below the surface. By the year 2000, accumulated wastes would require constructions of 2 to 5 such facilities. For a detailed discussion of
repository design, see DOE COMMERCIAL WASTE MANAGEMENT DRAFT EIS, supra note 1, at
3.1.104. See also IRG REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.

Nuclear Waste Disposal
1:569(1979)

for high-level wastes.
In the last several years, U.S. concerns over the possible misuse of
separated plutonium, which is one of the two fissionable materials from
which atomic weapons can be made, have led the United States to promote the concept of direct permanent disposal of spent fuel itself, without the intermediate step of reprocessing.62 Under this alternative,
after a period of interim storage at the reactor site or at an "away-fromreactor" surface storage facility, the spent fuel would be specially packaged in metal cannisters to protect against future radiation leakage and
would then be emplaced in a permanent repository similar to that envisioned for the disposal of post-reprocessing, high-level waste.63
As may readily be seen, unlike the permanent disposal of this latter material, direct disposal of spent fuel entails the permanent emplacement of all plutonium originally discharged from the reactor.
This means that once the fission products in the spent fuel have decayed to safe levels in 500 to 1000 years, considerably greater quantities
of long-lived alpha-emitting materials would remain in the repository
than in the case of post-reprocessing high-level wastes, necessitating
special care in repository design.64 Overall, however, the challenge of
disposing of spent fuel directly is considered to be roughly comparable
to that of disposing of post-reprocessing high-level waste and the attendant transuranic contaminated waste from reprocessing and plutonium fuel fabrication. 65 The term "post-fission" is being used in this
61 See, eg., IRG REPORT, supra note 1, at 38.
62 See text accompanying notes 91-99 infra.
63 For a general analysis of this alternative, see DOE COMMERCIAL WASTE MANAGEMENT
DRAFT EIS, note 1 supra.

64 McCormack 1978 Hearings,supra note 47, at 5, 11 (testimony of J. Edward Howard).
65 See FoRD-MrrRE STUDY, supra note 1,at 254; IRG REPORT, supranote 1,at 73; Glenn 1978
Hearings,supra note 47, at 80; MeCormack 1978 Hearings, supranote 47, at 5, 11. But see NEA
GROUP REPORT, supra note 58, at 66-67. It may be noted, for example, that when spent reactor
fuel containing recycled plutonium from a previous round of reprocessing is, itself, reprocessed,
the resulting high-level waste contains higher concentrations of long-lived alpha-emitting isotopes
than did the first "generation" of high-level waste. This means that over repeated cycles of
reprocessing the difference in the long-term hazard posed by high-level waste and spent fuel is
diminished, notwithstanding the fact that most of the plutonium originally present in each generation of spent fuel has been removed. See FORD-MITRE STUDY, supra note 1, at 248.
It is often argued that because the overall volume of solidified post-reprocessing high-level
waste is considerably smaller than the volume of the spent fuel from which it is extracted, the
reprocessing of spent fuel greatly reduces the scale of permanent disposal repository requirements
in comparison to the alternative of direct disposal of spent fuel. The higher heat per unit volume
emitted by the radioactivity in solidified high-level waste (which is highly concentrated), however,
necessitates that containers of this material be more widely spaced in a permanent repository than
containers holding spent fuel. In addition, the production of high-level waste by definition re-

quires reprocessing which inevitably entails the generation of significant volumes of transuranic
contaminated wastes, wastes which themselves need permanent disposal comparable to that re-
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article to refer collectively to all of these wastes requiring long-term
isolation from man.
The high inherent toxicity of post-fission wastes and their extraordinary longevity mean that programs for protecting the public
from the long-term hazard they pose demand high levels of scientific
understanding and technological competence.6 6 It is widely accepted,
for example, that because the hazard of post-fission wastes will endure
over time periods which will beggar the life span of human institutions,
disposal programs must be devised which will provide a high degree of
protection for future generations without requiring active managing or
monitoring of waste repositories.6 7 This means that the siting, designing, and construction of waste repositories and the development of
waste solidification and packaging technologies require great care so as
to take into account a wide range of eventualities which might result in
loss of isolation, including floods, vulcanism, glaciation, changes in sea
and water table levels, and inadvertant intrusion by man as a result of
mining or resource exploration.6 8
quired for high-level waste. As a result of these and other factors, total repository acreage requirements for a nuclear fuel cycle based on reprocessing are of the same general magnitude as for a
nuclear fuel cycle based on direct disposal of spent fuel. See DOE COMMERCIAL WASTE MANAGEMENT DRAFT EIS, supra note 1, at 1.10.
66 See generally IRG SUBGROUP REPORT, supra note 40, at app. A; EPA STUDY, note 60
supra.
67 See, e.g., DOE COMMERCIAL WASTE MANAGEMENT DRAFT EIS, supra note I, at 3.1.64.

68 Id. at 3.1.69. The following possible actions were listed as being one which might disrupt a
repository.
Potential Disruptive Phenomena
for Waste Isolation Repositories
Natural
Processes
Climatic
Fluctuations
Sea Level
Fluctuations
Glaciation
River Erosion
Sedimentation
Tectonic Forces
Volcanic
Extrusion
Igneous
Intrusion
Diapirism
Diagenesis
New or Undetected
Fault Rupture
Hydraulic
Fracturing
Dissolution
Aquifer Flux
Variations

Natural Events

Man-Caused
Events

Repository-Caused
Processes

Flood Erosion
Seismically
Induced Shaft
Seal Failure
Meteorite

Improper Design/
Operation:
Shaft Seal Failure
Improper Waste
Emplacement

Thermal, Chemical
Potential,
Radiation, and
Mechanical
Force Gradients:
Induced Local
Fracturing
Chemical or
Physical Changes
in Local Geology
Induced Ground
Water Movement
Waste Container
Movement
Increase in Internal
Pressure
Shaft Seal Failure

Undetected Past
Intrusion:
Undiscovered
Boreholes
or Mine Shafts
Inadvertent Future
Intrusion:
Archeological
Exhumation
Weapons Testing
Nonnuclear Waste
Disposal
Resource Mining
(Mineral,
Hydrocarbon,
Geothermal, Salt)
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Of perhaps greatest concern, however, is that underground water
might enter the repository, leach radioactive substances from emplaced

post-fission wastes, and transport these substances to the human environment.6 9 Although in the case of an actual repository many factors,
such as slow leaching and underground water flow rates, could be ex-

pected to reduce the overall danger to the public from such a breach of
repository integrity, one "worst case" analysis of such an event indicates the possibility (albeit remote) of up to 60,000 deaths or serious
genetic defects occurring over a 50-year period following such a breach
and suggests that persons living up to two hundred miles from the repository could be affected.7"
Notwithstanding these challenges, it is widely believed that perma-

nent isolation of post-fission wastes in mined repositories is scientifically and technologically feasible and that a properly designed waste

disposal program will expose the public to insignificant residual risks.7
Recent studies of the problem, however, have stressed that a number of
Man-Caused
Events (cont.)
Storage of Hydrocarbon or Compressed Air
Intentional Intrusion:
War
Sabotage
Waste Recovery
Perturbation of Ground
Water System:
Irrigation
Reservoirs
Intentional Artificial
Recharge
Establishment of
Population Center
Id.
69 EPA STUDY, note 60 supra; FORD-MITRE STUDY, supra note 1, at 256-58; IRG SUBGROUP
REPORT, supra note 39, at app. A, 37; Glenn 1978 Hearings, supra note 47, at 76 (statement of
Charles Hebel).
70 DOE COMMERCIAL WASTE MANAGEMENT DRAFT EIS, supra note 1, at 3.1.160, 3.1.163.
71 See, eg., DOE COMMERCIAL WASTE MANAGEMENT DRAFT EIS, supra note 1, at 3.1.73;
FORD-MITRE STUDY, supra note 1, at 262; NEA GROUP REPORT, supra note 58, at 66; ROYAL
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1,-at 81; Glenn 1978 Hearings, supra note 47, at 77, 104 (testimony of Charles Hebel and Dr. Philip M. Smith).
The costs of permanent disposal of nuclear wastes are thought to be relatively modest,
amounting to approximately .5 mills per kilowatt hour by one estimate, in comparison to nuclear
power generation costs of between 25 and 35 mills per kilowatt hour (of which approximately 6
mills per kilowatt hour are attributable to all nuclear fuel cycle costs). DOE COMMERCIAL WASTE
MANAGEMENT DRAFT EIS, supra note 1, at 1.22. See also FORD-MITRE STUDY, supra note 1, at
122 (direct spent fuel disposal would cost .4 mills per kilowatt hour).
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major gaps still remain in the current knowledge of repository behavior
and have called for expansion of waste management research and development programs.7" Many of these studies have also emphasized
the failure of governmental efforts to address the problem of postfission waste disposal in a comprehensive and timely fashion. 3 In sum,
a consensus appears to have emerged that post-fission wastes pose a
potentially grave public health hazard for this and many future generations, but that the hazard can probably be managed if scientifically rigorous programs are diligently and carefully pursued. This consensus,
however, appears to assume implicitly that adequate technical and
financial resources will be made available by government or industry to
tackle the job. This assumption may not always be warranted, especially in developing nations where such resources are often in short
supply.
CURRENT PROGRAMS FOR THE DISPOSAL OF POST-FISSION NUCLEAR
WASTES

This section surveys national and multilateral efforts to address the
challenge of safely and permanently disposing of post-fission wastes.
Although the problem of nuclear waste management confronts every
country which has a nuclear generating capacity, approaches vary
widely. Several of the developed nations are actively exploring waste
management alternatives through private efforts or through direct government action.7 4 Multilateral efforts are being made as well, through
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other multilateral institutions. 75 The programs which have reached some degree of
sophistication are described briefly below.
NationalPrograms
Post-Fission Waste DisposalActivities in the United States. Spent
fuel from power reactors in the United States is currently stored in
water-cooled basins at reactor sites around the country. 76 At the pres72 EPA STUDY, note 60 supra; IRG SUBGROUP REPORT, supra note 40, at app. A; Glenn 1978
Hearings,supra note 47, at 102 (statement of Philip Smith).
73 FORD-MITRE STUDY, supra note 1, at 263-64; IRG REPORT, supra note 1, at introduction;
M. WILLRICH & R. LESTER, note I supra.
74 See generally K. HARMON, SUMMARY OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RADIOACTIVE
WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS (EXCLUDING UNITED STATES) (1978); IRG REPORT, supra
note 1, at app. G [hereinafter cited as Appendix G].
75 Appendix G, supra note 74, at 1.
76 See, e.g., DOE DOMESTIC SPENT FUEL STORAGE DRAFT EIS, supra note 41, at 11-2; IRG
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ent time, however, the United States government has not adopted de-

finitive plans for the subsequent disposition of this material.77
Although there appears to be a growing consensus that the ultimate
goal of the U.S. post-fission waste disposal program for the next several
decades should be the development of mined geologic repositories for
the permanent sequestration of these substances, 78 crucial questions
concerning the intermediate steps in the program remain unresolved,
including whether and when spent fuel should be reprocessed,7 9

whether centralized, government-owned facilities for interim spent fuel
storage are needed," and how repository site selection should proceed.8 '

Historically, from the start of the U.S. civilian nuclear program in
the mid-1950's through 1974, responsibility for the U.S. post-fission
waste disposal program lay with the Atomic Energy Commission."2
The AEC program was based on the assumption that the electrical util-

ity companies operating nuclear power stations would have their spent
nuclear fuel reprocessed by other private, commercial entities, with the
REPORT, supra note 1, at D-25. As of mid-1979, 70 nuclear power reactors were licensed to operate in the United States (two of these, the Indian Point I facility and the Three Mile Island Unit 2
facility, will not operate for an indefinite period of time, however). The 70 units had a total
capacity of 51,000 megawatts (electric). Additional reactors with a combined capacity of 100,000
megawatts had received construction permits. Telephone communication with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Congressional Affairs (Sept. 14, 1979). Spent fuel accumulations at
the end of 1979 were estimated to be approximately 5700 metric tons. (A metric ton is approximately 2200 pounds.) DOE DOMESTIC SPENT FUEL STORAGE DRAFT EIS, supra note 41, at 11-7;
IRG REPORT, supra note 1, at D-28. With the exception of approximately 300-350 metric tons of
spent fuel stored at a never-opened reprocessing facility at Morris, Ill., and another 165 metric
tons stored at a second, no longer operating, reprocessing plant at West Valley, N.Y., all spent fuel
from U.S. nuclear power reactors is stored in water-filled pools at reactor sites. DOE DOMESTIC
SPENT FUEL STORAGE DRAFT EIS, supra note 41, at 11-12; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
FEDERAL FACILITIES FOR STORING SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL-ARE THEY NEEDED? i, 13-15 (EMD79-82) (June 27, 1979). No facilities for the reprocessing of commercial nuclear power reactor fuel
are now operating in the United States.
77 See, e.g., DOE COMMERCIAL WASTE MANAGEMENT DRAFT EIS, note 1 supra.
78 See, e.g., id
79 See text accompanying notes 62-63 supra and 95-97 infra.
80 See text accompanying notes 98-103 infra.
81 See text accompanying notes 106-08 infra.
82 For a brief review of the Atomic Energy Commission's programs for radioactive waste

management, see IRG

REPORT, supra note

I, at 2-5; U.S

DEP'T OF ENERGY, DRAFT ENVIRON-

MENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT

Apr. 1979) [hereinafter cited as DOE WIPP DRAFT EIS]; U.S.

2-I to 2-12, (DOE/EIS-0026-D

DEP'T OF ENERGY, REPORT OF

TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT 47 (DOE-ER-0004/D) (Feb. 1978

draft) (no final version of this document was prepared as the responsibilities of the DOE task force
were assigned to the Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management); U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE NATION'S NUCLEAR WASTE-PROPOSALS FOR ORGANIZATION AND

SITING 3-5 -(EMD-79-77) (June 21, 1979); M. WILLRICH & R.
Glenn 1978 Hearings,supra note 47, at 332-35.

LESTER,

supra note 1, at 13-18;
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U.S. government taking responsibility for the disposal of the resulting
solidified high-level waste in caverns to be mined in deep geologic salt
formations.8 3
For a variety of reasons, however, including the slow evolution of
commercial reprocessing and the public's apparent willingness to permit nuclear power development in the absence of a clear solution to
post-fission waste disposal, the AEC's program remained poorly
funded and narrowly focused on the deep salt option.84 In addition,
the program suffered a key setback in the early 1970's, when the AEC

was forced to abandon, for technical and political reasons, a proposed
waste repository near Lyons, Kansas. 85 As a result of these factors,

when the Atomic Energy Commission was disbanded in 1975 and its
waste disposal responsibilities transferred to the Energy Research and
Development Administration (ERDA),8 6 a definitive program for long-

term management of post-fission wastes remained far from fruition.
Under ERDA, research and development activities were considerably broadened under greatly expanded budgets,87 trends which have
continued after ERDA was incorporated into the Department of Energy (DOE) in November 1977.88 DOE's overall goal is to develop a
83 FORD-MITRE STUDY, supra note 1, at 247; Hearingson Nuclear Waste DisposalBefore the
Subcomm. on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Comm on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 233 (1978) (statement of Sol Burstein) [hereinafter cited as
Schmitt 1978 Hearings];McCormack 1978 Hearings,supra note 47, at 7 (statement of J. Edward
Howard).
84 FORD-MITRE STUDY, supra note 1, at 257; IRG REPORT, supra note 1, at 3; M. WILLRICH &
R. LESTER, supra note 1, at 52. For a brief history of unsuccessful attempts to develop commercial
reprocessing in the United States, see FORD-MITRE STUDY, supra note 1, at 321-22.
85 DOE WIPP DRAFT EIS, supra note 82, at 2-2; FORD-MITRE STUDY, supra note I, at 257;
IRG REPORT, supra note 1, at 3; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 82, at 4; Glenn
1978 Hearings,supra note 47, at 334.
86 Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801, 5814 (1976).
87 With the advent of the Energy Research and Development Administration in 1975, the
budget for nuclear waste management activities was increased by over 50% from the AEC's $61
million in 1974 to $94 million in 1975. (These figures are for activities for the management of
wastes from both the U.S. military program and for civilian nuclear wastes). In 1976, the budget
was increased to $158 million and in 1977, to $230 million. IRG REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
ERDA's program of expanded study of underground formations as potential repository sites contemplated scrutiny of formations in 36 states. U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, ERD,4 Studies Geologic Formations Throughout Nationfor Data on PotentialSitesfor
CommercialNuclear Waste Disposal,Press Release No. 76-355 (Dec. 2, 1976). The objective of
this ERDA program was the construction of six repositories, two each in salt, granite, and shale,
before the year 2000-with the first pair to be in operation in 1985. Id
88 Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, 42 U S.C.A. §§ 7101, 7151 (Supp. 11978).
DOE's 1979 budget for waste management activities (civilian and military) was $459 million.
DOE's current program includes accelerated study of non-salt geologies leading to an operating,
full-scale repository sometime after 1988. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DOE's COMMERCIAL WASTE
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (DOE/ET-0042, March 1978); Hearings on Dep't of Energy FY 1980
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permanent waste repository by 1988, or shortly thereafter. 89 Its present
program also calls for the operation, sometime after 1986, of the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a pilot scale repository to be built near
Carlsbad, New Mexico, which would hold transuranic wastes from the
U.S. military nuclear program and, possibly, experimental quantities of
high-level waste (also from the military program) and of commercial
spent fuel.90
Notwithstanding the increased attention given nuclear waste disposal by the DOE, a number of controversial shifts in U.S. nuclear
waste disposal policy under the Ford and Carter administrations have
introduced considerable uncertainties as to the future course of the U.S.
program. The first of these was articulated in President Ford's October
27, 1976, statement on nuclear policy in which he declared that the
United States would defer commercial reprocessing of spent power reactor fuel and that U.S. efforts to develop a permanent waste disposal
repository would be expanded to provide that any such repository be
able to accept spent fuel itself as a waste form for permanent disposiAuthorization, Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Environment of the House Comm. of Interior

and InsularAffairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3 (1979) (statement of Worth Bateman) [complete
hearings hereinafter cited as 1979 Energy Hearings].
89 See note 87 supra.

90 DOE WIPP DRAFr EIS, note 82 supra. The WIPP proposal has proven controversial.
First, DOE has-at least until quite recently-proposed that the facility be licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in part because the facility would hold at least a modest quantity of
commercial spent fuel. This has triggered strong opposition on the part of some in Congress who
believe such licensing might improperly impinge on the U.S. nuclear weapons program. To address such objections, which threaten continued funding of the project, DOE has apparently
agreed to limit the use of the facility to military wastes and to build it without its being licensed by
the NRC. See DOE Gives Up Attempt to License WIPP, Store Spent Fuel,Energy Daily, July 24,
1979; Hearingson Nuclear Waste Management Before the Subcomm. on Nuclear Regulation of the
Senate Comm on Environment andPublicWorks, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (statement of Worth
Bateman) [complete hearings hereinafter cited as Hart 1979 Hearings]; WIPP Changes Delay
Carter Decision on Nuclear Waste Policy, NUCLEONICS WK., Aug. 23, 1979, at I. But see New
Mexico Rejects DOE Fundsfor State WIPP Evaluation, Wants Licensing, INSIDE DOE, Sept. 7,

1979, at 5. Last minute legislation embodying a compromise on some of these issues will provide
funding during FY 1980 for the project as an unlicensed facility. See Dep't of Energy National
Security and Military Application of Nuclear Energy Authorization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96164, § 213, 93 Stat. 1259 (1979). President Carter in signing this measure into law, however, stated
that he did not endorse its approach to the project and that he would address WIPP's future in a
forthcoming comprehensive statement on U.S. nuclear waste management. A-Waste Measure
Signed But Assailed,Wash. Post, Jan. 1, 1980, at A18, col. 1.
In addition, the adequacy of the site chosen for WIPP has been challenged by some federal
agencies. See IRG REPORT, supra note 1, at 57 (some IRG member agencies believe a broad
range of sites should be considered before a first "intermediate scale facility" location is selected);
Carterto Consider Delaying Early Demo of Commercial Nuclear Waste, INSIDE DOE, Mar. 12,
1979, at 1.

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

1:569(1979)

tion.9t This initiative was reaffirmed and extended by President Carter
in an April 7, 1977, policy statement on nuclear weapons proliferation
in which he announced that the U.S. deferral of spent power reactor
fuel reprocessing would continue "indefinitely". 92 Carter also reiterated Ford's decision that the U.S. would develop mechanisms for the
permanent geologic disposal of spent fuel.93 Like the Ford statement,
the overall objective of the Carter policy was to discourage, by the example of U.S. conduct, reprocessing activities in other nations and the
concomitant accumulation of separated plutonium, usable for nuclear
weapons, under national control.94
Although shortly after the Carter statement generic regulatory
proceedings on commercial reprocessing and the recycling of plutonium in LWR fuel were terminated,95 effectively precluding these activities in the United States for the present, the Carter policy has been
strongly opposed by proponents of reprocessing in the Congress and
the nuclear industry.9 6 Others, while going along with the Carter policy for the time being, believe that the option to reprocess spent fuel at

some later time must be retained and, accordingly, that premature irretrievable disposal of spent fuel should be avoided.9 7 Even if it is assumed that the Carter policy will remain in force for some years to

come, these political pressures cast doubt on whether current proposals
91
92
93
94

12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1624 (Oct. 27, 1976).
1 PUB. PAPERS 587 (Apr. 7, 1977).

Id
Id

95 Generic Environmental Statement on Mixed Oxide Fuel [1975-1978 Transfer Binder] Nuc.

30,296. This decision was promptly challenged by Westinghouse Electric,
among others, as an abuse of agency discretion, but was sustained by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 598 F.2d 559
(3d Cir. 1979).
96 See, e.g., McCormack 1978 Hearings, supra note 47, at 1 (opening statement of Mike McCormack), 45 (colloquy between Cong. McCormack and J. Edward Howard); Schmitt 1978 Hearings, supra note 83, at 111, 114 (letter from Carl Walske to Adlai E. Stevenson and Harrison
Schmitt). For a general discussion of the potential energy contribution of plutonium in conventional or breeder reactors and countervailing non-proliferation concerns, see FORD-MITRE STUDY,
supra note 1, at chapters 11, 12, and 14; SCHURR, ENERGY IN AMERICA'S FUTURE: THE CHOICES
BEFORE Us 31-32, 389-94, 492-512 (1979).
More broadly, the annual battle between the Congress and President Carter over the funding
of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor has come to symbolize the sharp difference in views which
exists over future U.S. reliance on plutonium as an energy source. See Corrigan, Let's Make a
Deal,[1978] NAT'L J. 1402; Corrigan, Stuck in the Middle of Clinch River, [1978] NAT'L J. 1024;
Pelham, Annual Breeder Reactor Battle Set to Begin, 37 CONG. Q. 752 (1979); Clinch River Vote,
37 CONG. Q. 939 (1979) (Senate Energy Committee votes in favor of Carter proposal to halt
breeder construction); Committee Refuses to Halt Clinch River Project, 37 CONG. Q. 771 (1979).
97 See Glenn 1978 Hearings, supra note 47 at 3, 53 (statements of John Glenn); Schmitt 1978
Hearings,supra note 83, at 82 (statement of Harrison Schmitt).
REG. REP. (CCH)
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for the direct permanent disposal of U.S. spent fuel will ultimately be
implemented or whether solidified, post-reprocessing high-level waste
will turn out to be the material requiring disposal.
The deferral of commercial reprocessing and the lack of a fullscale geologic spent fuel repository for many years to come has meant
that utilities operating nuclear power plants have had to retain the
spent fuel discharged from these plants in storage pools at reactor
sites." Despite significant efforts to increase the storage capacity of existing spent fuel pools, some estimate that a widespread shortage of
spent fuel storage capacity could arise as early as 1983, potentially requiring the shut-down of a number of operating power plants. 99
To alleviate this possible near-term shortage of spent fuel storage
space at reactor sites, President Carter announced on October 18, 1977,
a program for the U.S. government (through DOE) to accept spent fuel
from domestic utilities (and in some limited cases from foreign nations)
in return for the payment of a one-time charge which would cover the
costs of continued interim storage at government owned "away-fromreactor" spent fuel storage facilities, as well as permanent disposal of
this material once a geologic repository entered into operation.10 0
Since the time of the President's announcement, DOE has published
several major documents outlining the main elements of this program,
including estimates of the fees to be charged and the methodology for
fixing them,1"' and has submitted enabling legislation to the Congress. 10 2 Again, however, the Carter proposal has been controversial,
and passage of such legislation at an early date appears unlikely. 10 3 To
date, no spent fuel has actually been accepted by the federal govern98 See IRG REPORT, supra note 1, at D-25.
99 See, eg., DOE DOMESTIC SPENT FUEL STORAGE DRAFT EIS, supra note 41, at 1-3; McCormack 1978 Hearings,supranote 47, at 8 (statement of J.Edward Howard); Schmitt 1978Hearings,
supra note 83, at 233 (statement of Sol Burstein).
10o U.S. Dep't of Energy, DOEAnnouncesNew Spent FuelPolicy,Press Release R-77-017 (Oct.
18, 1977).
101 See, eg., DOE DOMESTIC SPENT FUEL STORAGE DRAFT EIS, note 41 supra; U.S. DEP'T OF
ENERGY, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON CHARGE FOR SPENT FUEL STORAGE,

(DOE/EIS 0141-D, Dec. 1978); U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE STORAGE OF FOREIGN SPENT POWER REACTOR FUEL, (DOE/EIS 0040-D, Dec.

1978).
102 DOE Submits Legislationto Authorize FacilitiesforStorage of Spent Fuel, DOE-NEws R79-076 (Feb. 26, 1979). See Spent Nuclear Fuel Act of 1979, H.R. 2586, S.797, 96th Cong., 1st

Sess. (1979).
103 See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL FACILITIES FOR STORING SPENT

NUCLEAR FUEL-ARE THEY NEEDED? (EMD-79-82, June 27, 1979); Committee Tells DOE to
A void Building AFR ["away-from-reactor" spent fuel storage facility] But to Prepareto React to
India's Threats, NUCLEAR FUEL 11 (July 9, 1979).
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ment, nor have specific plans for the acquisition or construction of storage capacity been announced by the Administration.

In parallel with the two foregoing policy initiatives, President
Carter, on March 15, 1978, launched a major reassessment of the entire
U.S. nuclear waste management program under the guidance of an Interagency Review Group (IRG) chaired by DOE. 0 4 The IRG's final
report was published in March of 1979.105 The most far-reaching of the
Report's conclusions was its finding that major gaps exist in scientific
and technological knowledge concerning geologic waste repositories
and that, accordingly, U.S. efforts to develop such facilities must proceed with considerable caution and follow a scientifically conservative,
step-by-step approach.'0 6 IRG member agencies disagreed, however,
on how this joint recommendation should be implemented in the key
area of selecting a site for the first U.S. repository. 10 7 The crux of the
controversy was whether adequate information is currently available
on the use of salt as a host rock for a repository to permit selection of a
site in this medium, or whether a comparable understanding of alternative rock types should be developed first and a site then selected from
this broader range of options. 10 8 The second alternative could delay
the earliest date for operation of the first U.S. repository from 1988 to
104 Memorandum from President Jimmy Carter to the Sec'y of State, et al, on Interagency
Nuclear Waste Management Task Force, March 13, 1978, reprintedinIRG REPORT, supranote 1,
at app. A.
105 IRG REPORT, note I supra.
106 IRG REPORT, supra note 1, at 37, 48. Other major findings of the Report with respect to
post-fission waste disposal were: (1) Near-term program activities should be based on the assumption that the first disposal facilities will be mined repositories. The longer-term alternative
approaches of disposal in deep ocean sediments or very deep holes should be funded to allow their
adequate evaluation as competitors. Id at 58; (2) Near-term R&D and site characterization programs should be designed so that at the earliest date feasible, sites selected for location of a repository can be chosen from among a set with a variety of potential host rock and geohydrological
characteristics. To accomplish this, R&D on several potential emplacement media and site characterization work on a variety of geologic environments should be increased promptly. Id at 59;
(3) A number of potential sites in a variety of geologic environments should be identified and
early action should be taken to reserve the option to use them if needed at an appropriate time.
Near-term options should include having at least two (and possibly three) repositories operational
within this century, ideally and insofar as technical and other considerations permit, in different
regions of the country. Id; (4) Construction and operation of a respository should proceed on a
step-wise basis and initial emplacement of waste in at least the first repository should be planned
to proceed on a technically conservative basis and permit retrievability of the waste for some
initial period of time. Id at 62.
One of the IRG technical findings concerning the geologic repository program was that a
systems approach should be used to select the geologic environment, repository site, and waste
form. Id at 37.
107 IRG REPORT, supra note 1, at 52-53.
108 Id at 63; Hart 1979 Hearings, supra note 90, at 4 (statement of Worth Bateman).
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1992, or longer." 9 As of this writing, this difference of view was awaitig resolution by the President. Also bound up in this controversy is
whether the WIPP facility, which would be built in bedded salt, should
proceed or whether an expanded site selection process should be em-

ployed for siting this pilot facility, as well.'10

The IRG Report also stressed the need to remedy another uncertainty plaguing the U.S. nuclear waste management program, the continuing failure of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the
Environmental Protection Agency, respectively, to issue their safety
and environmental standards governing commercial post-fission waste
repository construction and operation."' These standards will have a
direct impact on the direction of DOE's research, development, and site
selection activities. The IRG proposed they be issued before the end of
1980.112

An additional recommendation of the IRG, triggered by the strong
concerns expressed by state governments during the past several years
over the possible disposal of post-fission wastes within their jurisdictions, was that state governments be given the right as a matter of federal policy to concur in all phases of the DOE repository siting and
development process. 13 Irrespective of whether this policy is fully implemented, however, strong state opposition to nuclear waste facilities
is likely to have a continuing and potentially profound impact on the
timing and ultimate shape of the U.S. post-fission waste repository pro14
gram.'
note 1, at 143.
110 Id at 72. WIPP has also been the subject of controversy within the Congress. See note 90
109 IRG REPORT, supra

supra.
I1I Id at 23-28.
112 Id at 140-41.
113 id at 93-95.
114 See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 82, at 3-6. This report notes the
history of opposition at the state and local level to the siting of nuclear waste repositories. The
report also states that "as of February 1979 nine states-Colorado, Louisiana, Michigan, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, South Dakota, and Vermont-had enacted legislation that
might prohibit waste repository siting" and that nineteen other states had enacted or were considering legislation "asserting lesser degrees of State control." Id at 5. See also Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Energy Regulation of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1979) (statement of Steven V. Sklar) (notes the National Conference of State
Legislatures' position that "State legislatures should exercise final approval power over the placement of nuclear waste disposal sites within the borders of their respective states.").
State and local opposition to the siting of post-fission waste repositories, it may be noted, is
not confined to the United States, but has also been manifest in a number of foreign nations, as
well. See A Tougher Nuclear Opposition in Britain Grows at the Grass Roots Level, NUCLEONICS
WK., Aug. 23, 1979, at 6 (U.K. Atomic Energy Authority prevented from testing rock in Cheviot
Hills area for potential waste disposal sites because of local opposition); Canada ir Beginning to
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While it is clear both from current funding levels and from the
attention the subject is receiving at the highest levels of government
that the United States is strongly committed to a vigorous, technically
sound post-fission waste disposal program, crucial elements of that program thus remain unresolved at this time. Even if such uncertainties
were promptly eliminated, however, it would still be 1988 at the earliest
before a full-scale waste repository for these materials could be opened.
. Japan. Japan has fifteen commercial nuclear power plants in operation and another fifteen under construction, or under letter of intent.I15 It is anticipated that the amount of nuclear generating capacity
will increase six-fold between now and 1990.116
Currently, Japan's spent power reactor fuel is in water-cooled
spent fuel pools at the reactor sites. 117 A small amount has been
reprocessed in a domestic pilot plant, and a modest quantity of spent8
fuel has been shipped to Great Britain and France for reprocessing."1
The Japanese waste management program is coordinated by the Japan
Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC). 119 The high-level liquid waste
from the pilot reprocessing plant which began operation in the fall of
1977 is being stored as acid liquids in stainless steel tanks pending a0
decision on solidification or more sophisticated processing treatment. 12
Japanese plans at the present time contemplate major exports of spent
fuel for reprocessing in England and France, and a number of spent
fuel shipments to these nations have already been made.' 2 1 Japan also
plans to develop a commercial scale domestic reprocessing capability to
commence operation in the late 1980s.122 Japan's early reprocessing
agreements with England apparently provide for retention of all resulting nuclear wastes in that country, 123 surely a masterstroke in this field.
However, the bulk of the agreements, signed more recently, call for the
return of the waste produced to Japan, assuming the material is
Experiencethe Same Problems as the US in Nuclear Waste, NUCLEONICS WK., Jan. 26, 1978, at 20
(Ontario provincial government resists national exploratory drilling program for repository); German Officials Hedge on Waste Storage, NUCLEAR FUEL, July 23, 1979, at 12 (Chancellor
Schmidt's meeting with officials of 11 West German states failed to produce solution to country's
waste management plight which stems from Lower Saxony's refusal to accept Gorleben facility).
115 Adopted and updated from World List of Nuclear Power Plants, note 40 supra.
116 K. HARMON, supra note 74, at 29. But see Japan Intends to Slow Its Plans to Increase Nuclear Power Output, Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1979, at 20, col. 3.
117 Appendix G, supra note 74, at G-5.
118 K. HARMON, supra note 74, at 29. See text accompanying notes 290-98 infra.
119 Appendix G, supra note 74, at G-5.
120 Id

121 K. HARMON, supra note 74, at 29.
122 Id

123 See Nuclear Fuel Transfer Hearings,supra note 17, at 87 (testimony of Joseph Nye).
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processed into a material suitable for transport.

24

A major problem

confronting Japan is that the country's high degree of seismic activity
puts serious technical constraints on the feasibility of burying nuclear
wastes permanently in mined repositories, as other nations are planning. For this reason, deep seabed disposal would appear to be especially attractive to Japan.
Japan's spent fuel shipments to France and England have been
controversial because they involve the retransfer for reprocessing of nuclear fuel material originally exported from the United States. As discussed below,"2 ' the U.S. retains the right to veto the shipment of U.S.origin *spentnuclear fuel for reprocessing in third countries. Since the
U.S. is now trying to discourage reprocessing, conflicts have arisen as to
whether the plans of Japan and these other nations to have their spent
fuel reprocessed in France and in Great Britain will be permitted to go
forward. To date, the U.S. position has been to permit reprocessing
under contracts entered into before the 1977 shift in U.S. policy and to
examine other retransfers of U.S.-origin spent fuel for reprocessing on
a case-by-case basis, with the U.S. likely to take a fairly restrictive
stand on approving them. 26 Japan's domestic reprocessing efforts are
also subject to a U.S. veto and are controversial for the reasons noted
below.I 27
Because Japan is densely populated and earthquake prone, the
Japanese have tentatively concluded that Japan may have difficulty
identifying a geologically suitable formation for below ground longterm post-fission waste disposal. 28 Therefore, Japan is interested in
seabed disposal or disposal on or within a deserted island. 129 However,
consideration of possible geologic burial sites within Japan is continuing, with limestone, diamonte, and shale formations under consideration.'

30

UnitedKingdom. The United Kingdom has thirty-two commercial
nuclear power plants in operation (many of them relatively small units)
31
and six units under construction, on order, or under letter of intent.'
124 Cumbria County Council, CopelandBorough Council Inquiry into Application of British NuclearFuels,Ltd, Transcript of Day Eight, at 17 (June 1977)(testimony of Lord Silsoe, Counsel for

British Nuclear Fuels, Ltd.) [hereinafter cited as Windscale Inquiry].
125 See text accompanying notes 264 and 290-98 infra.
126 MacLachIan, Once Again, Japan Asks U.S. Consent For Spent Fuel Reprocessing, Energy

Daily, Dec. 15, 1978, at 3. See also text accompanying notes 290-98 infra.
127 See text accompanying note 289 infra.

128 Appendix G, supra note 74, at G-5.
129 Id at 6.
130 K. HARMON, supra note 74, at 30.
131 Adopted and updated from World List of NuclearPower Plants,note 40 supra.
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The U.K. projections call for a ten-fold increase in generating capacity
by 2000 to 100 GWE, although this may be slowed significantly if current opposition to nuclear power increases. The U.K. has been
reprocessing its own fuel and, in addition, has entered into contracts to
reprocess light water reactor fuel from other countries. 132 It currently
has an over 1,000 metric ton per year commercial reprocessing plant in
operation, the "Windscale Works," and is hurrying with plans for a
33
second. 1 ,
The high-level wastes from the reprocessing are presently being
stored in liquid form in double-walled steel tanks.' 34 There has been
extensive work in the U.K. on the waste processing technology for
high-level waste and transuranic waste. The U.K. plans to store highlevel liquid waste in double-walled steel tanks for an interim period
and then to convert it to borosilicate glass. 135 In the meantime, the
U.K. is engaged in a program to evaluate the permanent storage of
radioactive waste in geological formations. The most probable options
136
are clay formations and crystalline rock.
France. France currently has twelve commercial nuclear power
plants in operation and thirty-seven units under construction, on order,
or under letter of intent. 137 It has one facility for commercial-scale
reprocessing of reactor fuel from its graphite-moderated, gas-cooled reactors at Marcoule and a second for reprocessing LWR fuel at La
Hague. 138 An additional facility for commercial LWR fuel reprocessing, also at La Hague, is planned for the mid-1980's. France, like Britain, is offering to reprocess fuel from other countries and to store the
residue for an interim period under contract with eventual shipment of
cooled wastes to the country of origin. 13 To date, most of the reprocessing wastes have been stored in liquid form in holding tanks. 14 0 However, the French have recently started operation of a plant at Marcoule
for the continuous vitrification of high-level wastes. ' 4 1 Another vitrification plant to "glassify" liquid high-level waste into a solid form is
132 Appendix G, supra note 74, at G-4.
133 Id
134 Id
135 1,d
136 Id See also K. HARMON, supra note 74, at 32; ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, note I supra;

Nuclear Power and the Environment: The Government's Response to the Sixth Report ofthe Royal
Commission on EnvironmentalPollution (Cmd. 6618), Cmd. 6820 (May, 1977).
137 Adopted and updated from World List ofNuclear Power Plants, note 40 supra.
138 Appendix G, supra note 74, at G-4.
139 Id at G-5.
140 Id
141 Id
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scheduled for completion in the early 1980's.' 42
With the start-up of the Marcoule solidification facility, the
French are, perhaps, at a more advanced stage of development in the
technology for converting high-level liquid waste to a borosilicate glass
than any other nation discussed in this section. 43 As recent French
reprocessing contracts permit the return of resulting high-level wastes
to the foreign contracting party only in solidified form, France is seeking to gain international acceptance of its solidification process." At
home, France presently intends to dispose of high-level waste in a glassious form in below-ground geological formations, probably salt, and is
studying salt domes in Southern France. 45 The French do not anticipate any large-scale permanent disposal for thirty years or so while a
final solution to disposal is developed 146
Belgium. Belgium has three operating power reactors and four
more planned for operation by 1982. 14' At present, none of the fuel
from the Belgian plants is being reprocessed. However, the Belgian
government is considering refurbishing and reopening the reprocessing
plant at Mol, Belgium.' 48 It is also working on plans for disposal of
wastes in clay beds below the Mol site, perhaps as early as 1981.
The Belgian government's proposed waste management research
and development five-year plan for 1978-1982 includes work to be
done under the framework of the Commission of European Communities in the following areas: (1) radioactive waste burial in geological
formations; (2) studies of compaction and encapsulation of reactor fuel
cladding waste; and (3) investigation
of high temperature incineration
149
of plutonium containing waste.
Belgium has also entered into a technical exchange agreement
with the United States to cooperate in the following areas: technology
of retrievable storage, terminal storage in geological formations, highlevel waste solidification and environmental effects of radioactive waste
disposal.' 5°
Sweden. Sweden has six LWR power plants in operation and will,
142 Id
143 See

text accompanying notes 116-92 supra. United States efforts to develop waste solidification technology have focused most heavily on high-level military waste.
144 K. HARMON, supra note 74, at 20. See also note 316 infra.
145 K. HARMON, supra note 74, at 20.
146 See K. HARMON, supra note 74, at 7; Appendix G, supra note 74, at G-4, G-5.
147 Appendix G, supra note 74, at G-9.
148 Id
149 Id

150 Id See also K. HARMON, supra note 74, at 16.
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under present plans, have six more in operation by 1983, though building of these plants is uncertain because of the anti-nuclear political climate in Sweden. 5 '
The Swedish Government Committee on Radioactive Waste recommended in 1976 that Sweden develop a reprocessing and waste
management capability. 52 Soon after this, the Socialist Party in Sweden changed from a pro- to an anti-nuclear power development pol- Subsequently, the Swedish Parliament enacted a law requiring
icy.' 53
that safe disposal of nuclear wastes be assured before any new reactors
be loaded with fuel and commence operation. 54 In response, the
Swedish utilities have sponsored a crash effort to develop a plan for
geological disposal of either spent fuel elements or solidified high-level
waste, and have contracted with France for reprocessing of Swedish
1 55
spent fuel at La Hague.
Prior to reprocessing, Sweden stores its spent fuel above ground in
water-filled pools at reactor sites. Sweden's announced policy is to
have its fuel reprocessed by France and to store solidified waste and
unprocessed spent fuel in near-surface bedrock (probably granite) for
30 years, followed by disposal in granite formations 500 meters underground. Swedish waste management research and development is directed toward this end. The present program includes: (1) preparation
for commissioning a pilot plant for disposal of spent fuel or solidified
high-level wastes; (2) design of underground storage areas; and (3)
powder-pressing and sintering techniques for making waste glass forms
and for making ceramic containers for spent fuels.' 5 6
Although two detailed studies of waste disposal methodologiesone for disposal of post-reprocessing waste and one for direct disposal
of spent fuel--completed under the auspices of the specially convened
utility panel noted above, have generally been accepted in Sweden as
describing technologies for the safe disposal of wastes, the actual implementation of these technologies remains something for the future. Recent Swedish government statements, moreover, have emphasized that
the proposals in these reports may prove too expensive to be imple151 Adopted and updated from World List of Nuclear Power Plants, note 40 supra.
152 K. HARMON, supra note 74, at 31; Appendix G, supra note 74, at G-5. See also Donnelly &
Kramer, supra note 22, at 15-18.
153 Donnelly & Kramer, supra note 22, at 17.
154 K. HARMON, supra note 74, at 31.
155 Id
156 Id at 31-32; Appendix G, supra note 74, at G-9, G-10. See also SWEDISH GOVERNMENT
COMM. ON RADIOACTIVE WASTE SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE, A SUMMARY
OF A REPORT GIVEN BY THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE ON RADIOACTIVE WASTE

(Statens offer lliga atredningin 197632 Industri-departmentet-Stockholm)(1976).
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mented in practice; 157 thus the reports demonstrate on paper how the
job can be done so as to meet public concerns but do not necessarily
embody a blueprint for how the Swedes will, in fact, proceed.
West Germany. West Germany has ten commercial nuclear power
plants in operation and nineteen units under construction, on order, or
under letter of intent.158
Except for the fuel reprocessed at a small experimental reprocessing facility, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has contracted
with a subsidiary of the French Atomic Energy Commission for the
reprocessing of spent fuel in France.'59 The FRG position has been
that reprocessing is an essential precondition to effective disposal of
radioactive wastes.' 60 The FRG does not expect to have its first commercial reprocessing plant in operation until the late 1980's. It proposes to concentrate reprocessing, recycling and waste treatment,
storage, and permanent disposal at Gorleben.16 1 Its plan is to solidify
high-level waste and to permit it to cool for an interim period of several
decades prior to permanent disposal in geologic formations. Local opposition at Gorleben has put these programs somewhat in doubt. As a
result, the bulk of West German spent fuel is currently stored at reactor
sites, with relatively modest quantities undergoing reprocessing in West
Germany's pilot-scale facility or in France.
Waste processing technology in the FRG is being developed for
treating high-level and alpha-contaminated, intermediate-level
waste. 162 The plan for high-level, liquid waste disposal involves spray
calcination and vitrification. 61 It is interesting to note that the FRG
already uses a salt mine located at Asse for the storage of low-level
in salt beds and in an abanwaste. 1" Disposal of high-level waste
65
doned iron mine are under study.'
Canada. Canada has eight commercial nuclear power plants in
operation and twelve units under construction, on order, or under letter
of intent.' 66 Though Canada does not now recycle its spent fuel, but
stores it in pools at reactor sites, its long-range plan is to convert to a
157 See note 156 supra.
.58 Adopted and updated from World List ofNuclear Power Plants,note 40 supra.
159 Appendix G, supra note 74, at G-7.
160 Id
161 Id
162 Ad at G-8.
163 Id

164 Id
165 K. HARMON, su'pra note 74, at 22.
166 Adopted and updated from WORLD LIST OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, note 40 supra.
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plutonium recycling process.167 In August of 1977, Canada's Department of Energy, Mines and Resources published a report by a group of
outside experts, entitled "Management of Canada's Nuclear
Wastes."' 6 8 The report concluded that the prospects were good for the
safe, permanent disposal of post-reprocessing wastes and irradiated
fuel and that, once stored in carefully selected subterranean reposito169
ries, these wastes should present no danger.
The report further concluded that underground disposal in igneous rock would be safest, and that a centralized location should be
available for all Canadian utilities to use.17° The schedule for providing a licensed repository calls for site selection by 1981, construction of
the demonstration facility by 1986, and commissioning of the repository by 2000.171 The report also found that spent fuel reprocessing is
not necessary for safe disposal and that both spent fuel and reproces172
sing waste can be disposed of in the same repository.
U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union has twenty-nine nuclear power plants
in operation with several more under construction. 73 It is reportedly
building a commercial scale spent fuel reprocessing plant and a largescale vitrification plant to be located near that facility. 74 The Soviets
also have been experimenting with a two-stage fluidized bed calcina175
tion process for solidifying high-level waste.
Although the U.S.S.R. has conducted studies of underground disposal, its program apparently has focused on long-term above-ground
storage of solidified high-level waste, an unusual approach when compared to those of other advanced nations. 176 Guiding principles for its
underground disposal studies apparently are that the disposal site
should adjoin the vitrification building, be above the water table, and
be converted section by section to a "tomb" as the waste ages and heat
177
generation decreases.
Developing Countries. However unfinished may be the nuclear
waste management efforts of the United States, Western Europe, and
supra note 74, at 17.
168 Id at 4. See also Appendix G, supra note 74, at G-6.
169 Appendix G, supra note 74, at G-6.
167 K. HARMON,

170 Id
171 K. HARMON, supra note 74, at 18.

172 Id See also Appendix G, supra note 74, at G-5.
173 Adopted and updated from World List fNuclear Power Plants, note 40 supra.
174 Appendix G, supra note 74, at G-10.
175 Id
176 K. HARMON, supra note 74, at 35.

177 Id at 35-36.
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Japan,17 8 they far surpass those under way in the less developed nations

with budding nuclear power programs where, it appears, this subject
has received only the most limited consideration.179 Two recent
178 See text accompanying notes 74-177 supra.

179 The following table indicates the status of nuclear power programs in less developed countries:
Status
Megawattsa
Argentina
Total
Brazil
Total
Egyptb
India

Total
Iranc

Total
Korea

Total
Mexico
Total
Pakistan
Philippines
Total
Taiwan

Total

319
600
919
626*
1245*
1245*
3116
622*
200*
200*
202
202
220
220
220
220
1684
1200*
1200*
900*
900*
4200
564*
605*
900*
900*
629
3598
654*
654*
1308
125
620*
620*
1240
604*
604*
951*
951*
907*
907*
4924

operating
7%constructed
80% constructed
5%constructed
ordered
ordered
operating
operating
operating
99% constructed
84% constructed
62% contructed
27% contructed
17% constructed
10% constructed
5 % constructed
0
0
operating
20% constructed
5%constructed
5% constructed
43% constructed
18.5% constructed
8.6% constructed
operating
11% constructed
ordered
operating
98% constructed
61% constructed
38% constructed
6% constructed
6% constructed

* Reactors marked with an asterisk are light water reactors (LWR's).
a Each number in this column indicates the capacity of a separate nuclear power reactor unless
denoted "Total."
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surveys of waste disposal programs world-wide, 180 for example, contain
no mention of activities to provide for the permanent disposal of highlevel waste or spent '.fuel in Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, or Taiwan."" India, which now has two
reprocessing plants in operation, appears to be the only exception; that
nation is now building a high-level waste solidification plant and has
conducted a geologic survey for potential repository sites.'8 2 Solidified

high-level waste will be stored in air-cooled vaults in the interim.'
One likely explanation as to why, apart from India, these developing nations have not turned their attention to nuclear waste disposal is
that they have not perceived the problem as an immediate one. Most
of these nations appear to have contemplated that their spent fuel
would be reprocessed, either in domestic facilities (in some cases to be
Egypt's power plant, to have been purchased from the United States, is contingent upon the
future negotiation of an agreement for cooperation between the parties.
c Iran's ambitious nuclear power program initiated under the Shah, has been terminated by

b

the new government of that nation. See Iran Cancels Reactors Raising Doubt on Link to

Enrichment Plant, Wall St. J., Apr. 10, 1979, at 4, col. 3. Discussion of the Iranian nuclear
program hereinafter refers to the period prior to this change of policy.
Source:
180

World List of Nuclear Power Plants, note 40 supra.
HARMON note 74 supra; INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, THE

See generally K.

MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE
181

(Mar. 1977) (Supp. Aug., 1978).

See also The Brazilian Nuclear Program, BRAZILIAN BULL., Jul., 1977, at 3; Concise Envi-

ronmental Review, Philippines Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1, Memorandum for James R. Shea,
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, from Louis V. Nosenzo, Deputy Ass't Sec'y of State, Bureau of
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs 3 (Sept. 28, 1979) ("Common to
many countries, especially those at the early stages of nuclear power development, the Philippines
has not yet developed any plans for the longer term handling of spent fuel beyond ten to thirteen
year's storage capacity in the reactor spent fuel storage pool.").
With respect to the difficulties encountered by developing countries in ensuring the safety of
nuclear power related activities, see Fitz, Regulatory Problems in Developing Countries, in

INTER-

NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM OF PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EXPORT OF NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS (IAEA-SM-223/22) (Mar. 1978) [hereinafter cited as SYMPosIUM]; Jacobs & Chung, Regulatory Diculties in a Developing Country, in SYMPOSIUM (IAEA-SM-223/25); Rosen, Critical
Issues of Nuclear Power Plant Safety In Developing Countries, 19 INT'L ATOM. ENERGY AGENCY

BULL. 12 (1979); Rosen, Upgrading the Safety Assessment of Exported Nuclear Power Plants, in
SYMPosIUM(IAEA-SM-223/22); Sanchez-Gutierrez & Vallalva, The Laguna Verde Nuclear Power
Project." Problems Confronted by a Small Regulatory Body, in SYMPOSIUM (IAEA-SM-223/14);
Problemsof Exporting to Developing Countries,NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INT'L 13 (May 1978). In

general, these articles cite small regulatory staffs, restricted budgets, limited availability of technically trained personnel and organizational deficiencies as constraining the effectiveness of LDC
nuclear power safety efforts. Such difficulties would presumably extend into the area of postfission waste disposal. See also note 28 supra.
182 K. HARMON, supra note 74, at 26-27.
183 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, note 180 supra.
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constructed with the assistance of an industrialized nuclear supplier na-

tion)1 84 or, possibly in foreign countries such as the U.K. or France. In
either case, the resulting high-level waste (which would most likely be

returned to the country of origin by foreign reprocessors) 185 would not
be available for final disposal for many years, perhaps not for a decade
or more, 18 6 leaving considerable leeway to address the disposal problem at a future date.
A number of recent developments, however, suggest that the role
of reprocessing in developing nations' nuclear fuel cycles is likely to be

substantially reduced in comparison to earlier expectations. First, in
part as a result of U.S. non-proliferation efforts aimed at discouraging
the separation of weapons-usable plutonium from spent fuel through
reprocessing, nuclear supplier nations have drastically curtailed their
export of the technology necessary for many developing nations to construct domestic commercial-scale reprocessing plants. France has
abandoned its sales of such technology to Korea and Pakistan, for example, apparently because of non-proliferation concerns.

87

West Ger-

many's agreement to provide this technology to Brazil may never reach
fruition because of major delays and possible cutbacks in Brazil's nuclear energy program.1 88 France and West Germany have, moreover,
specifically indicated that they do not intend to engage in further trans184 Argentina, for example, announced in 1978 plans to construct an "experimental" reprocessing plant near Buenos Aires. K. HARMON, supra note 74, at 14. A laboratory scale facility for
reprocessing research fuel has also operated there in the past. ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 95TH

CONG., 2D SESs., NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION FACTBOOK 202 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited
as NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION FACTBOOK]. Brazil has a pilot scale reprocessing plant under construction, with design and technical assistance provided by West Germany. K. HARMON, supra
note 74, at 17. In the case of Iran, reprocessing of U.S.-exported fuel was, reportedly, a major
issue in the negotiations between these countries on an agreement for cooperation. Korea and
Pakistan had hoped to purchase reprocessing equipment from France, although these deals have
fallen through. French Withdrawalof Nuclear Gear Sale to Pakistan Spurs Promise of U.S. Aid,
Wall St. J., Aug. 25, 1978, at 15, col. I; South Korea DropsPlan to Buy Nuclear PowerPlantFrom
France,N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1976, at 1, col. 2. As of 1976, Taiwan, had also begun construction
of a laboratory scale reprocessing plant. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION FACTBOoK, supra at 198 (Taiwan's reprocessing activities are now said to have ceased).
185 See notes 313 and 316 infra.
186 Japanese fuel shipped to the U.K. Windscale facility, for example will not be reprocessed
for at least 10 years. NuclearFuel TransferHearings, supra note 17, at 122 (letter from Nelson
Sievering to Congressman Clement Zablocki).
187 Burnham, South Korea Drops Plan to Buy a Nuclear Plantfrom France, N.Y. Times, Jan.
30, 1976, at 1, col 2; French Withdrawal of Nuclear Gear Sale to PakistanSpurs Promise of U.S.
Aid, note 184 supra.
188 Nuclebras WillRun BrazilianProgramAfterAngra-2, NUCLEONICS WK., May 31, 1979, at 5.
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fers of this technology; 8 9 and more broadly, a number of suppliers,
meeting as the London Suppliers Group, have subscribed to guidelines

under which suppliers agree to "exercise restraint" in the sale of
reprocessing technology.

90

Secondly, the United States has begun to exercise its controls over

reprocessing of U.S.-exported nuclear fuel (contained in its agreements
for nuclear cooperation) far more restrictively than in the past, again
for the purpose of limiting the availability of plutonium to decrease
proliferation risks.'

Although, these restrictions have principally af-

fected those nations with relatively well-developed nuclear programs,
i.e., those with significant accumulations of U.S.-origin spent fuel and
189 France announced its decision in December, 1976, Germany in June, 1977. Nye, NonProiferation: .4 Long-Term Strategy, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 602, 613 (1978).
190 In January 1978, following discussions among a small group of major nuclear supplier
states which began in 1974, each of the governments of Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia,
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States
informed the Director General of the IAEA, by individual letters, that when considering the export of nuclear material, equipment or technology, it will act in accordance with the principles
contained in documents attached to its letter. The identical documents were attached in each case
and consisted of "Guidelines for Nuclear Transfer" and its annexes. The letters from each government and the Guidelines, including annexes, were published in February 1978 in IAEA document INFCIRC/254.
The Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group provide that items on the trigger list developed by the suppliers should be transferred to a non-nuclear weapon state only when covered by
IAEA safeguards (ie., inspections and accounting reviews to verify that nuclear material has not
been diverted to non-peaceful uses), and specify additional requirements, including: formal governmental assurances from recipients, explicitly excluding uses which would result in any nuclear
explosive device; agreement by recipients to provide physical protection of specified levels to supplied items; specified provisions for relevant safeguards agreements; safeguards requirements applicable to facilities utilizing certain categories of technology which is transferred; controls on
retransfer of supplied items; and restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and
materials. In addition, the Guidelines outline a number of supporting activities in which supplier
governments should engage, including the promotion of international cooperation on physical
protection, support of effective implementation of IAEA safeguards, and consultations with other
suppliers generally and specifically, such as in the case of violation of understandings resulting
from the Guidelines. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 601
OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT OF 1978 26-27 (Jan. 1979) (unpublished report on
file with Senate Foreign Relations Comm.) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT].
191 See generally Nuclear Fuel Transfer Hearings, note 17 supra. The U.S. has exercised its
prior approval controls over the reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent fuel to prevent Indian reprocessing of any spent fuel from the Tarapur reactors, which use only U.S.-supplied fuel. See Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, Aug. 8, 1963, United States-India, 14
U.S.T. 1484, T.I.A.S. No. 5446, art. II(E); Memorandum to Lee V. Gossick, Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, from Peter Tarnoff, U.S. Dep't of State (March 6, 1978), reprinted in Hearings on Nuclear
Exports to India before the Subcoma. on Arms Control, Oceans and International Environment of
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 197, 200 (1978). The evolution of
current U.S. reprocessing approval policy is discussed in the text accompanying notes 264-65 and
290-98 infra.
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those with fully or partially constructed reprocessing plants, the U.S.
policy would also extend to the developing nations noted above. Since
the U.S. has been the chief supplier of nuclear fuels to many of these
nations,1 92 U.S. controls in its agreements for cooperation barring
reprocessing without U.S. permission will cover the bulk of spent fuel

eventually produced in these countries as their nuclear programs progress. This suggests that the shift in U.S. policy away from reproces-

sing may well result in a redirection of plans these nations may have
had for this activity.
Taken together, the curtailment of reprocessing technology trans192 As of 1977, the United States was the dominant supplier, in terms of outstanding contracts
for the uranium enrichment services necessary to produce light water reactor fuels in the case of
Brazil, Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines, Mexico, and Egypt (assuming Egypt and the U.S. enter
into the necessary umbrella agreement on civil nuclear cooperation). The following table compares the quantity of U.S. and non-U.S. enrichment services contracted for by each of these nations in metric tons of separative work units (the measure of uranium enrichment output):
U.S.
non-U.S.
Brazil
Egypt
Korea
Philippines
Mexico

6,669
532
3,800
1,230
1,994b

1,500a
0
0
0
0

a Brazil also has an option to purchase 1,900 additional units.
b U.S. sales of enriched uranium fuel are made pursuant to the U.S.-IAEA agreements,
which do not contain provisions granting the U.S. prior approval rights over reprocessing of fuel
provided thereunder. Agreement for the Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, Aug. 7,
1959, 10 U.S.T. 1424, T.I.A.S. No. 4291, amended,25 U.S.T. 1199, T.I.A.S. No. 7852 [hereinafter
cited as U.S.-IAEA Agreement]. Pursuant to § 126.a(2) of the Atomic Energy Act, however, a
renegotiation of the agreement between the U.S. and the IAEA to provide such control for the

U.S. is now underway.
Source: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION FACTBOOK, supra note 184, at 177-85.
Argentina's Canadian-style reactors are fueled with unenriched uranium not supplied by the
U.S. and, accordingly U.S. reprocessing controls do not apply. Had Iran continued its nuclear
program, the United States would have been a secondary nuclear fuel supplier (4,700 metric tons,
separative work units versus 8,800 for non-U.S. suppliers according to 1977 contract data). Finally, although the U.S. has barred the reprocessing of spent fuel from the two Indian Tarapur
reactors having a combined capacity of 400 megawatts, unenriched fuel discharged from India's
remaining power reactors (either operating or under construction) which have a combined capacity of 1284 megawatts will not be subject to U.S. controls.
It may be noted that Canada possesses controls over the reprocessing of irradiated fuel produced by the use of its exports. See, e.g., Agreement on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Jan.
7, 1973, Canada-Iran, [1973] Can. T.S. No. 2, art. IV(2)(c). Canada has, in a note accompanying
one of its agreements, indicated that it will not approve this activity if requested to do so by the
other party. Agreement for Cooperation in the Development and Application of Atomic Energy
for Peaceful Purposes, Jan. 26, 1976, Canada-Korea, [1976] Can. T.S. No. 11. France appears to
have exercised similar controls in at least one instance. See Diplomatic Note accompanying draft
Agreement for Cooperation on the Koeburg Nuclear Power Station, Stages I and II, Oct. 15, 1975,
France-South Africa (reprocessing in South Africa of fuel irradiated in French-exported reactors
prohibited). How, on a more general basis, these nations will exercise these controls and the
impact on recipient reprocessing activities remains to be seen.
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fers and restrictions over the reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent fuel suggest that spent fuel, itself, may ultimately come to be viewed in these
developing countries as the material requiring final disposal. This, in
turn, could necessitate the development of long-term disposal facilities
on a more accelerated schedule than had been previously planned.
Seen against this background, the current failure of these nations to
initiate waste management research and development activities may
have a greater short-term impact on their nuclear power programs than
has been heretofore appreciated.
MultilateralPrograms
The achievements of multilateral organizations in the field of nuclear waste disposal have been primarily in the areas of research and
development and facilitation of disposal efforts for non-high-level
wastes. Multilateral organizations have not, so far, set minimum standards or established deadlines for post-fission waste disposal. Some of
the accomplishments of the multilateral organizations, both in the area
of waste management and in other areas of nuclear activity, suggest
that these organizations may be able to lead the world toward early
demonstration of waste disposal technology and toward minimum
standards for waste disposal accepted by all, or nearly all, the countries
which use nuclear power.
InternationalAtomic Energy Agency. The International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) is an autonomous international organization
dedicated to the promotion of the use of atomic energy for peaceful
purposes under a system of non-proliferation controls which it administers. Although loosely affiliated with the United Nations, the
Agency, which now has one hundred and three member nations, operates pursuant to its own independent charter and is legally independent
of the U.N.' 93 The principal activities of the IAEA consist of providing
technical assistance to member states, promoting the exchange of technical information pertaining to nuclear power, and implementing a
program of inspections and related activities to verify that nuclear
materials and facilities subject to these safeguards in member states are
being used exclusively for peaceful purposes.'9 4
Over the years the Agency has conducted an active, though modestly funded, program concerning a broad range of nuclear waste treat193 Established by the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, openedfor signature
Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873.
194 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1977, GC

(XXII)/597 (July 1978).
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ment and disposal issues, including disposal of post-fission radioactive
wastes.'95 The objective of the program has been, on the one hand, to
evaluate, disseminate and promote the exchange of information on the
technologies relating to this subject and, on the other, to develop speand guides for application in member states on a voluntary
cific codes
96
basis.

1

In the areas of information exchange, the Agency over the past
several years has sponsored a number of major symposia on the subject
of waste management and has published numerous technical documents on such subjects as the safe handling, storage and movement of
high-level waste and the safe
irradiated fuel, characteristics of solidified
97
waste.'
high-level
liquid
of
handling
A major Agency activity at the present time is the formulation of
guidelines, which will ultimately lead to the preparation of more specific Codes of Practice and Safety Guides 8 for the underground disposal of post-fission radioactive wastes, including the disposal of these
materials in geologic formations. 19 9 The Agency also hopes to publish
shortly guidelines on safety assessments for geologic disposal, licensing
and approval procedures for geologic repositories, and guidelines regarding the investigation of repository sites for solidified high-level
waste. 200 The Agency will also be preparing guidelines and Codes of
195 In fiscal year 1979, for example, the total budget for the sub-program "Treatment and Disposal of Radioactive Wastes" (including wastes in addition to post-fission wastes) was estimated to
be about $.7 million. The Agencyr Programmefor 1979-84 and Budgetfor 1979, INT'L ATOM.
ENERGY AGENCY GC(XXII)/600 (Aug. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Budgetfor 1979]. The proposed budget for fiscal year 1980 includes $1.4 million for this area. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY, THE AGENCY'S BUDGET FOR 1980, GC(XXIII)/612, at 27. For a description of
the activities of the Agency in the area of radioactive waste management from 1958 when these
activities were initiated, see generally Budgetfor 1979, supra at 72-73. See also Nathanson, note I
supra.
196 Budgetfor 1979, supra note 195, at 72. In addition to its information exchange and standards development activities the IAEA has provided limited funds (generally $150,000 to $200,000
annually) for research and development in selected areas of radioactive waste management and
environmental assessment, usually for coordinated research programs involving participation by
member states. See K. HARMON, supra note 74, at 37.
197 I1d at 73.
198 IAEA Codes of Practice for nuclear power plants, for example, establish safety objectives
and minimum requirements; Safety Guides recommend procedures for implementing the Codes
of Practice. See Hendrie, Securing Reactor Safety Objectives In the Nuclear Power Program
Worldwide, 17 ATOM. ENERGY L.J. 338, 355 (1975). Adoption of such documents by the Agency
involves a complex series of steps to ensure that they reflect an international consensus on their
respective subjects. Id at 35-358. See also Ha Vinh, IAEA Safety Standards Their Legal Status
andImplementation, in EXPERIENCE AND TRENDS IN NUCLEAR LAW, IAEA LEGAL SERIFS,No. 8,
STI/PUB/333 (1972).
199 Budgetfor 1979, supra note 195, at 73.
200 Id
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Practice regarding the storage of high-level liquid wastes produced
from reprocessing and for the solidification of these materials. 20 1 The
Agency currently has underway, as well, a review of the state of technology and the requirements for the preparation of spent fuel elements
for direct long-term storage and/or disposal.20 2
As noted above,20 3 the Agency's Guides and Codes are promulgated for voluntary adherence by member states; the IAEA statute does
not require adherence to these issuances as a condition of membership.2 ' 4 The sole exception to this rule is in the case of projects sponsored by the Agency within member states for the construction of
research or commercial-scale nuclear facilities.20 5 For these projects,
the Agency's statute mandates that the Agency undertake a safety review encompassing, among other issues, the disposal of produced nuclear wastes, with the adequacy of safety measures to be judged against
safety standards agreed to by the recipient state and the Agency.20 6 In
20 7
practice, these have been the Agency's own safety standards.
NuclearEnergy Agency (NEA). The NEA is a specialized agency
201 Id
202 Id
203 See

text accompanying note 196 supra.
204 Notwithstanding their voluntary character, IAEA standards have been widely adopted
among IAEA member states in many cases. The Agency's model Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials (Safety Series No. 6, 1973 revision), for example, have been adopted
by regulators in some 70 nations. Telephone communication with Wendall Carriker, U.S. Dep't
of Transportation. According to the Agency's Director General, Sigvard Eklund, "The international transport of nuclear fuel would be almost unthinkable without them." Eklund, The InternationalAtomic Energy Agency and Its Role in World-Wide Security of Nuclear Fuels and Facilities
andNon-Prolferation, 17 ATOM. ENERGY L.J. 322, 327 (1976). (The U.S. regulations codifying
these standards are 10 C.F.R. §§ 71.1-71.64 (1979), 49 C.F.R. §§ 101.1-192.743 (1978)).
Similarly, guidelines published by the Agency for the protection of nuclear material against
theft or sabotage, INFCIRC/225, The PhysicalProtection of Nuclear Materials, (1975, revised
1977), have been widely embraced. The major nuclear supplier nations, for example, have each
agreed to require their export recipients to confrom with the essential elements of INFCIRC/225
as a condition for receipt of exports. Communications Received From Certain Member States
Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Facilities, or Technology,
INFCIRC/254, Annex B (February 1978). See note 190 supra. Virtually all U.S. nuclear export
recipient nations (including the EURATOM nations, Japan, Canada, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Philippines, Brazil, Argentina, Austria, Australia, Denmark, Norway, Turkey, Thailand, Yugoslavia, and Mexico) now apply these guidelines. Telephone communication
with Robin Delabarre, U.S. Dep't of State. Pursuant to recommendations in these guidelines, an
international convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials was concluded in Vienna
on Oct. 6, 1979. It will be opened for signature on March 3, 1980. Letter from J. Bryan Atwood,
Ass't Sec'y of State, to Senator Frank Church (Nov. 1, 1979).
205 See id
206 See Ha Vinh, supra note 198, at 4. The Agency's role in performing safety reviews with
respect to Agency projects is discussed below. See text accompanying notes 318-32 infra.
207 See Ha Vinh, supra note 198, at 5-6.
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of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) established to promote cooperation among the OECD countries for development and application of nuclear power for peaceful
purposes through international research and development projects and
exchange of scientific and technical experience and information.
In 1975, the NEA established a Radioactive Waste Management
Committee (RWMC). °8 Its purpose is to initiate, encourage and coordinate cooperative research and development activities in the field 2of
09
radioactive waste management, particularly within NEA states.
RWMC has held a series of meetings and established a number of permanent and ad hoc committees and study groups to deal with specific
technical areas.210 Current NEA waste management activities are focused on the definition of cooperative programs to develop geologic
waste isolation technology.21 It assists in joint projects of waste disposal of its members. For example, it has coordinated a series of ocean
dumps of low-level nuclear waste from certain European countries.212
First it coordinated the research by experts from the participating
countries to assess the danger of the project. Then the NEA commissioned the ship to make the dumps and oversaw the picking up of the
nuclear wastes at several European ports and the actual dumping.213
The NEA has coordinated development of packaging and dumping
standards as well.
Eurochemic. The Eurochemic Company is sponsored by a number
of OECD/NEA countries. 2 14 From 1968 through 1974 it operated a
reprocessing plant at Mol, Belgium, and is presently negotiating with
Belgium for turnover of the plant to a Belgian company for modernization and future operation. 215 Eurochemic is obligated to convert the
reprocessing waste from its current liquid form to solid form suitable
for interim storage and has determined to use the French AVM
208 K. HARMON, supra note 74, at 39. OECD member states are Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand (special status), Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
209 Id.
210 Id.

211 Id.
212 D. DEasE, supra note 1, at 51-52 (1978).
213 Id.
214 K. HARMON, supra note 74, at 39. Member states of Eurochemic are Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.
215 Id.
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(Marcoule)2 16 vitrification process for solidification of the high-level
liquid wastes. Apparently, Belgium will assume responsibility for disposal of the solidified waste.217
Commission ofEuropean Communities (CEC). The European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC) was created in 1951 to pool the coal and
steel production of the six member states.2 18 In 1957, the European
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were formed by the same six members. In 1967,
Euratom was merged into the EEC and its former activities are now
under the CEC, which formulates and implements policy for the Community.

2 19

Included within CEC's mandate are formulation of nuclear safety
standards and research and development of waste management technology. CEC's resources include a Joint Research Center with research
facilities in Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the FRG. A number
of research and development programs are currently underway in disposal and storage of nuclear waste.2 2 °

A five year program of nuclear waste disposal research was begun
by the CEC in June, 1975.221 At present, the CEC has outstanding
approximately fifty research contracts in the areas of processing, storage, and disposal of radioactive waste, and the separation and recycling
of plutonium. The processing research includes projects on (1) coating
medium-activity waste with plastic resin; (2) decontamination and conditioning of irradiated fuel element claddings; (3) incineration of plutonium-contaminated solid waste; and (4) comparative studies of the
properties of various materials suitable for the immobilization of highactivity waste. The storage and disposal research has included projects
on storage of solidified high-level waste in engineered structures and
disposal of this material in geological formations.
In addition, the CEC program has awarded grants to study the
legal, administrative, and financial problems of nuclear waste disposal.
These include: (1) the review of problems posed by the management of
radioactive waste which could not be solved under existing intera216 AVM is the name of the waste vitrification process developed by France. See text accompanying notes 141-43 supra.
217 K. HARMON, supra note 74, at 39.

218 The original members of the ECSC were Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands.
219 The current members of the CEC are Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
220 K. HARMON, supra note 74, at 38 (Table 7).
221 Id. at 37.
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tional, legal, administrative, and financial provisions; and (2) studies of
the principles which should govern the management of radioactive
waste.222 The CEC has also been instrumental in fostering treaties on
third-party liability and transborder pollution which are discussed below.

22 3

Councilfor Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA,). The CMEA,

which is the counterpart of the OECD for countries with centrally-controlled economies, has a standing commission concerned with the use
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. 224 In 1971, the CMEA established a coordinating scientific and technical council (CSTC) which is
mainly concerned with radioactive waste management and decontamination of equipment. It meets twice a year. The main task of CSTC is
to promote multilateral cooperation, analyze the status and trends of
development in radioactive waste management technology, recommend the main direction of research and development, examine the
economic efficiency of putting technology into practice, and organize
the exchange of experience and information.125 The CSTC has given a
high priority to the development of safe disposal methods for radioactive wastes, especially into geologic formations.22 6 The environmental
aspects of radioactive waste management are covered by a CSTC committee on radiation protection. 2 7 Apparently, neither minimum disposal standards nor time tables for disposal have been established by
CMEA. Compliance with its recommendations is voluntary.
InternationalNuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation.22 8

In his April 7,

1977 speech articulating United States nuclear non-proliferation policy,
President Carter announced a major U.S. initiative aimed at promoting
international cooperation in the development of nuclear fuel cycle activities more "proliferation-resistant" than the traditional nuclear fuel
cycle based on the reprocessing of reactor fuels and the separation of
plutonium usable in weapons.22 9 Reduced to its essentials, the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) is a two-year study undertaken jointly by a group of fifty-three nations and four international
222 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PROGRAMME OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ON RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT AND STORAGE (Eur. 6128EN, 1978).

223 Id. See text accompanying notes 357-59 and 367 infra.
224 K. HARMON, supra note 74, at 41. Member states are Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, the USSR, and Yugoslavia (special status).
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.

228 The purpose and scope of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) are
described in REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 190, at 13-20.
229 Id. at 13.
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organizations whose basic purpose is to evaluate current nuclear technologies and possible alternatives to them in an effort to assess their
relative economies, practicability, state of development, and, most important, the relative ease with which they can be turned from their ostensible civilian purpose to the military objective of making nuclear
weapons.23 °

The initiation of INFCE as an international endeavor took place
in Washington in October 1977 at the INFCE Organization Conference. At that conference, participants agreed that the study would be
divided into eight parts, each generally covering one aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle.23 1 A working group, co-chaired by representatives of
two or three governments and having membership from twenty or
thirty countries, would be responsible for each area.2 32 In addition, a
technical coordinating committee composed of the representatives of
the twenty-two co-chairman countries was established to integrate the
overall effort.2 33 The coordinating committee was to report to the Plenary Conference of all INFCE participants at two different times, at
roughly the mid-point in the evaluation and at the conclusion of the
23 4
study.

Two of the eight working groups are of particular relevance to the
subject here at issue: Working Group 6, Spent Fuel Storage, and
Working Group 7, Waste Management and Disposal. The Spent Fuel
Storage Working Group is focusing on short and intermediate storage
options for spent fuel from various types of reactors as an alternative to
immediate reprocessing of these materials.2 3 5 The working group on
Waste Management and Disposal is studying the disposal of separated
wastes from spent fuel reprocessing and the disposal of unreprocessed
spent fuel as a waste form. 23 6 Specific differences in proliferation risk

and safeguards, as well as environmental, technical, economic, and
safety aspects, are being analyzed. One topic identified for particular
treatment by both working groups is the "special needs of the develop230 Id.at 13-20.
231 Id. at 15.
232 Id. The eight Working Groups are: (1) fuel and heavy water availability, (2) enrichment
availability, (3) assurance of long-term supply of technology, fuel, and heavy water and services in
the interest of national needs consistent with "non-proliferation goals," (4) reprocessing, plutonium handling, recycling, (5) fast breeders, (6) spent fuel storage, (7) waste management and disposal, and (8) advanced fuel cycle and reactor concepts. Id. at 15-18.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 17.
236 Id.
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ing countries.

2 37

Although the INFCE working groups have met several times since
the beginning of the evaluation, the papers exchanged at these meetings
and the views of the various working group participants have been kept
confidential, undoubtedly to permit the free exchange of ideas and the
emergence of the fullest degree of consensus. 238 Thus, it is not possible
at this writing to state whether the working groups concerned with
spent fuel management and disposal will be able to establish any agreement on these topics which might serve as the basis for international
norms in the future. According to press reports, one likely result is that
agreement on certain very basic principles will be reached, such as the
notion that there are no scientific or technological reasons why spent
fuel cannot be disposed of directly on a permanent basis, and that accordingly, reprocessing is not a mandatory requirement for a safe nuclear waste disposal program.2 3 9
Given the terms of reference of the evaluation, however, it is unlikely that the INFCE endeavor will go beyond this to consider international guidelines in the area of nuclear waste storage or disposal, even
those to which adherence would be entirely voluntary. Such an outcome appears to have been ruled out by the terms of the Final Communique of the Organizing Conference of INFCE which stated:
The participants agreed that INFCE was to be a technical and analytical
study and not a negotiation. The results will be transmitted to governments for their consideration in developing their nuclear energy policies
and in international discussions concerning nuclear energy cooperation
and related controls and safeguards. Participants would not be committed to INFCE's results.
The evaluation will be carried out in a spirit of objectivity, with mutual respect for each country's choices and decisions-in this field, without
jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international cooperation, agreements, and contracts for the peaceful use of nuclear energy,
provided that agreed safeguards measures are applied.2 4
Similarly, it is not possible to predict how INFCE will address the nuclear waste management concerns of developing nations.
MultinationalFacilities'forPost-Fission Waste Management. In the
course of the past two years, a number of preliminary proposals have
emerged for establishing international facilities for the storage of spent
237 Id., app. A, at 5-6.
238 Conversation with George Rathjens, U.S. Dep't of State (Oct. 9, 1979).

239 Spent FuelIs Last, Working Group Seven Says, NUCLEAR FUEL, Sept. 3, 1979, at 10.
240 Final Communique of the Organizing Conference of the InternationalNuclear Fuel Cycle
Evaluation, Oct. 21, 1977, reprintedin REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 190, app. A, at 2.
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nuclear fuel or separated plutonium.24 Generally speaking, the underlying motive for the development of such proposals has been the desire
to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation which could be

242
posed by the widespread future availability of separated plutonium.

International spent fuel storage would provide a means for nations
to reduce accumulations of this material at reactor sites. Since, today,
the principal alternative means for accomplishing this result is
reprocessing the spent fuel, either domestically or in the U.K. or
France, an international spent fuel storage regime could ease near-term

pressures to expand reprocessing activities in additional nations and
the concomitant accumulation of separated plutonium.24 3 If at a future
date, following, for example, the development of new technologies for

reducing plutonium's proliferation risk, reprocessing were to become
more acceptable, spent fuel could be released for reprocessing; or it

could be disposed of permanently pursuant to agreement of the parties
involved. 2'

Under the international plutonium storage concept, reprocessing
would not necessarily be restricted; but after plutonium was separated

through this activity, it would be transferred to a facility operated
under international auspices. Retention in an international, as compared to a national, facility would reduce the risk of the plutonium
being misappropriated for military purposes.24 5 Plutonium would be
released from the international storage facility for specified civilian
241

See, e.g.,

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT AND

STORAGE OF PLUTONIUM AND SPENT FUEL (DRAFT) (1978) (draft not publicly released) (reported
in 1,4E Will Tackle Plutonium Storage and Management at December Meeting, Energy Daily,
Nov. 7, 1978, at 3). Working Group 6 of INFCE has also focused on international mechanisms
for spent fuel storage. See text accompanying notes 234-39 supra. Its report will apparently identify a number of requirements for successful implementation of any such arrangement. See Working Group 6 FaultsLimits on Choice, NUCLEAR FUEL, September 3, 1979, at 9. A third proposal is
the U.S. initiative to examine the use of isolated Pacific islands as international storage sites for
spent fuel from Pacific Basin countries. Hearingson S. 1119 before the Senate Comm on Energy
andNaturalResources,96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (testimony of Thomas R. Pickering, Ass't Sec.
for Oceans and Int'l Environment and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State) [hereinafter cited as
PickeringPacoc Isle Storage Testimony]. See also Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat. 120 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 22, 42 U.S.C.); Doub & Weiss,
InternationalNuclear Development in the Age of Interdependence, 32 VAND. L. REV. 843, 879-85
(1979).
242 See, e.g., Pickering Pacoc Isle Storage Testimony, note 241 supra.
243 Id.
244 Id. Establishing agreed upon guidelines for the subsequent disposition of spent fuel is
likely to be one of the more controversial aspects of this proposal. See IAE4 Will Tackle Plutonium Storage and Managementat December Meeting, note 241 supra. See also Working Group 6
FaultsLimits on Choice, note 241 supra.
245 See, e.g., Doub & Weiss, supra note 241, at 859.
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uses under strict controls which would provide added assurance that
the material was not being diverted to weapons uses.2 46

Article XII(A)(5) of the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute contemplates the development of a plutonium storage regime supervised by the IAEA,2 47 and, during 1978, the Agency developed a

preliminary report on this and the international spent fuel storage concepts.2 4

Discussions on these proposals were held during December,

1978, involving twenty-one countries, 249 with the international plutonium storage concept apparently gaining wider support than the comparable regime for spent fuel. 250 The United States, which has tended
to favor the latter alternative, 25 ' has since assisted the IAEA in organiz-

ing a second meeting of experts, in November 1979, to address this
option.25 2 Further discussions are anticipated. Both alternatives, it
may be noted, have also received considerable attention in the course

of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation. 253 Because of
their many institutional, financial, legal, and political complexities,
246 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2153 (1978). See also Daub & Weiss, supra
note 241, at 858, 861 n.88.
247 Article XII(A) of the IAEA Statute provides that in conjunction with the Agency's application of safeguards it shall have the right:
To approve the means to be used for the chemical processing of irradiated materials
solely to ensure that this chemical processing will not lend itself to diversion of materials for
military purposes and will comply with applicable health and safety standards; to require that
special fissionable materials [e.g., plutomum] recovered or produced as a by-product be used
for peaceful purposes under continuing Agency safeguards for research or in reactors, existing or under construction, specified by the member or members concerned; and to require
deposit with the Agency of any excess of any special fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-product over what is needed for the above-stated uses in order to prevent stockpiling of these materials, provided that thereafter at the request of the member or members
concerned special fissionable materials so deposited with the Agency shall be returned
promptly to the member or members concerned for use under the same provisions as stated
above.
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, art. XII (A)(5), openedfor signatureOct. 26,
1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873.
248 According to press reports, the IAEA document provides estimates of the amount of spent
fuel and plutonium likely to be produced through the year 2000 (25 metric tons of plutonium
already separated by IAEA members, excluding eastern bloc countries; 250 metric tons estimated
to be separated by 1990; 850 tons, by 2000). It also estimates the cost of spent fuel and plutonium
storage ($140-$280 million to store 5000 metric tons of spent fuel versus $8 million to store the 30
metric tons of plutonium this amount of fuel would yield) and notes the major issues associated
with establishing workable storage arrangements (for spent fuel, identifying a host country and
avoiding the risk that interim storage might become indefinite storage; for plutonium, how to
safeguard plutonium stores against forcible seizure and what rules should govern release of stored
plutonium). IA 4 Will Tackle Plutonium Storage and Management at December Meeting,supra
note 241, at 3.
249 InternationalPlutonium Storage Gets Big Boost, Energy Daily, Dec. 12, 1978, at 4.
250 Id.
251 PickeringPacoc Isle Storage Testimony, supra note 241, at 12.
252 Conversation with Thomas Pickering, U.S. Dep't of State (Nov. 20, 1979).
253 See PickeringPacoc Isle Storage Testimony, supra note 241, at 11.
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however, these international storage regime concepts will undoubtedly
be many years in developing.
As generally conceived, it may be noted, neither international
spent fuel nor plutonium storage options specifically address the ultimate disposal of post-fission wastes. 4 Spent fuel storage regimes are
usually described as interim measures whose purpose, in part, is to defer-rather than to resolve--decisions on reprocessing or other disposition of spent fuel. 5 Indeed, one serious drawback to the international
spent fuel storage concept is that any nation which accepted foreign
spent fuel on an "interim" basis might find itself being used as a de
facto nuclear waste dump indefinitely. 6 Similarly, international plutonium storage by definition is concerned with only one of the end
products of reprocessing, plutonium; 257 presumably arrangements for
dealing with the high-level liquid waste "product" from reprocessing
would be unaffected, and the matter would be left to reprocessors and
their customers, much as is the case today.
Even if these storage programs do not themselves address the
problem of permanent post-fission waste disposal, international cooperation in developing such joint storage regimes may well "spill over"
and foster cooperation in the latter area. This would seem especially
likely in the case of international spent fuel storage, where the host
nation would have a strong interest in developing mutually satisfactory
arrangements with other participants on the later treatment of stored
spent fuel. Indeed, according to press reports, INFCE Working Group
6 will recommend in its report on international spent fuel storage regimes that advance agreement on such subsequent disposal arrangements be a requirement for any international spent fuel storage
program. 2518 This suggests that negotiations on such programs may ultimately play an important role in developing an international consensus
on permanent post-fission waste disposal practices.
CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY EXPORTERS

Nations exporting nuclear fuel and power plant equipment have
expanded the international dimension of the post-fission waste hazard.
While seemingly in a strong position to influence the disposal practices
254 Cf. text accompanying notes 59-60 supra (discussing solidification and permanent burial of
nuclear waste).
255 See, e.g., PickeringPacfc Isle Storage Testimony, supra note 241, at 21.
256 This drawback is apparently noted in the IAEA report on international spent fuel storage.
A4A Will Tackle Plutonium Storage and Management at December Meeting, note 241 supra.
257 See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
258 Working Group 6 Faults Limits on Choice, note 241 supra.
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of their export recipients, these nuclear supplier nations have, in practice, declined to involve themselves actively in this facet of their cus-

tomers' nuclear programs.
United States Practices

Until the relatively recent non-proliferation initiatives of the
Carter Administration 259 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
1978260 aimed at discouraging the availability of separated plutonium
under national control, the U.S. largely viewed disposal of post-fission
wastes produced from its exports as a domestic health and safety con-

cern of its export recipients, to be addressed by these sovereign governments as they saw fit, without interference or active guidance from the
" ' Controlling U.S. law, policy, and international agreeUnited States.26
259 See text accompanying notes 280-305 infra.

260 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat. 120 (1978) (codified in
scattered sections of 22, 42 U.S.C.).
261 This policy with respect to post-fission wastes does not appear to have been formally announced, but to have evolved from the overall U.S. policy of non-interference in export recipients'
management of the health, safety and environmental aspects of nuclear reactors and fuel imported
from the United States. The basis for this broader policy was set forth in two opinions of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Edlow Int'l Co., 3 Dec. Nuc. Reg. Comm'n 563, [1975-1978
Transfer Binder] Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) T 30,069 (May 7, 1976), affdon othergroundssub nom.
Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 580 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curiam), and
Babcock & Wilcox, 5 Dec. Nuc. Reg. Comm'n 1332, [1975-1978 Transfer Binder] Nuc. REG. REP.
(CCH) 30,205 (June 27, 1977). In the former case, concerning a nuclear fuel export license for
the U.S.-supplied reactors at Tarapur, India, the Commission ruled that the provisions of the
Atomic Energy Act requiring the Commission to consider the "public health and safety" in granting certain licenses did not require that the Commission, in the context of reviewing nuclear export licenses, consider any foreign health and safety impacts which might result from such exports.
Edlow Int'l Co., 3 Dec. Nuc. Reg. Comm'n at 574, 582-83; [1975-1978 Transfer Binder] Nuc.
REG. REp. (CCH) 1 30,069.06, .30,069.10, at 27,394-95. Among other factors weighed by the
Commission in interpreting its mandate in this area, the Commission noted that with respect to
the health effects experienced in the vicinity of Tarapur "it would be extraordinary, as a matter of
international law, to conclude that we had authority to address ourselves to, or to attempt to
regulate, matters so clearly domestic to the Indian nation and within the purview of its own regulatory responsibilities." Id. at 582, [1975-1978 Transfer Binder] Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) at
130,069.10. The Commission also stressed that exclusion of such foreign health and safety impacts from nuclear export licensing decisions had long been the publicly declared practice of the
NRC and its predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission (whose export licensing functions had
been transferred to the NRC on January 19, 1975, under the Energy Reorganization Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5801, 5841(f) (1976)), a practice at least tacitly approved by the Congress. Id.
In the Babcock & Wilcox case, which concerned the export of a nuclear reactor to West
Germany, the Commission determined that the provisions of the National Environmental Policy
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976), did not require the Commission to prepare an environmental impact
statement on the proposed export examining its site-specific environmental impacts within West
Germany. Again, the Commission gave considerable weight in interpreting the statute to the
inappropriateness, under general principles of international law, of the United States' interfering
in exclusively domestic matters confined to West Germany and subject to that nation's health,
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ments 262 were essentially silent on the matter, leaving U.S. export resafety and environmental regulation. Babcock & Wilcox, 5 Dec. Nuc. Reg. Comm'n at 1343-46,
[1975-1978 Transfer Binder] Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) at 30,205.08.
262 Prior to the passage of thek Non-Proliferation Act, U.S. nuclear exports were governed by
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976), and additionally, after January 19, 1975,
by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5801 (1976). The latter act abolished the
Atomic Energy Commission and, interalia, created the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to which
it transferred the AEC's export licensing functions; however, the substantive provisions of the
Atomic Energy Act continued in force, governing the NRC's nuclear export licensing decisions.
Briefly summarized, the Atomic Energy Act established two preconditions for the commercial
export of nuclear reactors and fuel from the United States. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2074, 2077, 2133,
2153, 2094 (1976). First, the Act required that all exports be pursuant to an agreement for cooperation between the U.S. and the export-recipient country setting forth the overall framework for
such exports and specifically precluding recipients from using any export for atomic weapons or
any other military purpose. (Although these agreements contain numerous restrictions in addition
to those expressly required by the Atomic Energy Act, none of these address the disposal of postfission waste produced from U.S. exports. But see text accompanying notes 264-65 infra.) See
general, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
UNITED STATES AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION IN ATOMIC ENERGY: AN ANALYSIS (Comm.
Print 1976); ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT, U.S. NUCLEAR POWER EXPORT ACTIVITIES ch. 3 (ERDA-1542) (1976);

Brush, The Currentand Future Role of Agreementsfor Cooperationas the Framework/or International Nuclear Commerce, 18 ATOM. ENERGY L.J. 103 (1976).
Second, the Act required that commercial exports of nuclear equipment and material be licensed, with approval to be granted only if issuance of the license would not be inimical to the
common defense and security or to the health and safety of the United States' public. See generally Transnuclear, Inc., 6 Dec. Nuc. Reg. Comm'n 719, [1975-1978 Transfer Binder] Nuc. REG.
REP. (CCH) 30,247 (Nov. 10, 1977); Edlow Int'l Co., 5 Dec. Nuc. Reg. Comm'n 1358, [1975-1978
Transfer Binder] Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) 1 30,206 (June 28, 1977); Babcock & Wilcox, 5 Dec.
Nuc. Reg. Comm'n 1332, [1975-1978 Transfer Binder] Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) 30,205 (June 27,
1977). These standards conferred considerable discretion on export licensing authorities; as noted
above, however, in ruling on export licenses neither the AEC nor the NRC examined health and
safety impacts of proposed exports abroad. The NRC has recently taken the position in litigation
that in some circumstances the common defense and security standard (which has remained in
force even after the changes in U.S. nuclear export licensing standards wrought by the 1978 NonProliferation Act) may necessitate scrutiny of such foreign health and safety considerations. See
Defendants' Points and Authorities in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss, at 26-29, Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Hendrie, 2 Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) 20,125 (No. 79-2060, D.D.C. 1979). (All
U.S. power reactor exports and all but a small fraction of U.S. nuclear equipment and material
exports have been made on a private commercial basis. The remainder have been transferred
directly by the U.S. government, pursuant to similar export criteria. Telephone communication
with the Office of International Programs, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Dec. 21, 1979). See
42 U.S.C. §§ 2051, 2071, 2077, 2112 (1976). The authority to make such direct transfers was considerably restricted by the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2074d, 2094, 2111,
2141 (Supp. 1 1978).)
Procedurally, during the period of the AEC's authority, that agency had responsibility not
only for export licensing actions themselves, but also to a preponderant degree for the development of overall U.S. nuclear export policy. Inasmuch as only the former functions were expressly
transferred to the NRC, that Commission soon after its inception developed formal arrangements
for consulting with concerned Executive Branch agencies, including the Department of State, the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Energy Research and Development Administration (which succeeded to the non-regulatory functions of the Atomic Energy Commission
under the 1974 Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801, 5814 (1976)). See, e.g., Babcock &
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cipients virtually complete discretion in developing--or in deferring
the development of-technologies, standards, and timetables for postfission waste disposal programs. Indeed, the Energy Research & Development Administration's environmental impact statement on U.S.
nuclear power export activities, prepared in 1976, expressly excludes
consideration of the impacts of long-term disposal of the wastes produced from these exports in export-recipient nations, a clear reflection
26 3
of the U.S. laissezfaire approach to the issue at the time.
U.S. agreements for nuclear cooperation now in force (with two
exceptions)-all of which were entered into prior to 1975--did, in fact,
provide a mechanism for active U.S. involvement in one phase of the
export recipients' nuclear waste management decision-making by
granting the United States a right of prior approval over the reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent fuel.2 64 Prior to the emergence of the new
Wilcox, 5 Dec. Nuc. Reg. Comm'n 1332, [1975-1978 Transfer Binder] Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) 1
30,205 (June 27, 1977); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 3 Dec. Nuc. Reg. Comm'n 739, [1975-1978
Transfer Binder] Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) T 30,080 (June 21, 1976); Edlow Int'l Co., 3 Dec. Nuc.
Reg. Comm'n 563, [1975-1978 Transfer Binder] Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) 30,069 (May 7, 1976),
aJ'donothergrounds sub noma.Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 580 F.2d 698 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (per curiam). See generally Weiss, The Role of the NRC in Export Licensing, 18 ATOM.
ENERGY L.J. 85 (1976). These consultative arrangements were codified with some modifications
in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2155 (Supp. 1 1978).
263 ENERGY RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, supra note 262, at ii-iii, 2-11, 14I.
264 The U.S. has agreements for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy currently in
force with the following: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Finland, India, Indonesia,
Iran, Japan, South Korea, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, EURATOM, and the IAEA. See 3 REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT, note 190 supra (compiling current texts of all agreements). See also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, note 262 supra; ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, supra note 262, 3-91 to 3-124.
This approval right, though not mandated by the Atomic Energy Act, was included in all
U.S. agreements for cooperation, except the U.S.-IAEA Agreement, note 192 supra, and that with
EURATOM. Additional Agreement for Cooperation Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy, June 11, 1960, United States-European Atomic Energy Community, 11 U.S.T. 2589,
T.I.A.S. No. 4650, as amended May 21 and 22, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 1439, T.I.A.S. No. 5104, Aug. 22
and 27, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1459, T.I.A.S. No. 5444, Sept. 20, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 472, T.I.A.S. No. 7566.
See also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 262, at 11, 61B (Comm. Print 1976);
HOUSE COMM. ON INT'L RELATIONS, NUCLEAR ANTIPROLIFERATION ACT OF 1977, H.R. REP. No.
95-587, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 13-14 (1977), reprintedin SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ACT

OF 1978 426-27 (1979).
It may be noted that early U.S. agreements for cooperation signed between 1957 and 1970
(only a few of which are currently in force) provided for the reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent fuel
in U.S. facilities, either mandatorially or at the option of the United States, and apparently contemplated that the United States would retain the resulting wastes. See, e.g., Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, as amended May 21 and 22, 1962, United States
EURATOM 13 U.S.T. 2589, T.I.A.S. No. 4650, arts. III(E), III(G); ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, supra note 262, at 14-5. To date, the United States has not
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U.S. non-proliferation strategy, however, these approval rights were
not exercised to encourage any particular approach to post-fission
waste management. In practice, through mid-1976, individual export
recipient nations initiated reprocessing approval requests as, in their
view, the need arose. These requests, after review by low-level officials
within the U.S. government, were routinely approved upon verification
that the elementary non-proliferation controls specified in the relevant
agreement for cooperation would apply to the transaction.2 6 5 If the
reprocessing were being performed in a third country, the U.S. thereafter retained prior approval controls over the subsequent disposition of
the resulting plutonium by virtue of its agreement for cooperation with
that nation. However, regardless of where the reprocessing was to take
place, disposal of the separated high-level wastes from the reprocessing
was a matter left to the other nation or nations involved in the transaction.
Although the U.S. refrained in its bilateral nuclear trade relations
from actively encouraging the development of particular waste disposal
reprocessed any foreign power reactor fuel, whether under the earlier agreements or otherwise,
nor since 1970 has it been U.S. policy to offer reprocessing services for foreign power reactor fuel.
Telephone conversation with DOE Office of Congressional Affairs (Sept. 1979); ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, supra note 262, at 14-5. DOE and its predecessors
have, however, reprocessed some 1.1 metric tons of spent United States-origin research reactor
fuel and have retained the wastes produced from this activity. These wastes, commingled with
liquid wastes from DOE's reprocessing activities for the U.S. nuclear weapons program, are now
stored in liquid form at the DOE Savannah River facility. Telephone conversation with DOE
Office of Congressional Affairs (Sept. 1979).
265 The rank of AEC officials scrutinizing these approvals was verified with officials of the
Department of Energy (the successor to these AEC functions under the Energy Reorganization
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801, 5814 (1976)) familiar with these AEC practices. These officials also verified that the non-proliferation controls imposed were typically that the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency against diversion of nuclear materials to military purposes would be
applied to the reprocessing activity and to any separated plutonium, as appropriate, and, if transfers of spent nuclear fuel to another nation for reprocessing were involved, that the transferred
material and any resulting separated plutonium be subject to an agreement for cooperation between the receiving nation and the United States.
As a result of increased U.S. concerns over the connection between the availability of separated plutonium and the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons after mid-1976, see text accompanying notes 271-80 infra, U.S. controls over reprocessing by its export recipients were gradually
tightened and reprocessing approval requests began to receive attention from more senior U.S.
officials. During 1977, for example, the U.S. limited approvals to those cases where (1) reprocessing would take place in the U.K. or France (nations which already possessed nuclear weapons),
(2) U.S. controls over the subsequent disposition of the spent fuel to be reprocessed and/or over
any separated plutonium were clear, and (3) a near-term need for the requested reprocessing existed owing to limitations on spent fuel storage space. See Letter from Joseph S. Nye to Clement
J. Zablocki (Jan. 25, 1978), reprintedin SENATE COMM. ON GOV'TAL AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., IST
SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 1978, at 894 (1979).
Subsequent U.S. law and policy governing U.S. reprocessing approvals are discussed in the text
accompanying notes 275, 288-89 and 291-302 infra.
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programs, the U.S. during the pre-1976 period did engage in a number
of research and development projects with other nations in the field of
radioactive waste disposal and lent its support to the activities of the
International Atomic Energy Agency in this and other nuclear safety
and environmental protection areas.26 6 During this period, too, the
U.S. ratified the London Convention 26 7 and the Antarctic Treaty,268
both of which contain prohibitions on certain nuclear waste disposal
practices. 269 Through these cooperative and multilateral efforts, the
U.S. was broadly encouraging responsible disposal of post-fission nuclear wastes, notwithstanding its hands-off policy with respect to the
nuclear waste disposal programs of its individual nuclear export recipients.
Beginning in mid-1976, however, U.S. policy makers became increasingly concerned over the risk that nations might acquire nuclear
weapons by appropriating stocks of separated plutonium accumulated
for ostensibly peaceful uses.27 As discussed below, this has led to a
266

U.S. agreements providing for cooperation in the area of post-fission waste management

signed prior to 1975 include: Technical Exchange Arrangement on Radioactive Waste Management between the United States Atomic Energy Commission and the European Company for the
Chemical Processing of Irradiated Fuels [Eurochemic], (Jan. 31, 1973) (provides for cooperation
in the "field of radioactive waste management" but appears to be focused exclusively on the provision of U.S. assistance in the area of high-level waste solidification); Technical Exchange and
Cooperative Agreement between the United States Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal
Ministry for Research and Technology of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Field of Management of Radioactive Wastes (Dec. 20, 1974) (provides interalia for cooperation regarding the
disposal of radioactive wastes in salt deposits; retrievable surface storage facilities; waste solidification). K. HARMON, note 1 supra.
The United States has entered into a number of additional agreements for cooperation in this
sphere since 1975: Agreement between the United States Energy Research and Development Administration and the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority for Cooperation Concerning Liquid-Metal-Cooled Fast Breeder Reactors, September 20, 1976, as amended October 6, 1977
(amendment extends coverage of agreement to include cooperation in the areas of solidification of
high-level liquid wastes, interim storage of such materials in liquid form, and retrievable and
permanent radioactive waste disposal); Memorandum of Understanding-Arrangement Between
the United States Energy Research and Development Administration and Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., Relating to Information in the Nuclear Field, Annex 1 (Sept. 8, 1976) (provides for
exchange of information in the areas, interalia, of terminal storage in geologic formations (including characterization of geologic formations and development and testing of facilities); technology
of retrievable storage; waste processing technology (including high-level waste solidification); and
environmental effects); Agreement between the United States Energy Research and Development
Administration and the Swedish Nuclear Fuel Supply Company Concerning a Cooperative Program on Radioactive Waste Storage in Deep Geologic Formations, June 17, 1977 (provides principally for jointly conducted experiments on the behavior of granite under heat stress). Id.
267 See note 24 supra and note 350 infra.
268 Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780.
269 See, e.g., London Convention, supra note 24, at art. XII(d); Antarctic Treaty, art. V. See
also notes 349-56 infra.
270 See, ag., Export ReorganizationAct of1976: Hearings on S. 1439 Before the Senate Comm
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series of U.S. initiatives, as well as changes in U.S. law, aimed at discouraging the reprocessing of spent fuel around the world except under
the most stringent controls. An important element of U.S. efforts in
this regard has been to promote the concept of direct, permanent disposal of spent fuel, without the intermediate step of reprocessing, as a
means for effectively addressing the long-term radiation hazard posed
by this material. Thus, as discussed more fully below, although the
impetus for the new U.S. initiatives has been the desire to control the
spread of nuclear weapons, the intimate link between reprocessing, plutonium, and permanent waste disposal has caused the U.S. to involve
itself far more deeply than in the past in the waste management aspects
of its export recipients' respective nuclear programs.
Increased U.S. government interest in the disposition of U.S.-origin spent fuel first became manifest in 1976.271 In the summer of that
year, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in consultation with the Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
deferred issuance of a nuclear fuel export license to India pending further negotiations with that country over its future use of accumulated
U.S.-origin spent fuel.27 2 The underlying cause for concern was that in
May, 1974, India had detonated a nuclear explosive device using plutonium derived from supposedly peaceful nuclear activities, relying in
part on U.S.-supplied material.2 7 3 The 1976 negotiations were aimed at
developing arrangements for the U.S. to take back spent fuel irradiated
in the U.S.-supplied Tarapur reactors near Bombay, so as to eliminate
the possibility of this material's being subsequently reprocessed in India and its plutonium content thereby being made available for possible illicit military use at a later time. 74 Although U.S. take-back of
this material, has, to date, proven infeasible, the United States has in
the interim exercised its right under the U.S.-India agreement for coopon Gov't Operations,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 397 (testimony of Commissioner Victor Gilinsky), 565,
568 (testimony of Dr. Fred C. Ikle), 765, 768, 770 (testimony of Henry A. Kissinger).
271 See Edlow Int'l Co., 5 Dec. Nuc. Reg. Comm'n 1358, [1975-1978 Transfer Binder] Nuc.

REG. REP. (CCH)

30,206 (June 28, 1977) (especially concurring opinion of Commissioner Gi-

linsky).
272 Id.
273 rd.
274 The United States concern was that if at some time in the future the U.S. should decide to
terminate nuclear cooperation with India (in response, for example, to an acceleration of India's
nuclear explosives program), India might declare that it was released from the non-proliferation
controls contained in the 1963 U.S.-India agreement for cooperation (Agreement for Cooperation
Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, Aug. 8, 1963, United States-India, 14 U.S.T. 1484,
T.I.A.S. No. 5446) covering previously exported U.S. nuclear fuel and might thereafter reprocess
this material and use any plutonium separated in nuclear explosives. Id. (especially concurring
opinion of Commissioner Gilinsky).
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eration to hold up the reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent fuel.2 75 Thus,

while the United States' negotiations in 1976 were not aimed at the
radiological hazard posed by the Tarapur spent fuel, the U.S. initiatives
to limit reprocessing have substantially affected India's post-fission
waste disposal program, at least insofar as U.S.-origin spent fuel is concerned.
Of more far-reaching significance in 1976 was President Ford's
October 28 statement on U.S. nuclear policy.27 6 That statement officially expressed the United States strong concerns over the spread of
plutonium and technologies for its extraction and announced a number
of new policy decisions, in essence stating that:
(1) the U.S. would "no longer regard reprocessing of used nuclear fuel
to produce plutonium as a necessary and inevitable step in the nuclear fuel cycle;"
(2) the U.S. would defer domestic plans for the commercialization of
reprocessing;
(3) the U.S. would encourage other nuclear suppliers to exercise "maximum restraint" in the transfer of reprocessing technology, and
(4) U.S. nuclear waste management activities would include development of the capability for permanent disposal of spent fuel itself2 7
The policy statement also proposed discussions aimed at the establishment of an international regime for the storage of civilian plutonium
and spent reactor fuel and indicated that the U.S. was "prepared to
under the supervision of
consider" providing a site for such activities
278
Agency.
Energy
Atomic
the International
Although the Ford policy statement signaled what has, in fact, become an enduring shift in U.S. policy on these matters, the impact of
this change of course on the reprocessing and associated waste management activities of U.S. nuclear trading partners was not fully achieved
until after the Ford statement was ratified and extended by President
Carter. On April 7, 1977, President Carter's first major statement on
nuclear weapons proliferation made the Ford deferral of U.S. commercial reprocessing "indefinite" and proposed redirecting the U.S. nuclear
reactor research and development program away from plutonium-using designs.279 The President also:
(1) pledged continuing discussions with nuclear supplier and recipient
275 Id.
276 Statement by President Gerald Ford on Nuclear Policy, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc.
1624 (Oct. 28, 1976).
277 Id. at 1626.
278 Id. at 1628.

279 Statement by President Jimmy Carter on Nuclear Power Policy, 1 PuB. PAPERS 587 (Apr. 7,
1977).
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countries aimed at reducing the spread of reprocessing capabilities to
additional countries beyond those already possessing such facilities;
(2) proposed an international evaluation of the nuclear fuel cycle to
seek, on a cooperative basis with other nations, methods of reducing
proliferation risks posed by existing nuclear technologies; and
(3) reiterated the need for the U.S. to aid in developing alternatives to
reprocessing for eliminating the hazard posed by spent fuel. z8 0
During the ensuing months, various elements of the Carter policy
announcement gradually took more concrete form. On October 18,
1977, the Department of Energy announced the new U.S. spent nuclear
fuel policy, proposing to accept and take title to used nuclear fuel both
from domestic utilities and from foreign users, the latter on a limited
basis in support of U.S. non-proliferation goals. 28' At the same time,
the DOE announcement stated that the U.S. would encourage other
nations to expand their own storage capacity for spent fuel and would
support the study of regional or international storage sites.2 82 The
overall objective of the U.S. offer to accept foreign spent fuel, the DOE
announcement explained, was to enhance the United States "ability to
negotiate more effective non-proliferation measures with foreign coun2 83
tries and to prevent premature entry into the plutonium economy."
DOE indicated that it expected that foreign spent fuel would be but a
small part of the total spent fuel stored in the United States.28 4 To date,
this initiative has not reached fruition. No foreign spent fuel has been
accepted by the United States. z85
Also during October of 1977, the organizing conference for the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation proposed by President
increasing
Carter was held, launching a two-year study on methods for
2 86
technology.
nuclear
civilian
of
resistance
the proliferation
In the fall of 1977, the U.S. efforts to curtail the availability of
separated plutonium also had a significant impact on reprocessing activities in one foreign nation, Japan. Japan had anticipated start-up of
280 Id.

281 U.S. Dep't of Energy, DOEAnnouncesNew Spent Nuclear FuelPolicy,News Release R-77017 (Oct. 18, 1977). For a detailed analysis of this policy and its alternatives, see U.S. DEP'T OF
ENERGY, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, STORAGE OF FOREIGN SPENT POWER
REACTOR FUEL (DOE/EIS-0040-D) (1978).
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id.

285 No funds have yet been authorized for the construction or acquisition of facilities for storing foreign spent fuel in the United States. Nor have the preliminary studies which are the legal
prerequisite to U.S. acceptance of foreign spent fuel been completed. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2160(0,
2074a (Supp. I 1978).
286 See text accompanying notes 228-40 infra.
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its Tokai-Mura reprocessing plant at approximately that time.28 7 Inasmuch as the plant had planned to reprocess U.S.-origin spent fuel and

inasmuch as the reprocessing of this material was subject to prior U.S.
approval under the terms of the U.S.-Japan agreement for coopera-

tion,288 the United States had considerable leverage in establishing the
terms for the operation of the plant. After extended negotiations, it was
decided that the plant would be permitted to start up and reprocess a

limited quantity of U.S.-origin spent fuel (ninety-nine metric tons) and
that experiments in a facility adjacent to the reprocessing plant would
be carried out on technologies aimed at increasing the proliferation
resistance of this activity. The results of these experiments would then

be incorporated into the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation,
which by this time was under way. The agreement between the United

States and Japan on this matter, known as the Tokai Communique,
was to have a two-year term and will shortly be the subject of renegotiation.28 9

Also during the latter part of 1977, the Carter Administration negotiated with the Congress key provisions of pending nuclear nonproliferation legislation concerning the exercise of U.S. reprocessing
control rights found in then-existing U.S. agreements for cooperation.
This legislation was enacted the following March as the Nuclear NonProliferation Act of 1978.290
Prior to the enactment of the Non-Proliferation Act, no statutory
standard existed governing the exercise of this reprocessing approval

right. In practice, as noted above, reprocessing requests involving U.S.origin spent fuel were generally approved with little senior-level atten-

tion to the impact of such approvals on overall U.S. non-proliferation
goals. 29 1 Under the new legislation, section 303 provides that the Sec287 NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION FACTBOOK, supra note 184, at 201.
288 Agreement Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, July 10, 1968, United States-Japan,
19 U.S.T. 5371, T.I.A.S. No. 6520, as amended Feb. 24, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 275, T.I.A.S. No. 7306,
Mar. 28, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 2323, T.I.A.S. No. 7758, art. VIII(C)..
289 Joint Communique Concerning the Operation of the Tokai Reprocessing Facility, Sept. 12,
1977, United States-Japan, 28 U.S.T. 8008, T.I.A.S. 8734 (expiration date extended from Sept. 12,
1979, to Apr. 30, 1980. 44 Fed. Reg. 52741 (1979)).
290 For final text of this section of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, as enacted, see 42
U.S.C.A. § 2160 (1978).
291 See text accompanying notes 261-65 supra. In addition to its actions relating to reprocessing activities in India and Japan, see text accompanying notes 271-75 and 287-89 supra, the
United States in the spring of 1977 began to exercise more restrictively its right to approve the
transfer of U.S.-origin spent fuel from its export recipients to third nations for reprocessing.
Under the new U.S. policy, requests for such approvals were to be reviewed on a case-by-case
basis, with approval.contingent upon a clear showing of need, such as limited spent fuel storage
capacity in the nation requesting approval. (.S. Keys Okay ofForeignReprocessingto Continued
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retary of Energy in consultation with the Secretary of State and other
federal agencies may approve reprocessing requests, which are defined
to include requests to retransfer material to third countries for
reprocessing, only if he determines that such activity will not significantly increase the risk of proliferation.2 9 2 This section also specifies
that in making this determination, the Secretary shall give "foremost
consideration" to whether the conditions under which the reprocessing

or retransfer will take place will permit timely warning to the United
States of any diversion of the material for nuclear weapons purposes.2 93
As the legislative history of the Act makes clear, the concern of the

drafters was to limit national stockpiles of separated plutonium in
countries not possessing nuclear weapons.29 4 In such circumstances,
timely warning of diversion would be lacking, inasmuch as stores of

separated plutonium can be transformed into weapons in a matter of
days. Any warning of diversion would thus come too late to permit
diplomatic or other reaction to the diversion before the diversion had
achieved its objective-nuclear weapons. Timely warning, however,

may well be provided if certain institutional or technological approaches to reprocessing and plutonium use are implemented, such as
the storage of plutonium under international auspices, or its physical
commingling with other materials which reduce its weapons-usability.
The Non-Proliferation Act also provides opportunity for congressional

involvement in any decisions to approve reprocessing of U.S.-origin
spent fuel thereby emphasizing the degree of importance which the
United States now attaches to this matter.2 95
Reactor Usabiliy,NuCLEONICS WK. I (May 9, 1977); letter from Louis V. Nosenzo, Deputy Ass't
See'y, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Dep't of State, to
Jacob Scherr, Natural Resources Defense Council (July 1, 1977). As this policy evolved, the U.S.
added restrictions requiring that reprocessing be performed in France or Great Britain (nations
already possessing nuclear weapons) and that the U.S. be granted the right to approve any subsequent re-export or use of the plutonium separated by such reprocessing. Letter from Joseph Nye
to Congressman Clement Zablocki (Jan. 25, 1978), note 264 supra. This policy principally affected transfers of U.S.-origin spent fuel from Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and Spain to Great
Britain and France. Id.
292 42 U.S.C.A. § 2160 (Supp. 1 1978).
293 Id.
294 See H.R. REP. No. 587, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1820 (1977); S. REP. No. 467, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 467-68 (1977); 95 CONG. REC. H10280, 10282 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1977); 95 CONG. REC.
S1065, 1066 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1978).
295 42 U.S.C.A. § 2160(b) (Supp. 11978). See generally NuclearFuel TransferHearings, note 17
supra.

The Non-Proliferation Act also amends the Atomic Energy Act by adding a number of new
nuclear export licensing criteria. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2156, 2157 (Supp. 11978); Edlow Int'l Co., 7 Dec.
Nuc. Reg. Comm'n 436, [1975-1978 Transfer Binder] Nuc. REo. REP. (CCH) 30288 (Apr. 24,
1978). With one exception, the Non-Proliferation Act made no changes in existing law with re-
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As rigorous as the statutory standard is, in practice the Carter Administration has superimposed still more stringent standards in approving reprocessing requests involving U.S.-origin material. At present,
the United States will approve such requests on a case-by-case basis
only where a physical need for the requested reprocessing is manifest,

(as, for example, where spent fuel storage space is running out in the
requesting nation), or if the contract for the reprocessing for which approval is sought was entered into prior to the announcement of the new
U.S. non-proliferation policy in April 1977, atd then only if granting
the request will directly assist U.S. non-proliferation efforts.29 6
Under these combined requirements, the United States has thus
far approved reprocessing of material in the U.K. and France from Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and Spain.29 7 In approving these transactions, the United States has specified that the subsequent disposition of

the plutonium derived from such reprocessing is also subject to U.S.
approval.298 Complementing its tough position on reprocessing approvals, the U.S. government has taken.strong initiatives to encourage
nations to expand spent fuel storage capacity at existing reactors. 299
Under these initiatives Japan, for one, is providing storage capacity expansion at a number of facilities. 3°
U.S. restrictions on reprocessing approvals are also said to have
spect to the consideration of the health, safety, or environmental impacts of U.S. nuclear exports
including post-fission waste disposal. The sole exception is found in section 407 of the NonProliferation Act which specifies that in any new agreement for cooperation in the field of civilian
nuclear power the President shall endeavor to provide for cooperation between the parties in
protecting the international environment from radioactive, chemical or thermal contamination
arising from peaceful nuclear activities. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2153(e) (Supp. 1 1978).
While not an export licensing criterion, this provision, which would extend to contamination
from post-fission wastes, indicates congressional recognition of the potentially adverse environmental impacts arising from U.S. nuclear exports and the desirability of working with export
recipients to avert them.
The first U.S. agreement for cooperation to be negotiated pursuant to the terms of the NonProliferation Act (Agreement Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, July 5, 1979,
United States-Australia), however, does not address this subject specifically but states more generally in the Minute accompanying the agreement that "the parties have been engaging and will
continue to engage actively in international cooperation on international environmental considerations relevant to peaceful nuclear activities." Message of the President of the United States
Transmitting the Text of the Proposed Agreement between the United States and Australia Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Pursuant to Section 123d. of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended (92 Stat. 144) (July 27, 1979).
296 Nuclear Fuel Transfer Hearings,supra note 17, at 48 (statement of Joseph S. Nye).
297 Id. at 49-51. See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 25,347 (Apr. 30, 1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,167 (May 24,
1979).
298 Id. at 51 (statement of Joseph S. Nye) and app. 3.
299 Id. at 51 (statement of Joseph S. Nye) and app. 3, at 145-46.
300 Id.
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affected the Austrian referendum on start-up of the Zwetendorf nuclear
plant. Under Austrian law, arrangements must be made for ensuring
adequate post-fission nuclear waste disposal prior to the time of reactor
start-up. As this reactor was to be fueled with enriched uranium exported from the United States, concerns were raised during the public
debate on the referendum as to how the U.S. might exercise its controls
over reprocessing as this material began to accumulate in an irradiated
form at the Zwetendorf facility.310 It has been suggested that the difficulties experienced in establishing a workable arrangement with the
United States on this matter contributed significantly to uncertainties
as to Austria's plans for managing the post-fission wastes from this facility and that this, in turn, was a negative factor taken into account by
the Austrian public which narrowly disapproved the facility in the November 1978 referendum.30 2
In addition to the foregoing, another initiative which has been announced by the United States in conjunction with its spent fuel offer
has been the investigation of isolated Pacific islands as possible storage
sites for spent fuel from Pacific Basin nations such as Japan, Korea,
Taiwan and the Philippines. 0 3 Preliminary site studies of one island,
Palmyra, have been undertaken, and negotiations have been conducted
with the Japanese to determine the possible acceptability of the Pacific
island approach as a storage alternative for significant quantities of
Japanese spent fuel. 3" Although these investigations are in their preliminary stages, the island storage concept contemplates retention of
spent fuel for a number of decades rather than permanent disposal of
this material.30 5
In essence, therefore, U.S. initiatives potentially affecting the postfission nuclear waste management strategy of U.S.-export recipients fall
into three categories: (1) international discussions and cooperative efforts aimed at establishing a consensus on the desirability of alternatives to national reprocessing programs; (2) restrictions on U.S.
approvals of reprocessing within individual export-recipient nations
and of transfers for reprocessing to third nations, such as England and
301 Id. at 32-47 (statement of Janet E. Hieber), 83 (statement of Joseph S. Nye).
302 Conversation with Fritz Schmidt, Counselor of the Austrian Federal Chancellery (June 30,
1979).
303 See Dep't of State, Preliminary Studies of Possible Island Sites for Temporary Storage of
Spent Nuclear Fuel (June 14, 1979) (press background paper); S. REP. No. 205, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1979) (directing the Secretary of the Interior to report to Congress on plans or projects
affecting the territories and possessions of the United States).
304 Id.

305 Dep't of State, note 303 supra.
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France; and (3) proposals for the storage of foreign spent fuel in the
United States, including its possessions and territories in the Pacific.
While the motivation behind all of these initiatives, as noted above, has
been to curtail the risks of nuclear proliferation associated with the accumulation of separated plutonium under national control rather than
to address the radiation hazard posed by spent fuel, the impact of U.S.
policy has been to redirect at least the intermediate phase of a number
of national post-fission nuclear waste management programs.
While efforts to curb the separation and the recycling of plutonium
have been the most important U.S. initiatives affecting the nuclear
waste management activities of its export recipients, another development of particular interest has been the outcome of the long-standing
debate over whether an environmental impact statement must be prepared when the U.S. sells nuclear fuel, power plant equipment, or technology abroad.3 °6 If the environmental impact statement requirements
of NEPA were found to apply to these U.S. exports, then the adequacy
of waste disposal, which could have a significant effect on the environment, undoubtedly would have to be considered on a case-by-case basis
in determining whether such exports should be authorized.3 °7
President Carter, under pressure to clarify the scope of environmental reviews which would be required for exports of environmentally hazardous materials and technology, on January 4, 1979, issued
Executive Order 12114, which established U.S. policy on the international reach of NEPA.3 °8 Under the terms of that order, export of nu306 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976)
(NEPA). See also Robinson, ExtraterritorialEnvironmentalProtection Obligationsof ForeignAffairsAgencies: The Unfulflled MandateofNEPA, 7 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. 257 (1974) (although dated,
this article discusses the seminal State Department memorandum against the extraterritorial reach
of NEPA); Comment, ForthcomingCEQ Regulationsto Determine I)etherNEPA Applies to EnvironmentalImpacts Limited to Foreign Countries, 8 ENVT'L L. REP. 10, III (1978) (review of case
law, statutory interpretation and presumption against extraterritoriality); Comment, Reinvigorating
the NEPA Process:CEQ's Draft Compliance RegulationsStir Controversy, 8 ENvT'L L. REP. 1045
(1978); Note, 7he ExtraterritorialScope f NEPA "sEnvironmentalImpact Statement Requirement,
74 MICH. L. REv. 349 (1975) (examines limits on Congressional power, manifestations of Congressional intent, and policy considerations in reaching conclusion that NEPA has international

scope).
307 In the context of domestic reactor licensing, at least, such issues are considered as part of
environmental reviews. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1977) (Supreme Court upheld NRC procedures in enacting
rules providing for consideration of waste disposal and reprocessing in individual domestic licensing proceedings).
308 Exec. Order No. 12114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (1979). See also Concise Environmental Review,
Phillippines Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1,supra note 181, at I(B)(3) and Addendum 2. The first
Concise Environmental Review pursuant to Executive Order 12114 was released in September
1979 and considered the export of a power reactor to the Philippines. The review says nothing of
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clear reactors and radioactive waste management facilities will require
a full-scale environmental impact statement only when the export affects "the environment of the global commons outside the jurisdiction
of any nation" (e.g., the oceans or Antarctica). If the export may "significantly affect" only a foreign purchasing country or a third party
country, then one of two types of environmental reviews is required:
(1) bilateral or multilateral environmental studies of a general, rather
than case-by-case, nature, or (2) concise reviews of the environmental
issues involved in a short form, ie., a summary environmental impact
statement or analysis. Apparently, the Department of State will be required to determine which of these two procedures will govern nuclear
exports in particular cases. Nuclear fuel exports are exempted from
these requirements.
It is yet unclear how detailed the environmental reviews will be,
but first indications are that they will be only cursory. Litigation will
probably be used to test the adequacy of the procedures adopted to
implement Executive Order 12114, though the Executive Order attempts to limit the scope of litigation on this question. The Executive
Order may ultimately be interpreted to require a more detailed analysis
of the environmental dangers resulting from use of United States-origin reactors and waste management facilities including the adequacy of
disposal and storage techniques used by purchasing countries. The
Philippines Nuclear Power Plant Concise Environmental Review, the
first issued since the Executive Order, however, indicates that absent
judicial intervention or a major shift in current policy little attention is
likely to be paid to nuclear waste disposal questions.
Practicesof Other Free World Suppliers
Judging from the available evidence, the principal free world nuclear exporters other than the U.S. (France, West Germany, and Canada) have left the matter of safely disposing of the radioactive wastes
produced by their nuclear power related exports entirely to the nations
receiving these commodities, to be addressed according to the latters'
respective domestic health and safety policies and technological capaplans for disposal of post-fission wastes from the reactor, except to note that "Design specifications
for spent fuel storage facilities . . . are not available," and that, "Common to many countries,
especially those at the early stages of nuclear development, the Philippines has not yet developed
any plans for the longer-term handling of spent fuel beyond ten to thirteen years storage capacity
in the reactor spent fuel storage pool." This export license has been forwarded to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission for further consideration.
Procedures for implementing Exec. Order No. 12114 were issued on Nov. 13, 1979. 44 Fed.
Reg. 65560 (1979).
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bilities.

°9

None of these suppliers, for example, has required in those

309 This section is based principally on an extensive review of Canadian, West German, and
French agreements for cooperation in the civil uses of nuclear energy which provide for the export
of nuclear power reactors and associated fuel or of reprocessing equipment to particular nations or
groups of nations. A number of such agreements, however, have not been made public by their
parties, making a comprehensive review of such instruments for the purpose of determining their
treatment of nuclear waste disposal issues impossible. See, e.g., Agreement for Cooperation on
the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station, Stages I and II, Oct. 15, 1975, France-South Africa. This
agreement is listed in Table 2.2, Bilateral Agreements for Peaceful Utilization of Nuclear Energy,
by Main Supplier Country (governmental agreements in force by mid-1976), World Armaments
andDisarmament,in STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SIPRI YEARBOOK 40-41 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SIPRI YEARBOOK 1977], reprintedinNUCLEAR PROLIFERATION FACTBOOK, supra note 184, at 275-76.
In West Germany, a governmental agreement for cooperation is not a necessary prerequisite
for commercial transactions in nuclear technology with a given country. Id., note a. West German power reactor exports to the Netherlands, Spain, Austria, and Switzerland appear to have
been made in the absence of such agreements. See SIPRI YEARBOOK, supra at 43 (Table 2.4),
reprintedin NUCLER PROLIFERATION FACTBOOK, supra note 184, at 279. Any arrangements for
the disposal of nuclear waste in the case of such exports would, thus, not be revealed by a review
of West Germany agreements for cooperation. These knowledge gaps necessitate the qualifications to the conclusions in the text.
Six French power reactor or reprocessing plant export agreements have been examined:
those with Belgium, Indonesia, Iraq, Switzerland, Pakistan, and Korea, as well as a draft accord
with South Africa. Only Belgium and South Africa among these nations have, to date, actually
imported French nuclear power reactor technology. See WorldList of Nuclear PowerPlants,note
40 supra. Agreement for the Construction of an Irradiated Fuel Reprocessing Plant, Mar. 17,
1976, France-Pakistan (unpublished authors' copy); Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful
Uses of Nuclear Energy, Nov. 18, 1975, France-Iraq, [1976] J.O. 3654; Agreement on Cooperation
on the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station, Stages I and II, France-South Africa, supra (authors' copy
of unpublished draft believed to reflect final text); Agreement for Cooperation Between the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Commission on Atomic Energy, Oct. 19, 1974, KoreaFrance (unpublished copy provided by Korean Embassy); Agreement for Cooperation in the
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, May, 14, 1970, France-Switzerland, 811 U.N.T.S. 301; [1969]
Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, Apr. 3, 1969, France-Indonesia, 748 U.N.T.S. 87; [1966] Convention on Radiological Protection with Regard to the Installations of the Ardennes Nuclear Power Station, Sept. 23, 1966, Belgium-France, 588 U.N.T.S. 227.
In addition, France has entered into apparently unpublished agreements with Spain (which has
also imported French nuclear power technology), Japan, and Iran.
All West German power reactor agreements have been reviewed except the agreement with
the USSR which is apparently unavailable. The reviewed agreements include those with three
nations that have either imported or ordered West German power reactors (Argentina, Iran, and
Brazil), and two with nations which have not yet done so (Indonesia and Romania). Agreement
on Cooperation in the Fields of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, Dec. 5, 1978, West GermanySpain, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] 11133; Agreement on Cooperation in the Fields of Peaceful Uses
of Nuclear Energy, July 3, 1976, West Germany-Iran, reprintedin INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
FOR NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 431 (M. Muntzing ed. 1978); Agreement on Cooperation
Regarding the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, June 14, 1976, West Germany-Indonesia,
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] II 361; Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful
Uses of Nuclear Energy, June 27, 1975, West Germany-Brazil, reprintedin INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS FOR NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra, at 411; Agreement on Cooperation
Regarding the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, July 31, 1973, West Germany-Romania,
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I 1484; [1969] Basic Agreement Concerning Cooperation in Scientific
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of its bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements examined by the auResearch and Technical Development, March 31, 1969, Argentina-West Germany, 709 U.N.T.S.
197.
The author's review of available Canadian agreements for nuclear cooperation providing for
nuclear power reactor exports included all agreements with nations which have actually imported
or ordered Canadian-origin power reactors (India, Pakistan, Argentina and South Korea) as well
as other such agreements which have been published (Finland, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, Iran,
Sweden, Australia, EURATOM, and the United States). Agreement Concerning the Uses of Nuclear Material, Equipment, Facilities and Information Transferred between Canada and Sweden,
Sept. 27, 1977, Canada-Sweden [1978] Can. T.S No. 13; Agreement Concerning the Uses of Nuclear Material, Equipment Facilities and Information Transferred Between Canada and Finland,
July 16, 1976, Canada-Finland, [1976] Can. T.S. No. 27; Agreement for Cooperation in the Development and Application of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes, Jan. 30, 1976, Canada-Argentina, [19761 Can. T.S. No. 12; Agreement for Cooperation in the Development and Application of
Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes, Jan. 26, 1976, Canada-Korea, [1976] Can. T.S. No. 11;
Agreement for Cooperation in the Development and Application of Atomic Energy for Peaceful
Purposes, July 7, 1975, Canada-Spain, [1976] Can. T.S. No. 19; Agreement for Cooperation in the
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Jan. 7, 1973, Canada-Iran, [1973] Can. T.S. No. 2; Agreement
Relating to the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station and the Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Dec. 16, 1963, Canada-India, 528 U.N.T.S. 45, as amended Dec. 16, 1966, [1966] Can. T.S.
No. 27; Agreement for Cooperation Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy June 15, 1955,
United States-Canada, 235 U.N.T.S. 176, as amendedJune 26, 1956, 279 U.N.T.S. 318, asmodfed
May 22, 1959, 354 U.N.T.S. 63, as amended May 25, 1962, 453 U.N.T.S. 362; Agreement for
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Oct. 6, 1959, Canada-European Atomic Energy Community, 485 U.N.T.S. 187; Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy, Aug. 4, 1959, Canada-Australia, 391 U.N.T.S. 191; Agreement (July 2, 1959) and Exchange of Notes (July 27, 1960) for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, CanadaJapan, [1960] Can. T.S. No. 15; Agreement on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, May 14, 1959,
Pakistan-Canada, 426 U.N.T.S. 129; Agreement to Provide for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses
of Atomic Energy, Mar. 6, 1958, Canada-Switzerland, [1958] Can. T.S. No. 8. Hereinafter, all
bilaterial agreements for nuclear cooperation will be denoted by reference to their parties, e.g.
"Canada-Sweden agreement".
In the available nuclear power reactor agreements reviewed by the authors, there was a total
absence of discussion of rights or duties with respect to permanent disposal of the post-fission
wastes produced from transferred material and equipment. Despite the omission of some agreements from analysis, the existing documents support the view that such matters are similarly beyond the ambit of those unpublished agreements and quite possibly, of private reactor sales
arrangements as well. See also INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS FOR NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER, supra, at 344, 346-47 (only one French agreement is identified as addressing the issue
of "nuclear wastes," the Convention on Radiological Protection with Regard to the Installations
of the Ardennes Nuclear Power Station, Sept. 23, 1966, Belgium-France, 588 U.N.T.S. 227. In
actuality, even this agreement does not address post-fission wastes, as the term "nuclear wastes" in
the agreement refers to the radioactive effluents discharged by the Ardennes plants in normal
operation, not the post-fission wastes produced in the reactors' fuel.)
Many of the published West German and French agreements date from the mid-1970's-the
period when nuclear waste disposal was beginning to emerge as an important public issue in these
nations. The fact that this subject is not covered in any of these more recent agreements, allows
the tentative inference that it was similarly beyond the scope of earlier, unpublished accords entered into when neither public, nor governmental, attention had yet focused on the nuclear waste
issue.
In sum, the agreements reviewed reveal the practices of Canada, France, and West Germany
with respect to the post-fission wastes produced from their exports in many, though not all, instances. For reasons noted above, however, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the picture
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thors that, as a condition for receiving nuclear exports, recipient countries pledge to provide for the subsequent long-term isolation of the
resulting wastes or take other measures to protect their own populations, that of the supplier state, or global common areas from the harm-

ful effects of these materials. Indeed, although many agreements
clearly recognize that nuclear power reactor fuels are subject to handling after irradiation and may be reprocessed, 3 10 none of the agreements reviewed ever specifically mentions the subject of post-fission

radiological wastes or the permanent disposal of such materials or of
spent fuel.3 1 Similarly, there is little evidence to suggest that technology exports or other assistance specifically relevant to the management
or disposal of such materials is intended to be within the scope of the
bilateral nuclear cooperation offered by these suppliers.31 2
Nor has any of the above-noted suppliers undertaken through its
agreements to accept responsibility for disposing of the radioactive
wastes generated by its exports at an appropriate future time.31 3 Alprovided by these agreements is, in fact, fairly representative of these suppliers' practices in other
cases, as well. See also note 311 infra.
310 See, e.g., Canada-Iran agreement, supra note 309, art. IV(2)(b), requiring Canadian approval prior to the reprocessing of spent fuel produced through the use of exports transferred
under the agreement; Canada-Argentine agreement, supra note 309, art. 111(3), to similar effect;
West Germany-Brazil agreement, supra note 309, art. 1.
311 The evidence that post-fission nuclear waste management is beyond the scope of cooperation contemplated by Canada in her agreements with Argentina (1976), Korea (1976), Finland
(1976), and Spain (1976) is particularly strong, note 309 supra. In each, Appendix A defines with
great specificity what comprises "equipment" transferrable under the agreement, listing in considerable detail types of materitl designed to aid in nuclear fuel preparation and reprocessing; the
definition nowhere mentions, however, equipment useful for the solidification, storage, or permanent disposal of post-reprocessing high-level waste or for the permanent disposal of spent fuel.
Earlier agreements with Switzerland (1958), Pakistan (1959), Japan (1960), and Iran (1972), include in the definition of "equipment" items "of particular utility in research, development, use
" (Canada-Switzerland agreement, art. VI;
processing or storage relating to atomic energy ..
Canada-Pakistan agreement, art. VI; Canada-Japan agreement, art. VII; and Canada-Iran agreement, art. VI) (emphasis added) but no connection is made between spent fuel or post-reprocessing wastes and such "storage" nor is permanent disposal of such materials implied.
Similar evidence is provided in the West Germany-Brazil agreement, note 309 supra, that
cooperation on post-fission waste management matters was outside the intent of the parties. That
agreement provides for an unusually broad spectrum of cooperation, covering fields ranging from
prospecting for uranium, to fuel manufacture and reactor construction, to reprocessing of irradiated fuels. No reference of any kind is made, however, to post-reprocessing wastes, waste solidification technology, or to the permanent disposal of this material or of spent fuel.
312 See note 311 supra.
313 It is worth noting that the U.S.S.R. is said to require its Communist trading partners to
return Russian-origin nuclear fuels to Russia after irradiation. The underlying motive is said to
be to rule out the possibility of nuclear weapons development in those satellite nations. U.S.S.R.
Looks to Reactor Sales to Boost Prestigeand Pocketbook, Energy Daily, Nov. 7, 1978, at 2.
The U.K., which in the 1960's exported two small power reactors, one to Japan and one to
Italy, may be another exception to the general proposition stated in the text. Its agreements for
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though France and the U.K. have offered to reprocess foreign spent
fuel on commercial terms, as noted above,31 4 neither this, nor any other

program for treating post-fission wastes, is a mandatory condition for
receipt of exports from the principal suppliers mentioned earlier.31 5
Moreover, current reprocessing contracts with France and the U.K. apparently call for the return of separated waste products to the country
of origin, leaving the question of permanently disposing of such materi-

als entirely to that nation.316 Finally, like their export agreements, the
nuclear export laws and licensing practices of these suppliers appear
not to address the issue of post-export nuclear waste disposal.3 17
One important exception to this pattern are those nuclear technol-

cooperation of the period (Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy,
May 24, 1968, United Kingdom-Finland, [1968] U.K.T.S. No. 43; Agreement for Cooperation in
the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, March, 6, 1968, United Kingdom-Japan, 667 U.N.T.S. 229;
Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Jan. 19, 1960, United Kingdom-Spain, 404 U.N.T.S. 41; Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy,
Dec. 28, 1957, United Kingdom-Italy, 305 U.N.T.S. 357) specify that the United Kingdom Atomic
Energy Authority (U.K.A.E.A.) will provide reprocessing services for U.K.-origin fuel irradiated
in the cooperating country to the extent and on such terms as might be subsequently agreed upon
by the parties. The agreements do not indicate, however, how or where the high-level wastes
resulting from this reprocessing were to be disposed of. To the extent that the signing parties to
the U.K.'s agreements understood that the U.K.A.E.A. was offering not only reprocessing services,
but also the permanent disposal of the resulting wastes in Great Britain, it may be said that the
U.K. offered to take responsibility for the unwanted by-products of its export activities.
Britain has made no other exports of power reactors apart from those noted above and it
appears that, today, its reprocessing contracts call for the return of the resulting high-level wastes
to the nation contracting for such services. See Nuclear Fuel Transfer Hearings,supra note 17, at
87; Windscale Inquiry, supra note 124, at 17. Thus the British agreements of the 60's are something of an historic anomaly, with little current impact.
314 See notes 132 and 139 supra.
315 See text accompanying note 309 supra.
316 See, e.g., Nuclear Fuel Transfer Hearings,supra note 17, at 87, 89 (colloquies between Joseph S. Nye and Congressmen Findlay and Bingham on French and British reprocessing contract
with Austria); Agreement Concerning the GKT [Austria] COGEMA [France] Reprocessing Contract, reprintedin 22 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 36 (French specify that reprocessing will not commence
unless agreement is reached on waste form suitable for transport of material from France); Windscale Inquiry, note 124 supra (BNFL under contract with Japanese customer has option to return
waste which is in form suitable for safe transportation and to defer reprocessing until such form is
developed).
317 Letters to Sen. John Glenn from Carleton Kenyon, Law Librarian of Congress (May 24,
1979 and July 31, 1979).
In the case of France, there appears to be no statutory law governing nuclear exports. Id.
Since 1976, nuclear export decisions have been made by a senior Foreign Nuclear Policy Council
according to certain general principles which state, in essence, that (1) France is prepared to assist
other nations in the peaceful use of nuclear energy; (2) that its nuclear export policy will seek to
reduce the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation and that France will cooperate with other nuclear
supplier nations in this regard; and (3) that France will provide assured fuel supplies for its exported power reactors and, as requested, will also provide reprocessing and related services. Snai
Rapport No. 357 sur le contraleet laprotectiondes matibresnuckaires (May 30, 1979). The provi-
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ogy exports for which the IAEA serves as intermediary. 18 Under the
terms of the IAEA Statute, the Agency, at the request of the appropriate parties, may assist any member nation toward the peaceful uses of
atomic energy319 and "may arrange for the supplying of any materials,
services, equipment, and facilities necessary for the project by one or
more members or may itself undertake to provide any or all of these
directly ... ."I" For all such agency projects, Article XII of the Stat32
ute goes on to mandate that the agency's health and safety standards '
shall be applied, a requirement expressly included in the Agency's
agreements for specific projects with project recipients.3 23 General procedures for applying these standards to agency projects are today embodied in the Agency's Information Circular 18, revision 1 (1976) (the
Circular), with the standards themselves contained in detailed IAEA
sion of reprocessing services does not, as noted above, encompass permanent disposal of the resulting high-level waste.
West German nuclear exports, in contrast, are subject to statutory controls. These controls,
however, provide that only the "reliability" of the export recipient country and the impacts of a
proposed export on West German security and on that nation's international obligations in the
field of nuclear energy need be considered in authorizing exports. Atomic Energy Statute of 1959,
reprintedin 18 NUCLEAR L. BULL., Supp.
Similarly, Canada does not take into account in approving nuclear exports how post-fission
wastes from those exports will be handled by the recipient nation, according to Canadian officials.
Telephone communication with R.W. Blackburn, Secretary, (Canadian) Atomic Energy Control
Board (April 27, 1979).
318 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, art. III (A)(1), Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T.
1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873.
319 Id. at art. XI(A).
320 Id. at art. XI(C).
321 Id. at art. III(A)(6).
322 Id. at art. XII(2). See also id, art. XI (E)(3), providing that before approving any Agency
project the IAEA Board of Governors shall give due consideration to, interalia, "the adequacy of
proposed health and safety standards for handling and storing materials and for operating facilities."
323 Specific projects are the subject of individual "project agreements" with recipient nations
IAEA Statute, supra note 193, at art. XI(F). See, e.g., Yugoslavia-IAEA project agreement,
Agreement for Assistance by the Agency in Establishing a Nuclear Power Facility, June 14, 1974,
IAEA-Yugoslavia, IAEA INFCIRC/213 Part II (Nov. 8, 1974). Where a supplier other than the
Agency itself is involved, the supplier's participation may be set forth in a separate agreement
between the supplier and the Agency. See, e.g., US-IAEA Supply Agreement Regarding Yugoslavia Project, Agreement for the Supply of Uranium Enrichment Services for a Nuclear Power
Facility in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, June 14, 1974, IAEA INFCIRC/213
Part I. Or, the supplier's role may be reflected in a trilateral accord including the participation of
the recipient, as well. See, e.g., Agreement for the Transfer of a Training Reactor and Enriched
Uranium Therefor, Feb. 24, 1970, Mar. 12-13, 1970, IAEA-Argentina-West Germany, IAEA
INFCIRC/143.
In accordance with the provisions of article XII of the Agency statute, these agreements expressly provide that the provisions of the IAEA's Safety Standards and Measures, IAEA
INFCIRC/18 (May 31, 1960), shall apply to the respective projects they cover. IAEA-Yugoslavia
agreement, art. V and Annex; IAEA-Argentina-West Germany agreement, art. VI.
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safety issuances.32 4
In essence, this Circular specifies that the agency is to assess the
measures and procedures which the project recipient intends to implement to determine whether they will be adequate to "ensure the observance of the safety standards specified in the agreement between the
Agency and the recipient states" 325 which in practice are the Agency's
own standards.3 26 If the Agency determines the proposed measures
and procedures are adequate for this purpose, "the Agency shall agree
to the starting of the assisted project. 3 2 7 Where the project is a "nuclear facility," such as a nuclear power reactor, 328 and in certain other
cases, the Circular provides that information on "the quantities of
radioactive waste which are likely to be produced and the methods of
waste management to be employed" shall be considered in determining
whether to permit the sale.3 29 In other words, nuclear waste management is an issue which the Agency is to take into account in determining whether its safety standards can be effectively applied to a proposed
Agency project and, hence, whether the project should be approved.33 °
The Circular does not, however, state how much weight is to be
given to the waste management aspects of a proposed project in comparison to the other subjects it specifies as also "necessary to" the
Agency's safety decision. Thus, in theory, the Agency could overlook
deficiencies on the former subject, if it were satisfied other aspects of
the project were acceptable. Moreover, as of this writing, the Agency's
safety standards relating to the permanent disposal of post-fission
wastes are in only the preliminary stages of preparation. Hence, it
would be impossible for any candidate for an Agency project to
demonstrate that its safety measures would result in the effective implementation of these, yet unwritten, standards. In practice, therefore, the
Agency has not required recipients to possess a future permanent waste
disposal capability as a condition for Agency approval of a proposed
324 IAEA INFCIRC/18/Rev. 1, § 1(2) (Apr. 1976).
325 Id. at § 4.8.
326 IAEA-Argentina-West Germany agreement, supra note 323, at art. VI; Yugoslavia-IAEA
Project Agreement, supra note 323, at Annex; Agreements for the Supply of Uranium Enrichment
Services for a Nuclear Power Facility in Mexico and Agreement for Assistance by the Agency in
Establishing a Nuclear Power Facility, IAEA-Mexico, INFCIRC/203, Annex (Apr. 5, 1974)
(agreement for the U.S. to supply through the Agency uranium enrichment services and a nuclear
power reactor to Mexico).
327 IAEA INFCIRC/18/Rev. 1,supra note 324, at § 1(2).
328 Id. at § 1.5.
329 Id. at § 4.8. In INFCIRC/18, as originally adopted in 1960, the Agency was similarly authorized to require from project applicants information on "the methods of waste disposal."
INFCIRC/18, art. V(29)(b).
330 IAEA INFCIRC/18/Rev. 1,supra note 324, at § 1.5.
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project. Nevertheless, post-fission nuclear waste management on an interim basis has been a factor in the Agency's approval of its first two
power reactor projects, the Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1,
in Mexico and the Krsko Nuclear Power Plant in Yugoslavia. 33 1 The
project agreements for these facilities specify that the Agency shall consider the acceptability of the measures for the "handling and storage of
spent fuel after unloading from the reactor," the first phase of a waste
disposal program. 3
The day may still be distant when the Agency would reject a proposed project for want of an adequate permanent disposal program for
the project's undesired post-fission byproducts. It is, however, significant that the Agency has, in its principal safety document, already chosen to identify nuclear waste disposal as a subject relevant to project
approvals and has in practice scrutinized at least the first phase of
waste disposal in its two nuclear power reactor project approvals to
date. 333 If nothing else, the Agency's policies lend legitimacy to the
view that nuclear supplier and recipient, alike, have an interest in considering the waste disposal aspects of major exports at the time the arrangements for the export are being concluded. As the introductory
portion of the Circular states with respect to this and other safety issues:
The safe operation of nuclear facilities and the safe use of radiation
sources are of great importance to all persons connected with such facilities and sources, to the State authorizing their operation or use, and to
other persons and3 3States
that might be adversely affected by their unsafe
4
operation or use.

In light of this statement, the failure of the principal free-world
nuclear suppliers (and the United States may be included in this group)
to examine the nuclear waste issue as part of their respective bilateral
nuclear cooperation programs is noteworthy since, as important members of the IAEA Board of Governors,3 35 they have acquiesced in the
safety review requirements set forth in the Agency's Statute and the
331 See agreements discussed in notes 323 and 326 supra (the U.S. supplied the reactors for
these Agency projects).
332 See IAEA-Mexico agreement, supra note 326, at Annex; IAEA-Yugoslavia agreement,
supra note 326, at Annex.
333 See the agreements listed in note 332 supra.
334 See IAEA INFCIRC/18/Rev. 1, supra note 324, at § 2.2.
335 Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the U.S. were members of the
IAEA Board of Governors in 1976, when INFCIRC/18/Rev. 1 was adopted, and they concurred
in this action. IAEA GOV/OR. 486 (June 1, 1976). All of these nations, except for West Germany, also served on the Board when INFCIRC/18 was adopted. IAEA GOV/DEC/17(III)
(June 10, 1960).
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Circular, and presumably support their substance.336 Moreover, at
least two of these suppliers, West Germany and the United States, have
acquiesced in IAEA safety reviews of specific exports made through the
Agency, 33 7 indicating their willingness to have the nuclear waste issue,
among others, examined with respect to at least some of their exports,
though they have declined to undertake such examination in other
cases.

33 8

A number of reasons may explain why nuclear supplier countries
have been reluctant in their respective bilateral nuclear trade relations
to take up the waste disposal issue with their export recipients. None of
these reasons, however, fully explains why these suppliers have taken
such a decidedly different position with respect to exports made
through the IAEA.
Perhaps the prime explanation for the suppliers' avoidance of the
waste issue in dealing with their direct trading partners is that supplier
country governments have only begun to acknowledge the seriousness
of the nuclear waste disposal issue insofar as their own domestic nuclear programs are concerned within the past several years. This acknowledgment has resulted largely because of extra-governmental
political pressure, and only in this recent period have supplier nations
begun to accelerate domestic efforts to address the problem. 339 Most
agreements for cooperation pre-date this change in the pace of suppliers' domestic waste disposal programs.340 It is reasonable to assume
that when these agreements were drafted, supplier governments held
the same view toward wastes generated from exports as they held for
wastes generated at home, namely, that the technology for safe and
permanent disposal of these wastes would be developed in the future to
be available as the need for it arose. Accordingly, since wastes were
not a problem requiring immediate attention, there was no need to address their disposition in export arrangements.
Moreover, with permanent waste disposal technologies as yet un336 INFCIRC/18 was approved by the Board of Governors on March 31, 1960.
INFCIRC/18/Rev. 1 was approved by the Board of Governors on February 25, 1976.
337 IAEA-Argentina-West German agreement, supra note 323, at art. VI; US-IAEA supply
agreement/IAEA-Mexico project agreement, supra note 326, at Annex (containing safety review
requirements); US-IAEA supply agreement/IAEA-Yugoslavia project agreement, supra note 323,
at Annex (containing safety review requirements).
338 See text accompanying notes 259-63 and 309-11 supra.
339 See text accompanying notes 74-192 supra.
340 In the United States, for example, the major expansion of governmental programs for disposing of post-fission wastes dates from FY 1975, see notes 76-114 supra, while virtually all U.S.
agreements for cooperation with its current nuclear trading partners were signed prior to that date.
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION FAcTBOOK, supra note 184, at 274.
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demonstrated in supplier states, suppliers, had they sought a commitment from recipients to the safe disposal of export-produced wastes,
would have been seeking a pledge whose terms they themselves had
neither fulfilled nor even shown to be technologically feasible. In these
circumstances, recipient nations could fairly have questioned why their
right to go forward with nuclear power programs should be in any way
conditioned on the future disposal of produced wastes, while suppliers,
in view of their continued failure to implement comprehensive waste
disposal programs domestically, had obviously proceeded on a different basis. In addition, it has been suggested that recipient states perceive nuclear waste disposal and other hazards of nuclear power
generation as internal matters going to the exercise of their domestic
authority for the protection of their citizens and would view foreign
insistence on the implementation of specific health and safety measures
as an infringement of recipient state sovereignty. 34 ' Thus, even had
supplier nations come to the view that the future disposal of export
produced nuclear wastes was a topic worthy of discussion with recipients, fear of recipient resistance to such an initiative on the grounds just
noted could well have led suppliers to avoid pressing the waste disposal
issue during negotiations on nuclear trade relations.
Indeed, emphasizing the problems of the future management of
nuclear wastes during the course of negotiations with potential export
recipients would hardly have served the immediate interests of the supplier nation. Whatever the supplier's reasons for entering into nuclear
commerce-extension of nonproliferation controls, maintaining stature
as a leader in the nuclear field, improving payment balances, cementing relations with an ally, or wooing a new client state-to have
stressed an inevitable, increasingly politicized, and as yet unsolved
drawback to nuclear power would surely not have helped achieve this
objective. Within a given negotiation, moreover, supplier states may
well have had higher priority commitments (concerning, e.g., nonproliferation restraints) to obtain and may have been reluctant to burden the negotiating process with additional demands regarding what
they perceived as secondary issues.
Also militating against the implementation of conditions establishing recipients' responsibility for the safe disposal of nuclear wastes
through nuclear trade agreements or export controls has been the competition among suppliers to develop nuclear trade with particular recip341 See, eg., Hearingson Export-Import Bank Act Amendmentsfor 1978 Before the Subcomm.
on Resource Protection, Comn on Environment and Public Works, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-16
(June 20, 1978) (testimony of Marcus Rowden).
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ients. In such a setting, a supplier can "price himself out of the market"
by imposing conditions on such trade which go beyond those of his
competitors. Indeed, it was this perception which led a group of nuclear supplier nations, the so-called London Suppliers Group, to establish uniform minimum non-proliferation controls over their exports as
a mechanism for averting a bargaining process in which such controls
might be traded away by one or another supplier for commercial advantage? 4 2 These guidelines, however, do not establish a uniform position with respect to recipients' responsibility for nuclear waste disposal.
Thus, any supplier state seeking to include such terms in a nuclear
trade agreement could well be placing itself at a competitive disadvantage.
Assuming that some or all of the foregoing factors have influenced
these suppliers' thinking, there remains the question of why they have
nevertheless endorsed the IAEA's mandatory safety reviews, including
consideration of waste disposal issues. At a minimum, support for Article XII of the IAEA Statute and for the Circular would seem to imply
that these suppliers consider reviews of the nuclear waste aspect of exports to be desirable. This being the case, perhaps the most likely explanation as to why suppliers have provided such reviews solely in the
case of IAEA projects is that only in this setting did these suppliers
believe such reviews could be implemented at an acceptable cost politically and commercially. Recipient nations, as well as suppliers, it may
be noted, have ratified Article XII of the IAEA Statute and, by virtue
of their representation on the Agency's Board of Governors, the Circular.3 43 Recipients have thus, in effect, agreed in principle to prior-totransfer review by the Agency of the waste management aspects of exports made under its auspices. From the supplier point of view, this
means that many of the political strains alluded to earlier, which might
be triggered by supplier insistence on such reviews in the context of
direct, bilateral exports, would not be likely to arise when the Agency
serves as intermediary. Similarly, since all suppliers desiring to use the
Agency in this capacity for particular exports would be equally subject
to the Circular, Agency review of the waste management aspects of
such exports would not commercially disadvantage one supplier vis-avis another.
Although the history of nuclear cooperation over the past two decades makes it most unlikely that IAEA intermediation will displace bilateral cooperation as the basis for trade in the great majority of
342 See the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfer, note 190 supra.
343 See, e.g., note 335 supra.
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nuclear power reactor and associated fuel exports, the acceptance by
suppliers and recipients of the principle of the Agency's examining
waste disposal issues before Agency-sponsored exports are approved
may provide a basis for introducing consideration of these issues in the
context of bilateral trade. Where, for example, both a supplier and a
recipient engaged in bilateral nuclear cooperation have, through their
participation in Agency activities, indicated their support for the Circular and its subsidiary nuclear safety guides, it does not appear unreasonable or necessarily controversial for the supplier to propose that the
recipient agree to follow such internationally developed guidelines with
respect to the wastes produced by the supplier's direct exports. If such
recipients were to adhere to these guidelines, they could develop a
strongly rooted international consensus on the issue. Suppliers, it may
be noted, have obtained recipient adherence to another set of erstwhile
voluntary Agency standards, those concerning physical security measures for protecting nuclear materials against theft and sabotage, 3 " with
considerable success.345
TREATIES AND MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS

A number of widely ratified treaties and multilateral agreements
include provisions which restrict nuclear waste disposal activities or
otherwise seek to lessen nuclear waste pollution. While none of these
deals primarily with nuclear waste disposal, each demonstrates the
willingness of certain countries to be restricted in their freedom to pollute the global commons or frontier areas by multilateral agreement.
For example, the Antarctic Treaty signed at Washington, D.C., on
December 1, 1959, and ratified by a total of twenty-two countries
through June of 1979,346 is a broad document, limiting the exploitation

and use of the entire continent from a broad number of perspectives,
one of which deals explicitly with nuclear waste disposal.3 47 Article V,
section 1, of the Antarctic Treaty prohibits nuclear explosions in Ant344 IAEA INFCIRC/225 (Sept. 1975).
345 The major nuclear supplier countries in their Guidelines for Nuclear Transfer have adopted
the categorization of nuclear materials contained in the IAEA's voluntary guidelines on physical
protection of nuclear materials, IAEA INFCIRC/225, as the "agreed basis" for physical security
covering future exports. INFCIRC/254, Annex B. See note 190 supra.
346 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. 4780. States which are parties: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the
German Democratic Republic (with declaration), Japan, the Netherlands (including the Netherlands Antilles), New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania (with a statement), Spain, South Africa,
the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States.

347 Id. at art. V, § I.
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arctica and the disposal there of "radioactive waste material."3'48
Similarly, the London Convention is the leading international
agreement on pollution of the oceans and covers a broad range of issues on this subject.34 9 In its annexes, it deals specifically with the

dumping of nuclear waste in the world's oceans.35 0 Annex I, relating
back to Article Four's prohibition of certain types of dumping in the
oceans, states: "High-level radioactive wastes or other high-level radioactive matter, defined on public health, biological or other grounds, by
the competent international body in this field, at present the International Atomic Energy Agency, [are] unsuitable for dumping at sea." 3 5 '
The Convention allows for dumping of non-high-level wastes only
under special permits, with the added understanding that the Contracting Parties should take full account of the recommendations of the
IAEA in seeking such permits. 35 2 There has been some concern expressed that the Article 4/Annex I ban on dumping of high-level radioactive waste is itself weak since it relies on the IAEA's recently
recommended revision to its definition of high-level radioactive
waste.35 3 This definition of "high-level" radioactive waste is based on
immediate release and dispersion rates of the radioactive material, but
348 Id.

349 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes, 26 U.S.T. 2403,
T.I.A.S. No. 8165, enteredinto force August 30, 1975. See D. DeFSe, supra note I, at 68, 91.
350 The London Convention was developed in a series of four intergovernmental meetings in
1971 and 1972 and a Conference in October and November 1972. With fifteen ratifications or
accessions, it entered into force on August 30, 1975. See 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165, at
Annex I.
States which are parties include Afghanistan, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Rep., Canada,
Cape Verde, Cuba, Denmark (extended to Faore Islands), the Dominican Rep., France (with
reservation and statement), the German Democratic Rep., Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland,
Jordan, Kenya, Libya, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, New Zealand (not applicable to Cook Islands,
Niue, and Tokelau Islands), Nigeria, Norway, Panama, the Philippines, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia,
the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Rep., the Union of Soviet Socialist Reps., the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom (extended to Bailiwick of Guernsey, Belize, Bermuda, British Indian
Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Ducie and Oneo Islands, Falkland Islands and dependencies, Gilbert Islands, Henderson, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Bailiwick of Jersey
Montserrat, Pitcairn, St. Helena and dependencies, Solomon Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands,
Tnvalu, and United Kingdom Sovereign Base Areas of Akotiri and Dhekelai on the Island of
Cyprus), the United States, Yugoslavia, and Zaire.
Implementing legislation: Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052 (1972), as amendedPub. L. No. 93-254, 88 Stat. 50 (1974). For a comprehensive discussion on sea dumping and seabed disposal of nuclear wastes, see D. DEacE, note I
supra.
351 See 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165, at Annex I.
352 Id. at Annex I and art. IV.
353 See Statement of Clifton E. Curtis on behalf of the Environmental Defense Fund et al.,
Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
(July 1I, 1978) (concerning nuclear waste disposal in the oceans).
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it does not include criteria concerning the isolation and containment of
by4
wastes or minimizing the number of dumping sites, criteria espoused 35
some critics, including the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
However, EPA prodding has led to IAEA Advisory Group recommen-

dations which, if adopted, would amend the definition of "high-level"
wastes to incorporate these broader principles, thereby tightening still
further the restrictions on the ocean dumping of these radioactive waste

materials. 55
An analysis of the signatories to the London Convention and to
the Antarctic Treaty demonstrates that, while all the major supplier
countries are signatories to these agreements, with the sole exception
that Canada and Sweden have not yet signed the Antarctic Treaty,
many of the purchaser countries have not signed one or both agreements. 6 In other words, the supplier countries are more likely to
354 Id. (statement of Dr. William D. Rowe, Deputy Ass't Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency).
355 See, Statement of Clifton E. Curtis, note 353 supra. Statement of Dr. William D. Rowe,
note 354 supra.
356
Antarctica
London
Convention
Treaty
CANADAa
India
Pakistan
Argentina
South Korea

xb

NR

x

FRANCE
Belgium
Spain
Iran
South Africa

x
NR
x

x
x

FR GERMANY
Argentina
Netherlands
Austria
Brazil
Iran
Spain
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x
NR
x

x
NR

-

SWEDEN
Finland

x
x

-

UK
Italy
Japan

x
NR
NR

x

x
x
x
x
x

x

a Country names in upper-case lettering are nuclear support nations; listed beneath each supplier nation are its principal nuclear export recipients.
b x indicates that the country has ratified the treaty; NR indicates that the country has signed,
but not yet ratified the agreement under consideration.
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agree to restrictions on the use of the global commons than are purchaser countries, especially less developed purchaser countries. Pre-

sumably, supplier countries which have agreed to such restrictions on
their own waste disposal activities to protect the global environment

would wish to see their purchaser countries abide by comparably rigorous standards. Otherwise wastes from a supplier's nuclear exports
could cause the very harm the supplier had wished to avoid in ratifying
the anti-pollution accords. Supplier countries, however, have not
sought to influence purchaser countries to abide by restrictions on their

disposal of nuclear wastes by seeking assurances on this issue in nuclear fuel and equipment supply agreements.
A third agreement of note is the Convention on Third Party Lia-

bility in the Field of Nuclear Energy (the Paris Convention) ratified by

most of the OECD nations." 7 This Convention binds the signatories to

share in a portion of the financial liability for injuries arising from civil
nuclear accidents, including those arising from nuclear waste.358 It also
sets an upper limit of liability on the operators of nuclear installations
USA
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Germany FR
India
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Japan
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
Brazil
South Korea
Mexico
Taiwan
Yugoslavia
Philippines

x
NR
x

USSR
Bulgaria
German DR
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Czechoslovakia
Poland
Romania

x

Source:

NR
NR
x
x
x
NR
x

x
x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x

World List of Nuclear Power Plants, note 40 supra.

357 Doc. C (60) 93 (Final Text). Published at Paris, July 29, 1960, by the European Nuclear
Energy Agency, Organization for European Economic Co-operation, and Convention of 31st January 1969 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29th July 1960 on Third Party Liability in
the Field of Nuclear Energy.
358 See id. at arts. l(a)(i), l(a)(iv), and 7.
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and waste disposal sites.3 5 9 The shared liability for nuclear accidents
should give the signatories of the Paris Convention an incentive to cooperate toward assuring safe disposal of nuclear wastes.
The scope of the application of the Paris Convention to nuclear
waste, however, is very limited. Under articles 3(a) and 4(a) of the
Paris Convention, the operator of a nuclear installation is liable for
damage caused by a nuclear incident involving radioactive waste in, or
coming from, his installation until the operator of another nuclear installation has taken charge of such wastes. Facilities for storage of radioactive waste are among the installations to which the Paris
Convention applies, but disposal repositories are not referred to in the
Convention. It seems impracticable to consider that all operators in
whose installations the waste was last held before disposal into a repository would forever remain liable and would forever have the obligation to maintain insurance coverage under article 10 of the Convention.
This problem is dealt with in part by article 8 which limits the period of
liability of the operator to only ten years after abandonment of nuclear
waste. Further elaboration and expansion through amendment is
clearly desirable on the question of very long-term liability after a postfission waste repository were sealed and on the need to provide reserves
of money or substitute comfort to cover liability for centuries into the
future.
The Vienna Convention is an attempt to apply more broadly the
third party liability concept to any signatory nation, while the Paris
Convention is limited to OECD members.36 0 Though its terms apply
to nuclear waste,3 61 the Vienna Convention suffers from the same lack
of clarity as the Paris Convention with regard to long-term waste disposal. Article VI limits the liability of an "operator" of a nuclear waste
disposal site to the first twenty years after the abandonment of the site,
again raising questions as to the Convention's long-term applicability
following the closing of a post-fission nuclear waste repository.
Amendments to the Vienna Convention to clarify liability for damage
stemming from waste disposal are clearly desirable.
Although it does not allude to nuclear waste disposal, the Nuclear
359 Id.
360 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, openedfor signature May 21,
1963, IAEA Doc. LN-12/46.
361 Id. at art. I(l)(h)(ii). See text accompanying note 359 supra; and see especially art. VI(I) of
the Vienna Convention which limits liability to damage within ten years of a "nuclear incident"
and art. XXV(2), which allows countries to terminate participation in the convention each five

years.
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Test Ban Treaty3 62 is an example of a treaty limiting certain types of
nuclear activity. This treaty bars any nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water (including territorial waters or
high seas), or in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State
under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.363
Similarly, the currently pending Treaty between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation
of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests,3 64 the currently pending
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful
Purposes, 365 and the ratified Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu-

clear

Weapons 366

all place limits on the signatories' use of or experi-

mentation with nuclear materials.
The "Recommendation of the Council" of the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Redevelopment "For Strengthening International Co-operation and Environmental Protection in Frontier Regions" was adopted on September 21, 1978.367 It sets forth non-binding
guidelines for member countries to use when activities within their borders threaten to pollute the territory of a neighboring country. Among
these guidelines are: sharing with the government and public of neighboring countries any environmental impact studies on the effects of
border area pollution, the inclusion in environmental impact studies of
the impact on neighboring countries of polluting activity, and cooperation with neighboring countries in developing and implementing environmental standards. However, it does nothing specific to adopt or
advance standards for nuclear waste disposal.
These multilateral agreements show a willingness of nations to
362 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433 (1963). The U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, and U.S. are

signatories.
363 Id. at art. I (1)(a) and (b).
364 Signed on July 3, 1974, reprinted in DEP'T STATE BULL., July 29, 1974, at 216.
365 Signed on May 28, 1976, reprinted in DEP'T STATE BULL., June 28, 1976, at 802.
366 21 U.S.T. 438, T.I.A.S. No. 6839 (1970). See also Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 754, T.I.A.S. No. 7137; Seabed Arms Control
Treaty, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337 (prohibits emplacement, storing, and testing of nuclear weapons on the ocean floor outside territorial waters).
367 O.E.C.D. Doc. C (78) 77 (Final) of September 27, 1978. This Recommendation was based
upon earlier Council Recommendations; specifically, the Council Recommendations or Principles
concerning Transfrontier Pollution (November 14, 1974), on Equal Right of Access in relation to
Transfrontier Pollution (May 11, 1976), and on Implementation of a Requirement of Equal Right
of Access and non-Discrimination in relation to Transfrontier Pollution (May 17, 1977) appear
respectively at 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 242 (1975), 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1218 (1976),
and 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 977 (1977).
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deal with pollution and nuclear matters by treaty and convention.
While the developed countries generally have been more willing to
agree to the requirements of these agreements than have less developed
countries, participation has been broad enough to suggest that an accord on nuclear waste disposal might be feasible and worth pursuing.
CONCLUSION

A number of points have emerged from the preceding discussion.
First, the accumulation of post-fission nuclear wastes has become a
subject of public concern and political controversy in the great majority
of nations where nuclear power has begun to play an important role in
electric power generation. Such concern and controversy in many of
these cases threatens the continued use of nuclear power or its expansion, outcomes which could undermine efforts of these nations to decrease their dependence on imported oil as an energy source.36 8 In
addition, improper disposal of post-fission wastes can lead to serious
transboundary pollution and environmental degradation of global
369
common areas.
These risks notwithstanding, no nation anywhere in the world has
successfully implemented a complete program for the disposal of postfission wastes.3 70 To date, not one facility for the permanent disposal
of high-level wastes or spent fuel has been placed in operation, and in
many nations, including the United States, other major facets of nuclear waste disposal programs have yet to be decided upon or impleIn less developed countries with nuclear power programs,
mented.
moreover, planning for post-fission waste disposal often appears to be
rudimentary at best.372
Furthermore, despite the fact that all nations relying on nuclear
power confront a common problem in disposing of their post-fission
by-products and despite the fact that actions taken by any one of them
to deal with the matter may affect the safety and environmental interests of other nations, either directly or by contaminating areas shared
by all nations, international efforts to address the nuclear waste hazard
have been limited, both in terms of developing common technical solutions to the problem and in terms of establishing norms for the avoidance of international injury from the conduct of disposal activities.
368 See text accompanying notes 2-18 supra.
369
370
371
372

See text accompanying notes 22-26 and 69-70 supra.
See text accompanying notes 74-192 supra.

Id.
See text accompanying notes 179-92 supra.
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While, for example, the Euratom nations have agreed to the pooling of
information from national waste disposal research and development
activities and to the coordination of efforts so as to avoid duplication,
other nations with active R & D programs, including the U.S. and Sweden, are proceeding largely on their own, sometimes covering the same
ground. Similarly, although international organizations have developed widely accepted guidelines addressing a number of potentially
hazardous aspects of nuclear commerce, they are only at the preliminary stages of developing comparable guides for post-fission waste disposal. International agreements rule out disposal of post-fission wastes
in the global common areas of the high seas and Antarctica, but do not
appear to have addressed definitively the issue of transborder pollution
nor to have established affirmatively acceptable standards of conduct
for post-fission waste disposers.37 3
Nuclear export activities on the part of the United States, France,
West Germany, and Canada have, in a sense, contributed to the worldwide burden posed by nuclear wastes through the dissemination of nuclear technology.37 4 Yet these nuclear suppliers appear to have pro-

vided recipient nations with little in the way of technical assistance to
address this inevitable problem. Nor have suppliers sought pledges
from recipients that such wastes will be disposed of in an internationally responsible manner, even though (1) concerns have been raised as
to the adequacy of less developed recipient country disposal programs, 37 5 (2) exporters have demanded and obtained numerous other
guarantees concerning the use of exported nuclear technology, 376 and
(3) suppliers and recipients alike have endorsed IAEA documents
which, in general terms, recognize the hazardous nature of nuclear
wastes and the overall need for their safe disposal.37 7 Indeed, suppliers
have continued exports to nations which have so far refused to ratify
international agreements prohibiting disposal of post-fission wastes in
the high seas and on Antarctica-pacts to which the suppliers themselves have adhered-leaving open the possibility that wastes from nuclear exports will be disposed of in a manner directly at odds with the
policies of the exporting nation.37 8
373 See text accompanying notes 345-67 supra.
374 See text accompanying notes 259-345 supra.
375 See notes 28 and 181 supra.
376 Under all the agreements cited in note 309, supra, for example, recipients pledge not to use
imported nuclear technology for nuclear weapons. See also Guidelines for Nuclear Transfer, note
190 supra, under which exporter nations will require numerous guarantees from their export recipients.
377 See text accompanying notes 318-32 supra.
378 See text accompanying notes 346-56 supra.
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Finally, concerns that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would
be spurred by the spread of reprocessing capabilities and the accumulations of plutonium under national control have introduced major uncertainties into the post-fission waste disposal programs of many
nations regarding whether spent fuel will be disposed of directly or
reprocessed.3 7 9 These uncertainties are particularly acute in countries
for which the United States has been the principal supplier of nuclear
fuel inasmuch as reprocessing decisions concerning this material are
subject to U.S. approval. As long as the issue remains unresolved, increased reliance on interim spent fuel storage appears inevitable and it
is quite possible that ultimate decisions on reprocessing and, thus on
the direction of waste disposal programs, may be deferred until further
information on the need to recover the uranium and plutonium in
spent fuel is available.
This analysis suggests a number of areas where increased international cooperation may be fruitful in alleviating the adverse environmental-and political-impacts of post-fission wastes within individual
nations, between neighboring nations, and on commonly shared portions of the globe.
InternationalTechnical Cooperation
National efforts to address the problems posed by post-fission
wastes are likely to be aided by expanded cooperation among nations
on the technical aspects of this issue. Such cooperation would appear
to be a valuable, uncontroversial, and easily accomplished means for
achieving more efficient deployment of worldwide scientific and
financial resources devoted to this subject and, by fostering the exchange of information, could well reduce the time needed to develop
effective waste disposal mechanisms. This would yield obvious benefits
to all cooperating nations. Cooperative efforts could also prove beneficial because any proposed post-fission waste disposal plan supported
by the technical communities and governments of several nations
might enjoy greater credibility in the eyes of their respective publics
than proposals advanced by a single government. Improved national
programs for post-fission waste disposal would, in turn, lessen the risk
of radiological pollution beyond national borders.
A variety of mechanisms may be conceived for expanded international cooperation on the technical aspects of nuclear waste disposal,
many of them already tested in practice. These include general agree379 See text accompanying notes 91-97, 191, 276-89, and 293-305 supra.
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ments for the exchange of technical information, 80 jointly funded and
executed research and development projects,3 ' coordinated independent research and development efforts, and the funding of R & D activities to be performed under the supervision of international
organizations such as the IAEA or the CEC.382 As national programs
progress, one option which may merit further study would be joint
technical involvement in the first national repository to be built-be it
a "pilot scale" or full-size facility-where all cooperating nations
would share in the scientific data generated. Not only would cooperating nations receive invaluable technical knowledge, but their first hand
involvement in the project itself could enhance their credibility in addressing public concerns over post-fission waste disposal at home.
Another alternative worthy of consideration would be the initiation of a major international "study", modeled after the on-going International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation 38 3 which could attempt to pool
existing knowledge from various national sources, delineate current research needs, and recommend a coordinated attack on major knowledge gaps by the national research and development programs of
participating governments. The study could be reconvened periodically to incorporate new developments, gradually progressing toward a
definitive international consensus on acceptable waste disposal practices.
As noted, many of these cooperative mechanisms have been employed previously, usually on an occasional and ad hoc basis. A concerted effort to maximize international cooperation on nuclear waste
management issues, however, has never been mounted. In view of the
considerable importance of these issues to all nations seeking to rely on
nuclear power as a means for reducing dependence on foreign energy

sources, such a concerted effort may now be timely. Progress can be
made, notwithstanding uncertainties regarding reprocessing, by focusing on post-fission waste disposal mechanisms which could be used
both for post-reprocessing high-level wastes and spent fuel. Both the
U.S. and Sweden are already following this approach.38 4
380 See, e.g., AEC-Eurochemic agreement, note 266 supra; ERDA-U.K.A.E.A. agreement, note
266 supra.
381 See, e.g., ERDA-Swedish Nuclear Fuel Supply Company agreement, note 266 supra.
382 See text accompanying notes 193-223. See also NEA GROUP REPORT, supra note 58, at 68
("Geologic disposal is a primary candidate for [research, development, and demonstration] work
both at national and international levels.").
383 See text accompanying notes 228-40 supra.
384 See text accompanying notes 90-97 and 151-57 supra.
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Actions by Nuclear Supplier Nations

Nuclear supplier states may take a number of steps to reduce the
risk of transborder pollution and contamination of global common areas arising from the disposal of post-fission waste produced by their
exports. Most readily implemented would be an affirmative offer of
technical assistance by suppliers in all facets of post-fission waste management. This would provide the basis for recipients to implement disposal practices akin to those of suppliers and would offer the occasion
for suppliers, as they tendered such assistance, to encourage this outcome. Waste disposal assistance could be offered at normal market
prices, much as other nuclear technology is sold to recipients, avoiding
the need for significant financial commitments by suppliers. Unlike the
apparent situation today, however, suppliers would be acting affirmatively to address the international hazard (as well as the hazard to recipient nations themselves) arising from the unwanted byproducts of
suppliers' nuclear commercial activities.
A second approach would be for suppliers to seek assurances from
recipients that nuclear wastes from supplied technology will be disposed of responsibly. Such assurances could be sought informally
through consultations and other diplomatic exchanges, or could be
made a condition for further nuclear technology exports, although the
latter approach may be undesirable for a number of reasons discussed
earlier.38 Suppliers who are parties to the 1972 London Ocean Dumping Convention and the 1957 Treaty on Antarctica would appear to
have a strong interest in obtaining assurances from recipients which
have not adhered to either or both of these accords that they will abide
by the strictures of these instruments concerning the disposal of postthe effect of the supfission nuclear wastes so as to avoid undermining
386
agreements.
these
of
ratification
own
pliers'
Apart from suppliers' presumed interest in effectuating the purposes of these two accords, however, supplier nations, as world leaders
in the field of nuclear power and as the parties which have reaped the
profit from world nuclear trade, may be charged with at least a modicum of responsibility for the hazards which inevitably arise from their
exports. Where, for example, post-fission waste management practices
of a recipient nation were despoiling global common areas, the world
community could well hold a supplier country making nuclear technology transfers to such a recipient without regard to its waste disposal
385 See text accompanying notes 339-42 supra.
386 See text accompanying notes 346-56 supra.
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program at least partly to blame for the resulting harm. These considerations suggest that suppliers may have a legitimate interest in encouraging safe nuclear waste management practices on the part of their
customers and, accordingly, in seeking assurances that such practices
will be implemented.
It may also be recalled that suppliers and recipients through their
participation in the IAEA may be said to have broadly endorsed the
notion that recipient waste disposal practices may be considered in the
course of deciding whether particular nuclear technology transfers
should be authorized. 8 7 This fact would add legitimacy to supplier
requests for assurances on this subject and correspondingly weaken the
basis for recipient country objections thereto. For a variety of reasons
noted earlier, unilateral action by individual suppliers may be an unattractive approach to guaranteeing nuclear waste disposal safety on the
part of recipients.38 8 Most salient, perhaps, is that such actions may
prove ineffectual if recipients are free to turn to alternate suppliers not
seeking this additional constraint on their conduct. This suggests that
multilateral efforts, either on the part of suppliers as a group, following
the approach of the London Suppliers Group nonproliferation guidelines,38 9 or in a wider context, such as through an international accord,
may be a more fruitful alternative for implementing norms concerning
acceptable post-fission waste disposal methods.
A final option for supplier action to alleviate the risks of international pollution from the post-fission wastes produced by exported nuclear technology would be for suppliers to assume responsibility for
disposing of such materials by taking them back, much as the United
States has offered to do on a limited basis. Such proposals, however,
are likely to encounter considerable domestic opposition within supplier nations and, accordingly, to be difficult to implement. They may,
however, stand a greater chance of gaining public acceptance if they
are perceived as conferring a benefit, in addition to a reduction of
world-wide post-fission waste pollution risks, on the supplier state, for
example, by diminishing the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation.
In this context, supplier take-back of spent fuel would appear more
likely to achieve public acceptance than retention in supplier countries
of post-reprocessing high-level waste.39 °
387
388
389
390

See
See
See
See

text accompanying notes 318-34 supra.
text accompanying notes 339-42 supra.
note 190 supra.
text accompanying notes 281-85 supra.
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InternationalAgreements, Guidelines,and Storage Arrangements

Although the discussion immediately preceding has focused on
possible future transboundary and global common area pollution by
nuclear recipient nations, such harms can arise from the conduct of any
nation using nuclear power, including the principal nuclear suppliers
themselves and other states with indigenous nuclear programs. For this
reason, efforts to lessen the risks of such pollution which focus exclusively on nuclear importer nations will, at best, be only partially effective in addressing this issue. Accordingly, while concerted supplier
action to seek recipient assurances regarding future waste disposal
practices could well prove beneficial, if only in a limited sphere, the
remainder of this article will focus on more comprehensive international approaches to this subject.
Undoubtedly the most effective means for minimizing cross-border global common area pollution from post-fission wastes would be
wide-scale adherence to a treaty or international convention on this
subject which set forth the duty of adherents to avoid nuclear waste
pollution beyond their borders. As noted above, such accords for protecting global common areas have for a number of years been open for
ratification. Unfortunately, a large number of nuclear power user
states have not yet ratified these instruments. Encouraging adherence
by these nations is obviously desirable.
It may also be noted, however, that since these accords involve
many issues apart from nuclear waste disposal, nonadherence in these
cases may not necessarily signify opposition to the conventions' restrictions on this activity. This fact suggests an additional approach which
might be fruitful, namely, an initiative, perhaps under the auspices of
the IAEA, to obtain less formal undertakings from nonadherents to the
London Convention and the Antarctic Treaty to the effect that they
intend to act in consonance with the prohibitions in these accords regarding post-fission waste disposal. This could reduce risks of global
common area pollution from these materials while not affecting other
objections which nonadherents may have to these accords. A precedent
for such defacto adherence to international agreements concerning nuclear technology, it may be noted, is France's undertaking to behave as
though it had ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, even though it has not, in fact, formally adhered to that instrument.391
391 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, note 366 supra; Hearingson the Second Nuclear Non-Prolferation Treaty Review Conference before the Subcomm. on Int'l Security

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

1:569(1979)

Accords also exist concerning third party liability for nuclear accidents with impacts in foreign nations.3 92 The Paris and Vienna Conventions specifically address third-party liability for injuries resulting
from nuclear waste and cover injuries from interim waste storage and
the first years of long-term disposal. This is an excellent beginning and
could be followed up with amendments to the Paris and Vienna Conventions clarifying long-term coverage of injury resulting from permanent post-fission waste disposal. Neither convention, however,
specifically addresses the development of strict nuclear waste disposal
standards.39 3 More brQadly, accords concerning transboundary pollution, generally, do not address the specific issue of pollution from postfission radioactive wastes.39 4 Extending the coverage of both types of
accords to include long-term post-fission waste contamination may well
be a practical approach to reducing the risk of cross-border pollution
from these materials inasmuch as these agreements already embody a
recognition of the general class of hazard posed by such radioactive
wastes and set forth rights and duties for alleviating such hazards, either through compensation of resulting injuries or by direct reduction
of the hazard itself.
Development of an entirely new international accord to cover
transborder and global common area pollution from post-fission wastes
may thus be unnecessary. In addition, development of such a new accord would likely be considerably more protracted both for the time
needed to negotiate its text and for obtaining formal ratifications, than
would be the case if the initiatives suggested above, based on the
framework of existing accords, were pursued.
An additional approach for achieving international agreement on
basic standards for disposing of post-fission waste so as to reduce the
dangers of international pollution would be the promulgation by the
International Atomic Energy Agency of guidelines covering this field to
which IAEA member states could adhere on a voluntary basis. This
approach has proven successful in the areas of international transportation of radioactive materials and in the implementation of physical security standards against illicit seizure of nuclear materials by terrorists
or other subnational groups.39 5 In both instances the Agency's guidelines have gained virtually universal acceptance by nations with nuand Scientfc Affairs and on Int'lEconomic Policy and Trade ofthe House ForeignAffairs Comm.,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (July 16, 1979) (testimony of Charles Van Doren).
392 See text accompanying notes 357-61 supra.
393 Id.
394 See text accompanying note 367 supra.
395 See note 204 supra.
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clear programs. Significantly, because the development of such guides
takes place as part of the on-going business of the Agency, avoiding the
need for formal treaty negotiations, and because adherence to such
guides does not entail the formal processes mandated for treaty ratification, this approach could prove more efficient in establishing an international consensus on post-fission waste disposal than the development
of a new convention on the subject or even the extension of existing
conventions to encompass this area.
While the Agency, as noted earlier, is still in the early stages of
developing its technical safety standards for post-fission waste disposal,396 the voluntary guidelines, if worded broadly in terms of basic
principles and performance standards, could be promulgated in advance of the completion of these detailed safety standards and revised
in the future to incorporate the standards, as needed. To provide an
example, the guidelines when first issued might include a statement
that post-fission wastes are to be disposed of in a manner which will not
cause injury beyond the border of the disposing nation and that use of
geologic repositories for disposal under conditions which ensure repository integrity for a minimum period of time-perhaps 10,000 years-is
an acceptable disposal mechanism.
As noted above, Working Group 7 of the International Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Evaluation will apparently endorse accelerated development of internationally agreed upon codes and standards for postfission waste disposal.397 This broad support should give added impetus to the IAEA's work on this promising approach for lessening the
risk of international contamination from these materials. It is worth
noting in this regard that as international standards are developed they
could prove most valuable in aiding individual nations in the development of their domestic nuclear waste disposal programs, on the one
hand providing guidance to those nations with programs and standards
in the early stages of evolution, and on the other, enhancing the credibility before domestic publics of more developed programs which conform to such standards.
Finally, on-going international efforts to develop joint spent fuel
storage facilities may also play an important role in curtailing the risks
of transboundary and global commons pollution. Since, for example,
the concept of such facilities will inevitably entail one nation's playing
host to the facility-and thus to the wastes of other nations-safety
conditions are likely to be especially rigorous; absent such conditions, it
396
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is hard to imagine the public in a potential host country, already concerned over the management of domestically produced wastes, accepting additional radioactive materials from abroad. The stringency
of waste management safety standards in other nations participating in
such a joint storage facility, conversely, might vary across a wide range.
On balance, therefore, placement of post-fission wastes in multilateral
facilities is likely to provide a high degree of protection against pollution for all stored materials, whereas retaining the materials under the
national programs of the respective participating nations might not
provide comparable protection in all cases. Even assuming that the
multilateral facility provided only interim storage, rather than a permanent disposal capability, a net benefit in terms of reducing the risk of
radioactive pollution over the short run could still be achieved.
As noted above, moreover, cooperation in the development of international post-fission wastes storage facilities is likely to aid in the
development of an international consensus on acceptable longer term
disposal mechanisms.3 9 8 Thus in addition to their contribution to nonproliferation objectives, multinational spent fuel storage facilities could
aid in a number of respects in reducing the risk of international radioactive pollution from post-fission wastes, assuming political and other
obstacles can be overcome.
The foregoing analysis indicates that while national and international activities for disposing of post-fission wastes today remain unfinished, and in some cases rudimentary, a wide range of international
cooperative initiatives would appear to be available for helping to address the political, health, safety, and environmental risks posed by
these materials. Some of these initiatives, at least, would seem relatively uncontroversial and fairly easy to implement; and, in some instances, work is already underway to bring them to fruition.
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